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ABSTRACT 
Adam Bledsoe: Defender Nosso Pedaço de Chão: Quilombola Struggles in Bahia 
(Under the direction of Alvaro Reyes and Altha Cravey) 
This research examines the territorial understandings and practices of three “quilombo” 
communities in the state of Bahia, Brazil, as they seek to protect their way of life amidst a series 
of land grabs enacted by public and private actors.  These quilombos, which were started by 
slaves and runaway slaves over two hundred years ago, are located in the Bay of Aratu—an area 
that took on national importance as a site of industry and shipping in the mid-
20th century.  Because of this, the communities have spent nearly sixty years struggling to defend 
their territories against the enclosures, environmental degradation, and irreversible topographical 
changes that typify state, military, and industrial presence in the area.  While the tactics and 
discourses employed by the quilombos reflect the realities of present-day Brazil and attend to the 
shortcomings of the country’s “progressive” government, I argue that the quilombola struggle is 
part of a much larger legacy of Black Geographies.  I define Black Geographies as the spatial 
expressions of those that recognize the inherent violence of modern territorial practices and 
notions of human hierarchy and seek to create a world not defined in these exclusive 
terms.  Using qualitative and participatory methods, I explore the ways in which the Quilombos 
from the Bay of Aratu analyze the oppressive qualities of Brazil’s prevailing political and 
economic climate and how the communities’ own territorial arrangements work to protect 
against these violent expressions while simultaneously creating geographies that value and 
promote Black life. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation takes its title from the lyrics of the Anthem of the Campaign for Fishing 
Territory1.  The song begins Chegou a hora de defender/Nosso pedaço de chão/A terra é nossa 
isso por direito/Respeite nossa tradição/A nossa luta é por terra e água/Do litoral ao 
sertão/Lutamos juntos por igualdade/Com liberdade garantir o pão2 (Neves et al. 2012).  Often 
repeated at quilombo3 meetings and actions, these few phrases touch on many of the aspects of 
what it means to exist as a quilombola in Bahia, Brazil.  As the following pages will show, the 
struggle over land, water, territory, and what it means to exist as a quilombola in Brazil remain 
central components of the lives of the three communities I profile.  The quilombos of Rio dos 
Macacos, Tororó, and Ilha de Maré, all located in the Bay of Aratu—which forms a part of the 
much larger All Saints’ Bay—have existed for centuries in the area and in that time have 
defended against the various iterations of anti-Blackness that have manifested themselves in 
Bahia.  This work seeks to contextualize the quilombos in the present Latin American moment 
while also demonstrating how the quilombos continue the tradition of Radical Black struggle 
                                                          
1 This is the official anthem of the Fisherman and Fisherwoman’s Movement—a national movement aimed at 
regulating fishing territories for traditional communities. 
 
2 The time has arrived to defend/Our piece of ground/The land is ours by right/Respect our tradition/Our struggle 
is for land and water/From the littoral to the interior/We struggle together for equality/With liberty guaranteeing 
bread 
 
3 The word quilombo is of African origin and has had several significations throughout the history of Brazil.  During 
the days of slavery, quilombos were understood legally and colloquially as settlements of escaped slaves.  As I 
show in this dissertation, the word (and concept) has been subsequently picked up over generations to signify 
various things.  What has remained constant throughout the history of the word, however, is the connotation of a 
space inhabited by Black peoples and an attendant set of unique cultural and productive practices. 
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which is a phenomenon central to the modern epoch.  Specifically, I argue that the Quilombos 
from the Bay of Aratu evidence the continuation of marronage—the establishment and protection 
of Black space and politics and independence from modernity’s anti-Blackness—in the present
moment.  Before discussing chapter order and content, I first explain the background to this 
project, my positionality in Bahia, and my methodology and framework. 
Project Background 
I have been spending time in Bahia on and off for almost eight years.  My first trip there 
took place in 2008 during which time I had an internship with a local NGO.  In many ways this 
initial trip set the stage for my interests that have since become research questions and, now, this 
dissertation.  Early on in my time in Salvador I became fascinated by the inequities I witnessed 
daily, as I was able to travel between the wealthier inner city, where I lived during that time, and 
the lower-income, auto-constructed neighborhoods on the city’s periphery, where I had many 
friends.  While issues like the income gap and police violence seemed to be regular topics of 
conversation among the people with whom I was familiar, questions of race and racial inequality 
were constantly approached with caution.  It was constantly explained to me that racism was not 
so much a problem as was income inequality and the difficulties that that brought.  Despite the 
denial that race was a conditioning factor of Brazilian society, I remained interested in the topic 
as I saw it manifest spatially in where people were and were not expected to be, how they were 
expected to behave, and how they were treated by their fellow citizens and the police.  With this 
in mind, I came to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill planning to study the spatial 
aspects of Brazilian racism and racial violence. 
 At the University of North Carolina I found a community of scholars that were not only 
interested in questions similar to the ones I was asking, but willing and eager to interrogate them 
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in their various permutations.  Among the different seminars, reading groups, conferences, 
lectures, and informal conversations I had in Chapel Hill I began to slowly piece together a 
framework for analyzing what I had seen and heard while in Brazil.  In particular, the reading 
lists and seminars offered by Dr. Alvaro Reyes played a vital role in my understanding of the 
issues of anti-Blackness and Black political movements.  It is unsurprising that a great many of 
the works I draw on in this dissertation are pieces that I read in Dr. Reyes’ seminars and the 
independent studies I conducted with him during my time in Chapel Hill.  The strategically 
picked constellation of readings, along with the various conversations we had on the topic, 
helped me to make sense of the racism I saw firsthand in Brazil.  The continuing relevance of 
colonialism and the Middle Passage to our present world presented itself to me in the works of 
(among others) Frantz Fanon, Carlo Galli, Sylvia Wynter, and Carl Schmitt.  That anti-Blackness 
can exist in a country with a majority Black population became much clearer to me after reading 
the works of Jared Sexton, João Vargas, and Frank Wilderson.  The centrality of territory and 
subjects’ territorialities to creative struggle was made evident to me in Dr. Reyes’ own work, as 
well as the writings of the various Latin American movements I was introduced to in his 2012 
Global Crisis, Global Spring? course. 
In addition to the courses, independent studies, and conversation with Dr. Reyes on these 
topics, I was able to hone my thoughts through a variety of reading groups with my fellow 
graduate students.  Meeting to discuss geographical approaches to race in the work of Ruth 
Gilmore and Laura Pulido, and examinations of biopower in the work of Michel Foucault helped 
to sharpen my analysis of how power takes shape geographically and corporeally.  Finally, but 
certainly not least importantly, my seminars with Dr. Sara Smith and Dr. Banu Gökariksel 
introduced me to issues of gender and violence as they pertain to geography.  The work of Heidi 
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Nast, Jacques Rancière, Arun Saldanha, and Hannah Arendt stand out among the readings from 
Dr. Smith’s 2011 course and Dr. Gokariksel’s 2013 class that have come to bear on my current 
line of thinking.  From the readings, courses, and conversations mentioned here, I came to the 
conclusion that our world is continuing to feel the effects of a violent hierarchical ordering that 
was inaugurated with European colonization of the globe.  Despite the devastation that has 
followed us into the present moment, I came to see glimmers of hope from the most oppressed 
sectors of society who, by recognizing the violent underpinnings of the modern world, take it 
upon themselves to lay the foundations for entirely new existences.  The list of authors and 
interlocutors above is not meant to be exhaustive, nor is it meant as an attempt to prove my depth 
as a scholar.  Rather, I describe those that have influenced me as an insight into the nature of the 
texts I have drawn on in the present work and the lines of argument I employ. 
 Of course, learning is constantly occurring outside the halls of the university, and my 
experience researching race, racism, and Black struggle in Brazil was no exception.  Despite not 
becoming familiar with the Quilombos of the Bay of Aratu until relatively late in my graduate 
school career, I did continue yearly trips to Bahia with the intention of familiarizing myself with 
the dialect of Portuguese spoken in Bahia and meeting people active in Black political organizing 
in Salvador.  After speaking to a number of activists, it quickly became clear to me that, while 
the majority of the city of Salvador was of African descent, to self-identify as Black was nothing 
short of a political statement.1  This was, I learned, a product of Brazilian anti-Blackness, as 
Brazilians of African descent were actively discouraged from identifying as Black.  Instead, 
Afro-Brazilians were conditioned to aspire to whiteness; that is, they were encouraged to adopt 
white aesthetic norms and disassociate themselves from outwardly “black” religious, cultural, 
                                                          
1 The word used by those who self-affirm in this way is negro or negra as opposed to preto or preta—a word often 
used to describe people of very dark complexion. 
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and political expressions.  This was, unsurprisingly, rejected by the activists with whom I was 
familiar.  Instead, they affirmed their status as Black Brazilians, pointing out that Brazilians of 
African descent suffered greatly from numerous forms of state and non-state violence and 
insisting that these racial problems needed amelioration.  As I became increasingly familiar with 
the critiques put forward by these activists I began to look for instances of community building 
and creative expressions of Black politics in the city.  It was my connection with the Federal 
University of Bahia and, subsequently, the quilombos of Bahia, that would introduce me to the 
creative elements of Black struggle as they manifest themselves in Brazil. 
 When the Brazilian geographer Carlos Walter Porto Gonçalves came to Chapel Hill as 
part of the Geography Department’s colloquium series organized by Dr. Reyes, I, along with a 
number of other graduate students, was able to discuss his work and the state of social 
movements in Latin America.  During one of our meetings, I asked him about Quilombo Rio dos 
Macacos, as I had become familiar with their situation from the Black activists in Salvador.  Dr. 
Porto Gonçalves confirmed that he was personally familiar with them and that he knew a number 
of people in the Department of Geography at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) that 
worked with “traditional” communities2.  Upon returning to Bahia in the summer of 2013, Dr. 
Porto Gonçalves put me in touch with the geographers at UFBA and I was thus introduced to the 
research group A Geografia dos Assentamentos na Área Rural3 (GeografAR).  While we 
disagreed with certain aspects of each other’s political analysis (particularly with regards to the 
legacy of quilombo communities in Brazil), the group was an invaluable source of information 
                                                          
2 “Traditional” communities can be one of a number of communities in Brazil, including, but not limited to, 
indigenous communities, quilombo communities, fishing communities, communities living in swamps, and 
communities that live from foraging.  For a full list of the communities included in the “traditional” category, see 
the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment’s webpage (MMA 2016). 
 
3 The Geography of Settlements in the Rural Area 
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regarding current work on Black and indigenous communities in Brazil and was always eager to 
introduce me to various quilombo communities.  It was through them that I met the members of 
Rio dos Macacos and, as a result, the other Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu. 
 Nearing the end of my time in Bahia in the summer of 2013, I attended an event at UFBA 
in which four members of Rio dos Macacos were participating.  After introducing myself and 
telling them about my interest in their struggle, they invited me to visit the community the 
following day.  As I explain in the dissertation, since the late 20th century, the quilombo has 
essentially been encompassed by the Brazilian navy’s villa, making access to the community 
very difficult.  Because of this, I met a member of the quilombo in a neighboring section of the 
city and we entered the community together.  The quilombolas expressed their surprise that I, as 
a foreigner, would show up alone—something they said few people did.  My first trip to Rio dos 
Macacos lasted only briefly, during which time the quilombolas took me to the different parts of 
the community and told me about their history of struggle with the Brazilian navy.  It was during 
my return to the community in 2014 that I became more familiar with the struggle they and their 
quilombola brethren were waging. 
   When I arrived in Bahia in January of 2014, I had the intention of working solely with 
Rio dos Macacos.  However, I quickly realized that their struggle as a quilombo was 
fundamentally tied to the struggles of other communities in the area.  In the process of 
documenting the various protests and public audiences of which Rio dos Macacos partook, I 
became familiar with the presence of Ilha de Maré and Tororó—two other quilombos in the area.  
The three communities were very active and vocal in their support of one another, such that it 
took me some time to figure out who was a member of which community, given the constant 
presence they had in each other’s territories and public actions.  In the same way that I 
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participated in and documented the struggles of Rio dos Macacos, so, too did I engage with the 
activities of Ilha de Maré and Tororó.  During my time with these quilombos, I came to realize 
that while the history and concrete actions of these communities were unique, they were all 
nonetheless struggling to defend against the systemic racism central to Brazilian society, in an 
attempt to create a viable future for themselves.  Moreover, I saw their struggles as predicated on 
maintaining their autonomy from the anti-Blackness of Brazilian society.  As I show in later 
chapters, self-subsistence, political autonomy, and distinct religious and cultural practices—all of 
which signify, to various degrees, separation from the racist violence of Bahia—typify the 
quilombos’ past, present, and future aspirations. 
To say that I was treated with anything other than warmth and acceptance by these 
communities would be a grave falsehood.  I was welcomed into their territories and, as I felt, into 
their quilombola struggle.  As I shared meals with the quilombolas, marched in their protests, 
recorded their legal proceedings, and simply sat and talked with them, it became clearer and 
clearer to me that they truly had a unique vision and understanding of the world.  In spending my 
time with them, I came to see them as practitioners of modern-day marronage.  That is, their 
communities’ being is defined by their insistence on the value of their lives and their ability to 
establish the conditions of a dignified existence, despite living amidst a fundamentally anti-Black 
world.  Before discussing this dissertation’s theoretical framework and the ways in which I 
conducted my work in Bahia, I first briefly reflect on my experiences as a Black scholar in 
Brazil. 
Positionality 
 During my time in the field, I had to grapple with the fact of being both a person of 
African descent, a male, and a foreigner in Bahia.  These realities led to interesting results as far 
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as how I was treated and viewed by the quilombolas and the various actors against whom they 
are struggling, as well as how I interacted in the everday spaces of Bahia.  Being of African 
descent meant that I was not automatically viewed as “out of place” or “foreign” by those that 
were not aware of my status.  Because of this, I was able to access locations and have personal 
interactions that I may not have otherwise had, had I fit the profile that so many Brazilians 
seemed to have of “Americans” (that is, a person of European phenotype).  By not sticking out as 
a person of European descent within an overwhelmingly Black city, I was able to use my 
phenotype as a means to access spaces and engage with people in a way that gave me unique 
insight into life in Bahia.  As I show in this dissertation, by “blending in” to the city of Salvador, 
I was witness to several examples of quotidian life that inform this study and help to illustrate 
present-day iterations of anti-Blackness as it exists in Brazil.  One example of this is the ways in 
which the banality of violence from police and drug traffickers played out in front of me (see 
Chapter 3).  Because I did not appear as outwardly different from the people of Salvador, the 
practitioners of this violence did not seem to have any qualms about carrying out the violence 
that typifies their way of life.  This fact speaks to Kia Caldwell’s assertion that Black researchers 
often experience, firsthand, the racialization they seek to investigate while in the field (Caldwell 
2007, xxii).  These experiences inform how I understand the quilombos as unique to wider 
society in Bahia.  As I argue in Chapter 4, while the quilombos certainly deal with specific 
actualizations of anti-Black violence, the mundane violence that I saw and experienced in 
Salvador does not take place in the quilombos.  The nature of their communities protects against 
such phenomena, and thus evidences the unique territoriality that the quilombos have.  My status 
as a Black person also gave me access to spaces that are otherwise difficult to navigate. 
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The effects of my positionality in Salvador were made even more evident when I visited 
Rio dos Macacos.  While the community is encircled by the naval villa and therefore requires 
entering through military checkpoints guarded by soldiers, I was usually able to pass through the 
checkpoints with little problem.  In the event that I was stopped, I explained that I was visiting 
people that I knew in the quilombo.  My appearance and my ability to speak Portuguese made 
such interactions more easily navigable for me, as I did not appear to be aberrant to the soldiers 
that reviewed those entering the villa.  The soldiers usually thought I was the family member of a 
quilombola, and generally gave me little trouble when entering.  As a person of African descent, 
I was able to use my appearance to pass the navy’s checkpoints and thereby interact relatively 
easily with the community—a privilege many non-Blacks and foreigners do not have (Gay 2015, 
30).  This fact was vital to my interactions with the community, and my overall time in Bahia.  
Being able to frequent Rio dos Macacos meant that I learned much about them, their struggle, 
their hopes for their community’s future in personal interactions with various members, and also 
led to me becoming familiar with the other quilombos in the Bay of Aratu. 
As far as my positionality with regards to the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, it was 
not and is not clear to me how my positionality as a person of African descent influenced the 
quilombos’ view of me.  The quilombolas rarely made any mention to my race, save to note that 
I was light skinned.  While this acknowledgement, in and of itself, points to a consciousness 
about my racial background, I never heard any direct statements from the quilombolas regarding 
my race or how it influenced their feelings towards me.  It is possible that my existence as a 
(light-skinned) Black person helped establish rapport with the quilombo communities.  It is also 
possible that my racial status made me at once an insider and an outsider, given my nationality 
(Joseph 2016, 79).  Still, as I never discussed this fact with any of the quilombolas, I have have 
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no idea in what way it affected their ideas about me.  Regardless of how the quilombolas viewed 
me racially, I nonetheless felt welcomed by them and was able to make important connections 
with their communities.  My ability to work with, and be accepted by, the quilombos led to 
collective discussions on race. 
While my race was not discussed in any detail, I frequently discussed issues of race and 
racism with the quilombolas.  Among the countless conversations I had with the members of Rio 
dos Macacos, Tororó, and Ilha de Maré, the topic of race was a common one.  As a Black person 
concerned with issues of Black struggle and freedom, it was an incredible experience to interact 
with, contribute to, and learn from the history and struggle of the Quilombos from the Bay of 
Aratu.  As Black liberation and freedom are global struggles to which I am deeply committed, 
the ability to engage with a group of communities whose very being means remaining dedicated 
to the respect and protection of Black life was an extremely important experience for me.  By 
immersing myself in the quilombos’ struggle, I see myself as partaking of a Black, transnational 
commitment to analyzing and critiquing racial hierarchy in its various manifestations (Hordge-
Freeman and Mitchell-Walthour 2016, 1-2).  While my time spent in Bahia might be termed 
“fieldwork” by some, the nature of the quilombos’ struggles, my own political and intellectual 
interests, and my interactions with the communities led to what I understand as a continued set of 
exchanges and interactions in which we collectively shared ideas and partook of activities that 
pushed forward the quilombola struggle.  This approach informed my methodology, as well as 
the frameworks through which I have structured this dissertation. 
Methodology and Framework 
 The time I spent with the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu involved me learning from 
their unique articulations of quilombismo.  When I say I learned from them, I mean this in the 
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purest sense of the word, as most of my interactions with the communities involved me sitting 
and listening to them describe their history, struggles, and aspirations, and having dialogues with 
them regarding these same issues.  I found these to be richer experiences than interviews or focus 
groups—methods I did not even attempt to employ, as I felt that it would make an otherwise 
intimate relationship awkward and artificially formal.  In addition to my personal interactions 
and discussions with the quilombos, I attended a number of events in which the quilombolas 
engaged with their oppressors, as well as the general public. 
 During 2014 and 2015, I attended public audiences with the Quilombos from the Bay of 
Aratu, as they confronted various levels of the Brazilian government to demand recognition of 
the numerous oppressive factors they were facing.  These audiences were held in government 
buildings and, to a lesser extent, in the communities themselves, and often brought the 
quilombolas face to face with officials from the Salvador mayor’s office, National Institute for 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform, Brazilian navy, and a variety of other state actors.  Again, 
my positionality as a Black person seemed to help me in these situations, as I was never openly 
acknowledged by the state actors, or anyone else in attendance, as being foreign or out of place.  
Little attention was called to my presence at these meetings; a fact that allowed me to observe 
and record these numerous interactions unmolested. 
 I also accompanied the communities when they took to the streets and seas of Bahia to 
protest the marginalizing agendas of the Brazilian state and private corporations.  These actions 
were sometimes planned—other times they were spontaneous.  Regardless of how far in advance 
the communities planned them, these protests served to momentarily bring the existence and 
spatial capacity of the quilombos into view for those living in Salvador.  By inserting themselves 
into public space, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu state that they are not remnants of the 
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past, nor a-spatial actors, contrary to what dominant Brazilian actors may think or do.  All of the 
statements from the quilombolas and the accounts of the public audiences and protests present in 
this dissertation are directly from my own experiences in Bahia.  Unless indicated otherwise, the 
quotes from the quilombolas and the government officials, the observations of public audiences 
and protests, and the daily practices of the quilombo communities come directly from my own 
experience with the people and institutions in question.  This in no way means that I was present 
for all of the meetings, protests, and activities of which the quilombos partook—in fact I know I 
was not present for all of them.  I am simply clarifying that my renderings of the quilombos’ 
struggles come directly from my own participation in them.  This dissertation, therefore, draws 
on the many ways in which I experienced, engaged with, and thought about the phenomenon of 
quilombismo.  While their struggle is unique to them and their respective situations, I 
nonetheless see their existence as part of a much larger existence of Black Geographies. 
 This dissertation draws on, and contributes to, the field of Black Geographies.  Far from 
being simply an academic discourse, Black Geographies entail the political, intellectual, and 
ethical analyses and practices of populations deemed non-existent and inhuman, acknowledging 
that these same groups are always and everywhere creating their own sense of place (McKittrick 
and Woods 2007, 4).  I draw on Black Geographies because of its usefulness as a mode of 
critique of the spatial, social, and political effects of the assumed non-being of Black populations 
and its commitment to recognizing the unique ways in which Black populations create their own 
notions and practices of being.  Because the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu wage their 
struggle in spatial terms, discursively and concretely insisting on their ability to establish unique, 
non-capitalist, anti-racist territories that acknowledge and reify Black political life, their 
existence fits within the purview of the Black Geographies framework.  My decision to put my 
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work in conversation with this corpus enriches the field, as most of the literature on Black 
Geography focuses on the modes of critique and creativity in the context of North America.  The 
blues of the Mississippi Delta (Woods 1998; 2009); the spatial expressions of Black women in 
the plantation economies of the United States (McKittrick 2006); the spatial analysis of Malcolm 
X and the Black Panthers (Tyner 2006a; 2006b); and the shifting legal landscape of the United 
States prior to and after abolition (Delaney 1998) comprise some of the major themes that have, 
until now, defined the field of Black Geographies.  By discussing an example from Latin 
America, this dissertation textures the approach put forward by Black Geographies by 
considering how anti-Blackness manifests itself in the Brazilian context and how Afro-Brazilians 
construct a politico-spatial existence in the midst of that anti-Black violence through modern-day 
marronage. 
 In addition to contributing a Latin American example to the otherwise North American-
centric field of Black Geographies, this work discusses Black struggle in the context of our 
present political economic moment.  More specifically, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu 
offer a case in which new and still changing political and economic realities are emerging in 
Brazil and Latin America, entailing new iterations of marginalization and dispossession of the 
masses, as well as new articulations of popular struggle.  While these forms of oppression and 
the attendant resistance and creativity are unique to their given moment, they nonetheless 
comprise part of a long legacy of human expressions put forward by the Latin American masses.  
In this dissertation, therefore, I situate the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu as a new expression 
of a much larger, long-lasting Latin American struggle; an approach taken up by a number of 
scholars that focus on Latin America (see Hardt and Reyes 2012; Reyes and Kaufman 2011; 
Cusicanqui 2012). 
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 In locating the quilombos’ struggles as part of long-standing movements against closed, 
colonized notions of humanity and being, this dissertation also contributes to bodies of literature 
that insist on the inherent openness of radical Black struggle.  This approach emphasizes the 
ways in which radical Blackness rejects static notions of freedom, humanity, and gender, and 
instead focuses on always shifting, innovating ways of existing in the world (Wynter 2001; 
Bogues 2012, 2010; Fanon 2007; Roberts 2015).  This dissertation speaks to such an approach 
by paying attention to the multiple ways in which the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu have 
historically and presently waged their struggle.  Furthermore, while the quilombos’ existences 
have always worked to express and defend the humanity of their inhabitants, the various ways in 
which they articulate that humanity are always changing—including in the current neoliberal 
moment.  It is because of this openness, and the ways in which the Quilombos from the Bay of 
Aratu offer new articulations of autonomous Black struggle in the current moment that I 
understand them to be practitioners of modern-day marronage. 
 This dissertation, by engaging with a case of Black struggle in Latin America that 
simultaneously seeks to address the marginalizing effects of global capital while acknowledging 
and working to protect the unique territorial expressions of multiple communities, contributes to 
an increasingly growing body of literature on the topic (Escobar 2008, 2; Escobar 2010, 10; 
Perry 2009).  This corpus is significant in that it contributes concrete examples of the ways in 
which the oppressed, racialized sectors of Latin America self-organize to create open senses of 
politics and being amidst an increasingly globalizing, interconnected world.  As this dissertation 
shows, these struggles shift over time and place as their constitutive elements find new ways of 
resisting and creating futures for their communities through unique territorial arrangements.  In 
this way, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu evidence the interconnectedness of Black 
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Geographies, territory, and the “progressive” moment in Latin America, demonstrating the ways 
in which alternatives to prevailing political economic practices are possible.  By recognizing that 
these quilombos do, indeed, offer an alternative to the spatial arrangements enforced by 
capitalism and state sovereignty, this study locates itself in the geographical literature that insists 
on the fact that territory is created through the relations entailed in populations’ engagements 
with itself, outside actors, and the physical world (Raffestin 2012; Murphy 2012; Delaney 2005; 
Reyes and Kaufman 2011).  These relations signify power relations and social meaning that are 
specific to the given territory.  In this way, different territorialities—or subjects’ relations to their 
territories—serve as examples of alternative ways of existing in the world.  Through the always-
shifting relations the quilombos create, they continually seek to express their being amidst a 
world predicated on their assumed inhumanity and destruction. 
For over two hundred years, these communities have sought to live their collective lives 
without falling under the control of state sovereignty or relying on capitalist modes of production 
and accumulation to sustain themselves.  This tradition continues to inform their current political 
manifestations, as they refuse to allow outside actors to dictate their way of life.  Not content to 
simply receive the legal title of “quilombo,” these communities push forward in their attempts to 
protect the lives of their people.  As I show, the quilombolas are not satisfied with trading their 
fertile fields for land entitlement.  They are not placated by the promise of food aid when their 
fruit trees remain inaccessible.  State acknowledgement of quilombo territory is pointless to the 
quilombolas if it means giving up access to important fishing, religious, and cultural sites.  In 
sum, they are totally against exchanging their definition of quilombismo for that of the state.  
The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, through their lived politics and territoriality, prove that 
the “rational” practices of the modern subject are but one way of living in the world.  They 
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uncover the lie that is the assumption of a singular form of being.  Moreover, these quilombos 
have rejected the modern “truth” that Black life is mere biological automation; that there exists 
no true Black humanity, and hence that there can be no political subjectivity for Black 
populations that is not essentially an aping of “rational” existence. 
The quilombos not only insist on the viability of their own, individual politics, but also 
recognize and acknowledge each other’s political nature, as well as the politics of other 
quilombos in Bahia and around the country.  Their recognition of each other as political actors 
shows the open nature of their existence—given the distinct political practices of each 
community—demonstrating the concrete actualization of the radical imagination.  This 
recognition does not pertain solely to discursive acknowledgements of their respective political 
competence, however.  Fundamentally attached to this mutual recognition is the collective 
commitment these communities show for protecting one another and defending each other’s 
territorial integrity.  The quilombola struggle is one, even though the concrete quilombola 
existence is plural.  Uniting these communities is the understanding of the inherently anti-Black 
nature of Brazil as expressed in Bahia, and the collective resolve to preserve those collective 
subjectivities that do not base themselves on the destruction of Black life.  The political and 
territorial openness practiced in the quilombos, their commitment to a way of life not defined by 
anti-Black violence, their refusal to reify dominant ideas of race and gender, and the fact that 
they struggle to create an existence autonomous to the inimical effects of prevailing social, 
political, and economic norms evidences the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu as modern day 
maroon communities.  The particular case I present in this dissertation is especially relevant for 
understanding how Black Geographies are created amidst the inimical effects of present-day 
global capital.  As is demonstrated in the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, there do exist 
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alternatives to the extractivist agenda of “progressive” Latin American governments.  This shows 
the ways in which Black Geographies continue to emerge in our current moment.  It is from the 
quilombos’ struggles and their collective ability to critique, and offer alternatives to, present-day 
forms of domination that we can begin to see glimmers of hope for new ways of existing in the 
world.  In this way, marronage, as a Radical Black Geography, remains a viable politico-spatial 
alternative in the present moment. 
Chapter Breakdown 
 Chapter 1 of the dissertation gives the background of the region of Aratu in Bahia and the 
history of the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu.  I discuss the rise of the Bay of Aratu as a site 
of state and national development, focusing particular attention on Luiz Viana Filho—the 
governor of Bahia during Brazil’s military dictatorship—and his role in constructing the Aratu 
Industrial Center and the Port of Aratu, both of which came to have a tremendous influence on 
the quilombos.  I draw on the communities’ oral histories, as well as their present conditions, to 
discuss the ways in which the quilombos have historically struggled against prevailing political 
and economic formations in the Bay of Aratu, starting from the days of slavery through the 
present. 
 Chapter 2 contextualizes the case of the Bay of Aratu by situating it as part of a much 
larger Black struggle in Brazil.  To show the national conditions under which the Quilombos 
from the Bay of Aratu struggle, I touch on various aspects of Brazilian anti-Blackness, from 
slavery to abolition to the post-abolition codification of the Brazilian racial democracy—a 
fundamentally anti-Black discourse.  In addition to this, I explore the various ways in which 
Black Brazilians have fought against these iterations of racist and gendered violence.  Among the 
various forms of resistance I mention, I give particular attention to marronage; or, as it is 
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described in Brazil, the establishment of quilombo communities.  I follow this tradition of 
quilombismo (the Brazilian articulation of marronage) through the late 20th century, to show the 
ways in which Brazil’s Black Movement drew on quilombismo to demand Black inclusion in the 
1988 Brazilian constitution.  As I demonstrate, the quilombo, as a spatial figure, came to be 
included in the constitution, thanks to the efforts of the Black Movement and the persistence of 
Black Brazilian struggle. 
 Chapter 3 focuses on the present-day forms of anti-Black violence as they manifest 
themselves in Brazil and Bahia, more specifically.  I illustrate these realities in two ways.  First, I 
situate the Bay of Aratu in the extractivist moment in Brazil, showing the ways in which Brazil 
fits into the prevailing global economy and what this has meant regarding the political economic 
climate in the country.  While the Brazilian government is understood by some to be 
“progressive,” the consequences of the social programs, redistribution of wealth, and racially and 
ethnically “inclusive” legislature that gives the state this nomenclature means a reliance on the 
increased extraction of natural resources and erosion of grassroots politics.  What becomes 
evident is that the Bay of Aratu—through the Aratu Industrial Center and Port of Aratu—
remains a strategic site of national “development” through its role in the fabrication, refinement, 
and shipping of commodities—commodities whose extraction and production adversely affect 
the environment.  The effects of the importance of these two establishments has led to the 
devastation of many aspects of quilombola life.  From the entrenchment of the Brazilian navy as 
a protector of these industries, to the environmental degradation wrought by shipping and 
industry, to the series of land grabs that have taken place in the Bay, to the attempts at coopting 
quilombola politics, the region’s role in the global economy has meant an all-out assault on the 
quilombos’ ways of life. 
20 
 
 The second aspect of anti-Blackness I talk about in the chapter has to do with the various 
ways in which the population of Salvador is subjected to violent treatment.  I base this section on 
firsthand accounts of living in a favela in Salvador, as well as my general experiences moving 
about the city.  I draw on these experiences to show how labor practices, expressions of 
sovereignty, and gender relations in Salvador lead to anti-Black violence—realities that the 
quilombos seek to protect against. 
 The fourth and final chapter takes the current case of the Quilombos from the Bay of 
Aratu and argues that these communities, through numerous forms of resistance and creativity, 
act as present-day maroons and therefore represent alternatives to prevailing political and 
economic practices in Brazil.  While not an exhaustive rendering of the ways in which the 
communities practice quilombismo today, the chapter touches on the quilombos’ engagements 
with the Brazilian state, their interactions with ultra-state actors, their employment of protest and 
civil disobedience, and certain aspects of their internal organization and inter-quilombo 
solidarity.  While their practice of quilombismo has myriad, far reaching effects, I focus 
specifically on how quilombola gender relations, subsistence practices, understandings of nature, 
and commitment to mutual political recognition evidence their uniqueness in “progressive” 
Brazil.  That is to say, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, in their very being, show the ways 
in which there do exist alternative ways of understanding and existing in the world.  Given the 
violence that typifies urban life in Salvador and the destructive effects of the progressive 
government’s extractive measures, Chapter 4 argues that the quilombos demonstrate the ways in 
which a different way of life is not only possible, but present today. 
On not essentializing quilombismo 
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While I focus on quilombo struggles and their efforts to protect their way of life, it is 
unsatisfactory for me to pretend to understand the life-world of these quilombo communities.  
Quilombo life carries its own intricacies, metaphysics, and ethics, of which I caught but a 
fleeting glimpse during my time there.  As such, I must state that the aspects of quilombo life 
which I analyze in this study pertain mainly to what was explained to me and what I perceived 
regarding methods of production within the communities, gender relations, personal-
environmental interactions, and the understandings of the history and perseverance of Black 
struggle in the region of Aratu and in Brazil more widely.  What I present here, while essentially 
coming directly from the pronouncements and actions of the quilombo communities, nonetheless 
is mediated through my own understanding, interpretation, and choice of placement in this text.  
With this in mind, I must add that I do not claim to “understand,” “know,” or in any way fully 
grasp what it means to be quilombola.  While I personally greatly admire and support quilombola 
communities and their struggles, what proceeds in my arguments is not commensurate to 
quilombola life.  I do not pretend to know what their alternative way of life is—I simply 
recognize that it is present and alive and that they struggle daily to protect and preserve it.
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Chapter 1 
“Era muito bom.  Muito bom, esse aqui.  Muita alegria.  Muita alegria para a gente.  A 
gente catava café, a gente plantava roça.  A gente vivia da plantação da roça da gente, e a 
criação; criava porco, criava muita galinha…”1  The words of Quilombo Rio dos Macacos’ 
eldest resident reflect the history of her community’s struggle to construct a world in which 
inhabitants could provide for themselves and live on their own terms.  While the case of Rio dos 
Macacos is unique in its own way, I argue that the goal of establishing an existence based on 
self-subsistence and governance is precisely the goal of all of the Quilombos in the Bay of Aratu.  
Rio dos Macacos, Tororó, and Ilha de Maré all have a legacy of crop cultivation, fishing, 
foraging, and collective governance that demonstrate their willingness and ability to create 
communities autonomous from the violence that typifies the surrounding area.  In this chapter, I 
describe the recent history of the Bay of Aratu, the history of the quilombos, and the forms of 
oppression the communities currently face. 
The area of Aratu, located in the municipality of Simões Filho, in the Salvador 
metropolitan area, is home to a number of “traditional” communities, including the quilombos 
Rio dos Macacos, Tororó, and Ilha de Maré.  Ilha de Maré is comprised of a number of different 
settlements named Santana, Bananeiras, Nevis, Botelho, Maracanã, Itamoabo, Porto de Cavalo, 
and Praia Grande.
                                                          
1 It was very good.  Very good, this here.  Lots of happiness.  Lots of happiness for us.  We collected coffee, we 
planted the fields.  We lived from planting our fields, and from raising animals; we raised pigs, we raised lots of 
chickens… (This quote is taken from a YouTube video about Rio dos Macacos, which can be found at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssiBUXa1AdY).  
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Each community (Rio dos Macacos, Tororó, and Ilha de Maré) has unique situations with 
which they are dealing.  What is important about this region, however, is that within a small 
geographical area there exists three quilombo communities that are struggling (and have 
historically struggled) against the effects of “modernization” in its prevailing iterations.  
Specifically, the aspects of modernity I discuss are the exploitation and domination of “nature” 
and the natural environment; the centralization of sovereign power—in this situation particularly 
in the name of the state; and the subordination of Black populations with the intention of 
maintaining them in the position of les damnés.  I look specifically at how these qualities of the 
modern epoch play out in the present moment in Brazil, as the country is dominated by 
extractivist practices and defined by an often-times obscured anti-Black agenda.  These different 
articulations of modernity certainly overlap with each other, and while the situations of the 
different communities are unique in and of themselves, the communities articulate their struggle 
in terms of solidarity with one another.  If one thing is clear from the cases of the quilombos of 
Aratu, it is that the communities recognize their interconnectedness and their own position as 
part of Black struggle. 
What this chapter ultimately demonstrates is that the Brazilian nation-state and various 
corporations have enacted an agenda of genocide against the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, 
as the communities seek an autonomous existence.  The importance of shipping, industry, and 
militarization, while vital for Brazilian notions of “development,” adversely affect the 
quilombos.  The actions taken by the state and the various industries in the Bay of Aratu promise 
nothing less than the erasure of these communities’ way of life as they know it.  Relatedly, the 
quilombo communities I describe continue to push against modern truths regarding notions of 
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development and rational participation in the state as they have for centuries.  Struggling against 
this reality has meant that the quilombos in question articulate their struggle on several fronts. 
Confronting the government face-to-face in public meetings, interrupting the banality of 
everyday life in both the public and private sphere of society, and reproducing and innovating 
localized practices within and between the quilombos all make up the agenda of struggle among 
these groups.  In addition to this, the quilombos are able to protect against various iterations of 
violence mundane to the city of Salvador.  Specifically, gendered oppression, labor exploitation, 
and sovereign violence are rejected in the quilombos in favor of unique quilombola relations that 
define the communities.  While I describe these actions in some detail in Chapter 4, the centrality 
of these struggles to the perseverance of the quilombola way of life cannot be overstated, as 
Brazilian society continues to seek the destruction of these autonomous ways of life.  These 
localized methods of struggle are vital despite the fact that public policy and whole organs of 
government have been created and put into place under the auspices of recognizing and aiding 
quilombo communities across the country.  Despite the open pronouncements of support for 
“traditional” communities across Brazil (including Indigenous and quilombola populations), the 
fundamental commitments of the state apparatus—the centralization of sovereign power, 
domination of nature with the goal of rational production and consumption methods, and the 
erasure of alternative nodes of power—cannot allow for these quilombo groups to persist on their 
own terms.  Instead, the language of the Brazilian state, which preaches inclusion, obscures their 
true goals, which is to destroy quilombola life as quilombolas presently understand it.  Contrary 
to the hypocrisy of the Brazilian state and its masked genocidal agenda, the quilombo 
communities discussed in this dissertation maintain the analytical approach fundamental to all 
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radical Black struggle and, both internally as well as collaboratively, adjust their public and 
private actions and pronouncements with the goal of protecting and perpetrating their way of life. 
Before exploring the particular situations of the communities in question, I describe the 
region of Aratu and what it has historically meant to the state of Bahia and the issue of 
development and Progress. 
The State of Bahia, Region of Aratu, and its role in Order and Progress 
Salvador da Bahia was the original capital of colonial Brazil and the state of Bahia was 
an important center of trade, production, and commerce in the Portuguese colony’s early days.  
Salvador was a large port, receiving slaves from Africa and goods from Europe, while the 
Recôncavo region—located across All Saints’ Bay from Salvador—remained one of the world’s 
largest sugar producers through the 19th century (Schwartz 1986, 22; 423). 
After the economic and political rise of the southern region of Brazil (with coffee in São 
Paulo and Rio as well as the industrialization of the region) and the flood of European 
immigrants to the area, Bahia and the northeast in general became less of a national focus 
politically and economically.  During the First Republic (1889-1930), national economic and 
political power shifted from the sugar, tobacco, and cotton growing regions of the Northeast to 
the industrial and coffee growing South and Southeast (Butler 1998, 25).  Ultimately, Bahia 
came to be seen as a decadent area rooted in an archaic past, which had a (Black) population 
deemed backwards and not amenable to the increasingly mechanized (and thus modernized) 
work regimen that the nation was at that point undertaking (Martins 2012; Barreiro 2003, 39).  
This stigma continues to follow the northeast region as well as its inhabitants through the present 
day.  However, during the military dictatorship which lasted from 1964 until the mid-late 1980s, 
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Bahian politicians sought to make Bahia a central focus of the national government by proposing 
several projects which would bring the state up to speed with the rest of the country. 
Specifically, this was realized through projects like those that took place in Aratu, where 
the Port of Aratu and the Aratu Industrial Center (CIA) were built.  In addition to this, the Naval 
Base of Aratu was strengthened through the construction of the Naval Dam of Aratu as well as 
the Naval Villa.  In addition to strengthening the Brazilian Navy through these constructions, the 
fortification of the military presence there meant added protection for the newly arrived 
commercial establishments represented in the CIA and Port.  The history of development 
projects proceeded from the aspirations of the government during the reign of the military 
dictatorship in Brazil.  Politicians viewed petrochemicals, in particular, as an important industry 
that could increase the strategic economic importance of Bahia. 
Luiz Viana Filho, the thirty-sixth governor of Bahia, helped orchestrate, and later wrote 
about, the arrival of the petrochemical industry in Bahia.  His book Petroquímica e 
Industrialização da Bahia (1967 – 1971) documents the efforts made to bring industry into the 
Bay of Aratu and the significance of those actions, from Filho’s point of view.  The arrival of the 
petrochemical industry, explains Filho, “Mudou-lhe a fisionomia econômica, criando esperança 
de prosperidade e, portanto, de vida melhor”1 (Viana Filho 1984, 7).  This apparent improvement 
in life was necessary, according to Filho, because of the waning importance of the Brazilian 
Northeast—“Dia a dia maior distância nos separava do Sul, especialmente de São Paulo e do Rio 
de Janeiro”2 (Viana Filho 1984, 7).  As a result, it was necessary “assegurar aos baianos uma 
                                                          
1 Changed the economic physiognomy, creating hope of prosperity and, therefore, of a better life. 
 
2 Day by day a greater distance separates us from the South, especially São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
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perspectiva de desenvolvimento”3 (Viana Filho 1984, 7).  The decadence of society in Bahia 
became the focal point of those seeking to make the state economically relevant again.  The 
discovery of petroleum in the state in 1938 presented a potential for future development projects.  
While the utilization of this all-important natural resource was initially slow-going, the rise of 
the Military Dictatorship led to increased government intervention in the economy and gave 
industry incentive to begin working in the region.  Petroleum would eventually take off in the 
region, however, industry and shipping were the initial capital-enticing factors in the area. 
After creating the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE) the 
federal government created a system of fiscal and financial incentives for industries to locate 
themselves in the northeast region.  Everything from a complete tax exemption to extending 
benefits for the importation and purchase of equipment was offered to industries willing to locate 
themselves in the area.  These incentives achieved several objectives, such as the capitalization 
of businesses in the northeast, which facilitated the unification of various businesses for 
development.  It also meant the transfer of resources from more prosperous regions and from the 
public sector to the private sector for investment in industry.  Filho is clear that all of the above 
was made possible through infrastructure needed to assist business settlement in the area.  It was 
the Industrial Center of Aratu that provided this smooth transition for the recently-arrived 
industries (Viana Filho 1984, 27-28). 
The construction of the CIA was a long-term project, beginning construction in 1967 and 
continuing through the 1970s.  Filho is clear that “Nada, no entanto, influiu mais para atrair 
projetos do que o próprio CIA com o que representou de suporte para as indústrias em 
                                                          
3 Assure for Baianos a perspective of development. 
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implantação.  Aliás, desde o início do Governo foi a consolidação do CIA objetivo permanente”4 
(Viana Filho 1984, 28).  Of all the projects constructed with regards to the CIA, “nenhuma, 
isoladamente, teve a importância e o custo do Porto de Aratu.  Era, porém, realização 
fundamental, pois dela dependia o escoamento, de granéis sólidos e líquidos, da produção de 
Aratu, e, mais tarde, também de Camaçari, sem os graves inconvenients de atravessar Salvador 
para alcançar seu porto”5 (Viana Filho 1984, 28).  This sentiment was echoed by Dr. Rivaldo 
Guimarães—the superintendent of the CIA—who, in 1970, stated that the Port of Aratu would 
contribute “para o desenvolvimento econômico de uma grande sub-região, constituída 
principalmente pelo Estado da Bahia”6 and that this arrangement would be “um projeto de 
integração econômica regional, de excepcional importância para o conjunto dos interesses de 
desenvolvimento econômico do Estado”7 (de Cássia Santana de Carvalho Rosado 2000, 81). 
The first stage of construction of the Port of Aratu began in 1971, with the building of a 
floating dock, dike, and bridge made for moving solid cargo; a platform for the movement of 
liquid cargo; loading and unloading equipment; buoys and tugs; and a paved area for mineral 
storage.  Next, a road was built between the Port of Aratu and the CIA, followed by energy lines 
being constructed throughout the Port along with a transformer station (Viana Filho 1984, 29).  
The growth that this promoted in the CIA was notable.  Between 1967 and 1970, investment in 
                                                          
4 Nothing, however, influenced more to attract projects than the CIA which represented support for the industries 
in implantation.  In fact, since the beginning of the Government the consolidation of the CIA was a permanent 
objective. 
 
5 None, in isolation, had the importance and cost of the Port of Aratu.  It was, nevertheless, a fundamental 
realization, because it determined the flow of solid and liquid cargoes, of the production of Aratu, and, later, also 
from Camaçari, without the serious inconveniences of crossing Salvador to reach its port 
 
6 To the economic development of a large sub-region, constituted principally by the State of Bahia. 
 
7 A project of regional economic integration, of exceptional importance for the bringing together of the interests of 
economic development of the State. 
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the CIA grew tenfold.  In 1967, there were thirty-nine official industries present in the CIA, 
whereas in 1970 there were 125 anticipated industries, assuring around 126,000 jobs (Viana 
Filho 1984, 30).  Luiz Viana Filho saw the creation of the CIA, along with the Port of Aratu, 
growing side by side with the petrochemical industry, as a “complete success” for the state of 
Bahia.  The 1960s and 1970s, following the installation of the military government in Brazil, saw 
a tremendous rise in the investment in industry in Bahia.  The establishment of the Bay of Aratu 
as this strategic location of development required a great amount of financial investment and 
political attention at multiple levels of government.  This moment was seen by both state and 
federal politicians as a step in the right direction for the northeast region. 
In May of 1970, Emílio Médici, then president of Brazil, visited the state of Bahia and 
was welcomed by Luiz Viana Filho, who was governor of Bahia at the time.  Lauding Médici for 
his previous support for the petrochemical industry in Bahia, Filho proclaimed, “Com a 
petroquímica Vossa Excelência proclamou que a Bahia continuará a se desenvolver para tornar o 
Brasil mais rico, mais homogêneo, mais unido”8 (Viana Filho 1984, 61).  Assuring Filho and 
those in attendance of his continuing support of the petrochemical industry and overall 
industrialization of Bahia, Médici, responded, “Sinto a presença e o reencontro da Bahia nos 
momentos econômicos deste País: no pau-brasil, no açúcar, na pecuária, na mineração, no cacao 
e, agora, na industrialização e na petroquímica.  A História mede a força do Brasil nos braços 
todos da Bahia: no índio, no negro, na lenha, na cachoeira, no petróleo”9 (Viana Filho 1984, 62).  
Médici went further in this speech, claiming, “Sinto, por inteiro, nesta hora nova da Bahia, a 
                                                          
8 With petrochemicals Your Excellency proclaimed that Bahia will continue to develop to make Brazil richer, more 
homogeneous, more united 
 
9 I feel the presence and reencounter of Bahia in our country’s economic moments: in Brazil wood, in sugar, in 
livestock, in mining, in cocoa, and now, in industrialization and petrochemicals.  History measures Brazil’s force in 
all of the arms of Bahia: in the Indian, the Black, the wood, the waterfall, the oil 
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participação do povo na nova dimensão do progresso, que governantes, como Luiz Viana Filho e 
Antônio Carlos Magalhães, souberam entender sabendo seguir seu povo”10 (Viana Filho, PIB, 
118). 
The statements put forward by Filho and Médici demonstrate a clear commitment to the 
shifting discourses and goal of Order and Progress.  Filho sees federal support of the 
petrochemical industry in Bahia as allowing the state to become part of Brazil’s drive for wealth, 
homogeneity, and unity.  Médici agrees with this sentiment, claiming that Brazil’s historical 
development—its commitment and ability to demonstrate progress toward a rational existence—
is measured by what takes place in Bahia.  To make Brazil a truly modern, homogeneous place, 
all of the nation must be developed—including the northeast, a traditionally backwards region.  
To evidence these claims, Médici draws on Bahia’s historical role in the national economy, 
signaling that the state has traditionally acted as an indicator of prevailing economic practices, 
and, as such, an indicator of national progress.  Brazil wood, sugar, cattle, mining, and cocoa are 
all named as national economic steps that were also evinced in Bahia.  What Médici did not 
acknowledge in his speech was the violence inherent in all of those economic transitions.  The 
enslavement and extermination of indigenous groups resultant from the extraction of Brazil 
wood, the destruction wrought by the chattel slavery used for sugar and mining, and the violence 
used to consolidate the cocoa industry are not mentioned in his speech, nor is the impending 
violence that would come as a result of the industrialization of the Bay of Aratu.  The human 
costs of economic modernization in Brazil, then and now, remain unacknowledged, or, at best, 
written off as the cost of doing business.  
                                                          
10 I feel, overall, in this new time in Bahia, the people’s participation in the new dimension of progress such that 
rulers, like Luiz Viana Filho and Antônio Carlos Magalhães, were able to understand to follow their people. 
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The approach taken by Filho and Médici speaks to the idea of the meio técnico-científico 
described by Brazilian geographer Milton Santos in A urbanização brasileira (1993).  The meio 
técnico-científico is marked by the presence of science and technique in the process of 
remodeling territory.  Part of this reality is the integration of previously separated territories.  In 
this case, the Port of Aratu linked Bahia not only to the rest of Brazilian industry, but to foreign 
capital, as well.  Santos describes the result of this approach as the “tecnoesfera” (techno-
sphere), which is accompanied by the “psicoesfera” (psycho-sphere).  The psicoesfera is 
dominated by the discourse of objects, the relations that move those objects, and the motivations 
that preside over them (Santos 1993, 46).  The psicoesfera undergirds the objectives of the 
rationality and imaginary of the tecnoesfera and helps to propagate the tecnoesfera (Santos 1993, 
46-47).  Industrialization and transportation as central to the Bay of Aratu present a case of the 
increasing importance of science and technology in Bahia.  The discourse of progress, the 
economy, and the practices and objects that define that economic development are evidenced in 
the speeches of Filho and Médici.  As shown in subsequent sections, the chaos that accompanies 
the implementation of the meio técnico-científico is certainly evident in the case of the Bay of 
Aratu. 
As territory is defined by the social relations and power arrangements found therein 
(Delaney 2005), then the Bay of Aratu came to have a strategic importance for the perpetuation 
of sovereign territory in the mid-20th century.  The CIA, Port of Aratu, and the Brazilian naval 
base were, and are, part of an attempt to solidify certain aspects of state sovereignty—
specifically military power and the facilitation of capital circulation—as well as ultra-state 
sovereignty.  Through the creation of the CIA and the Port of Aratu, certain powerful political 
actors within wider Brazil and Bahia selected the Bay of Aratu as the location from which 
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participation in the centralized and unitary regulation of the world market and global power 
relations could take place.  As I show below, the Bay of Aratu has become an important location 
within both national and global capitalist assemblages.  Serving as a location from which public 
and private actors defend and propagate capitalist accumulation while dominating nature and 
erasing the subjectivities that contend with such practices, the Bay of Aratu has become a focal 
point for purveyors of sovereign territory.  Despite the entrenchment of sovereign power in this 
area, the quilombo communities in the Bay of Aratu continue their centuries’ long struggle 
against the shifting articulations of sovereignty, constantly finding ways to address the prevailing 
forms of modern, sovereign power. 
History of the Quilombos’ Struggles 
The introduction of the CIA and the Port of Aratu in the Bay of Aratu meant nothing less 
than a complete assault on the lives of the quilombos residing there.  As I show in this section, 
the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu have consistently struggled against the various shifts in the 
economy that former president Médici so proudly named in his speech on economic 
development in Bahia.  Whereas the communities were originally formed to protect against the 
oppression of slave society, they continue to fight against the imposition of marginalizing factors 
present in the industrialization of Bahia. 
The exact date of the origins of the Quilombos of Aratu is all but impossible to pinpoint.  
For one, most of the people that are identified as original members of the community have died.  
Secondly, the communities as they exist today mostly have their origins in communities of slaves 
that were brought to work on plantations in the areas and runaway slaves that were already in 
those locations, meaning that there is no singular founding member or moment.  Rather than rely 
on a set date of origin, the quilombos explain their communities’ history through comparisons of 
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past and present lifestyles.  The following section describes a brief history of the quilombos and 
references the troubles they have faced in the last few decades as the Bay of Aratu became a 
strategic area for both military fortification and development projects.  While some archival 
research was done to clarify and contextualize some claims made by members of the quilombos, 
what I present here is my rendering of what was told to me directly from the quilombolas I talked 
to during my time in Bahia. 
I first discuss Quilombo Rio dos Macacos, the over 200 year old community in conflict 
with the Brazilian Navy.  I then explore the situation of the quilombolas from Ilha de Maré as 
they struggle to cope with the effects of a disastrous chemical and oil spill from a Singaporean 
vessel in the Bay of Aratu.  Finally, I turn to Quilombo Tororó, which is fighting against the 
negative effects brought on their community by both the Brazilian Navy and the private 
industries present in the Bay of Aratu.  Again, while these cases may seem unique to each other, 
they are all the result of specific aspects of the unfolding of the modern technologies constitutive 
of the meio técnico-científico as it materializes in the Bay of Aratu.  These examples also 
evidence the persistence of the anti-Black violence perpetrated by Brazilian society.  Ultimately, 
what is at stake in this case are the effects of violence resultant from the assumed a-political, a-
spatial nature of these quilombos and their resolve to defend their territory and subjectivity, as 
these phenomena have played out spatially and temporally.  Furthermore, despite whatever 
differences each group may have, they understand themselves as part of the same struggle.  
Quilombismo, as an ethic and practice that creates life free from racial forms of domination 
(Nascimento 1980), underpins the activities of these communities’ everyday life. 
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Rio dos Macacos 
The origins of Quilombo Rio dos Macacos stretch back to pre-abolition days, when there 
existed Fazenda Macaco, Fazenda Mereles, Fazenda Carne Verde, and Fazenda Martins on the 
land where the quilombo currently resides.11 On Fazenda Macaco the slaves cultivated coffee, 
corn, cloves, beans, and had dairy cattle.  Fazenda Mereles and Carne Verde both cultivated 
sugarcane and raised cattle as well.  Fazenda Martins was owned by brothers Fernando, Edgar, 
and João Martins and also raised cattle.  Much of the quilombo’s early history is recounted by its 
oldest member, who is now 96 years old.  Her parents, Maria Camila Batista de Souza and João 
Segundo de Souza, were brought as young adults to work as slaves on Fazenda Macaco for the 
millionaire landowner Coriolan do Bahia in the late 19th century.  Her father had been in charge 
of packing mules and working on the farm, while her mother took care of all the domestic 
necessities for Coriolan—cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, etc.  Her parents had 18 children, 
of which she was the youngest and is now the only surviving member of her immediate family. 
In addition to working for Coriolan do Bahia, the slaves also planted their own crops and 
raised animals for subsistence.  Corn, squashes, beans, and manioc were all mentioned, as was 
fishing, and the raising of pigs, chickens, and ducks.  Coriolan do Bahia moved to Paripe—a 
nearby urban neighborhood—when his wife took ill in order to be closer to medical care, and 
ultimately moved to Praia Grande after his wife died—leaving his land and the slaves on it.  
Upon leaving Fazenda Macaco, Coriolan do Bahia did not free his slaves or legally will his land 
to them.  This reality is critiqued somewhat bitterly by the younger generations of the quilombo.  
One of the eldest member’s daughters labeled Coriolan do Bahia a “filho de puta,”12 saying that 
                                                          
11 “Fazenda” is the Portuguese word for farm or plantation. 
 
12 Son of a bitch 
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it was not unusual for slave owners to free their slaves or leave them land.  Instead, she insisted, 
he had used up her grandmother and her family and left them nothing.  After his death in the 
1940s, Coriolan’s land remained legally unclaimed, as he had no legitimate heirs.  Due to 
Coriolan’s negligence in granting his former slaves land titles, a series of land grabs took place 
throughout the mid-20th century. 
Land Grabs 
The United States Military came to the Bay of Aratu in the 1940s to build an air base 
during World War II.13  The quilombo’s oldest member has vivid memories of the Americans’ 
time in the area.  As a young girl, she worked as a cook and server for the American military 
men that were in the area.  A number of other young women worked for the Americans at this 
time, as well.  One story that the oldest member frequently told was about a friend of hers that 
got pregnant by an American officer.  “Ele gostou de uma amiga minha e ela se engravidou”14 
she said, noting that the officer eventually left both the mother and child in Bahia.  It was shortly 
after the Americans built the base that they left the area and the Brazilian Navy took it over.15 
The oldest resident explained to me “pra mim foi ontêm que eles [da marinha] 
chegaram”.16  She explained how after taking over the base from the Americans, they began 
construction of the dam which was to serve as the power source for the base.  This moment was 
                                                          
13 According to the Brazilian Navy’s records, the land purchased for the aerial base was taken from Fazenda Ponto 
da Areia and Fazenda Pombau, which is where Quilombo Tororó currently is.  The landowner for this area was the 
Portuguese-born businessman Antônio Torres (http://www.mar.mil.br/bna/historico.html). 
 
14 He liked my friend and she got pregnant 
 
15 The Navy’s records state that it was decided in 1949 that the aerial base would be transitioned to a naval base 
for the Brazilian military, that in 1959 the project was approved by the Navy, and that the project was not actually 
finished until 1969 and began operating in 1970. 
 
16 For me, it was yesterday that they [from the navy] arrived. 
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the first time she was forced to move from her house.  She said a Brazilian naval officer came to 
her and told her they needed the land on which she lived in order to build the dam.  This was for 
the good of the area, he claimed, as it would provide energy for both the Navy and the 
surrounding locales.  According to various members of the quilombo, construction on the dam 
began in 1954 and was completed in 1964.  Many of the men currently living in Rio dos 
Macacos describe having worked on the construction of the dam as boys and young men—
essentially aiding in the construction of an entity that would later brutally oppress and 
marginalize them.  The naval villa, built with the ends of housing naval soldiers and their 
families, was built between the years 1964 and 1976.  The construction of the villa also displaced 
numerous families.  In addition to these removals, the villa was built around the populations that 
were not expelled, essentially forcing them into constant interaction with the Navy. 
Despite this imposition by the navy, the community continued to live a semi-autonomous 
lifestyle.  While many of them did indeed work for the Navy—a reality that is discussed in more 
detail below—much of what is described by the quilombolas focuses on the agricultural, 
productive, and cultural practices of the community in the mid to late 20th century.  Fishing, for 
example, was an important practice for the community.  One member recounted how her mother 
would make fishing nets out of used cloth bags, take two nets, and leave to fish in the evening, 
coming back in the morning.  She would come back with huge quantities of fish and shrimp from 
the Bay or the river, go to the terreiro, lay out palm leaves on the ground, and set the catch on 
them.17  Members from all over the community would come and fill up buckets full of the catch, 
communally sharing their bounty.  Their land was planted with a variety of crops—corn, beans, 
passion fruit, African palm, manioc, and tomatoes were some of the crops mentioned to me.  
                                                          
17 A terreiro is a temple of the Candomblé religion.  Candomblé is based on the Yoruba religion of West Africa as 
well as Catholicism and is an important Afro-Brazilian practice. 
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Crop cultivation was clearly a central practice in the community, as the quilombo’s oldest 
member smiled as she told me, “Tudo eu sei plantar”.18  One quilombola told me that her father 
had such excellent eyesight that if he caught sight of a bee he could follow it to its hive, after 
which he would sedate the bees and bring honey back to the family.  Several casas de farinha—
where manioc was processed into the farinha that accompanies meals in Bahia—also existed in 
the community.19  The distribution of farinha was treated like that of the seafood—people from 
all over the community would come with a variety of receptacles to take whatever amount of 
farinha they needed.  In addition to chickens, ducks, and pigs, some members of the community 
had cattle, as well. 
Conditions were such that very little food had to be bought by those living in the 
community—they cultivated and raised almost everything they needed to eat. While they were 
able to provide for themselves, they were also able to raise enough crops to sell for profit, as 
well.  Several quilombolas mentioned to me how they used to rent out stands in the neighboring 
cities to sell their produce.  Potatoes, tomatoes, and cassava were the different crops which were 
mentioned as being sold in neighboring locales.  At least three terreiros were present in the 
community, as well.  The Pais and Mãe de Santo for the terreiros were named Jaime, Paizinho, 
and Dona Calú.  As stated above, the terreiros comprised not only important religious and 
cultural spaces, but also spaces for the distribution of foodstuffs. 
The Violence of the Navy 
                                                          
18 I know how to plant everything 
 
19 The Portuguese word “farinha” translates to “flour” in English.  Farinha made from manioc is a coarse kind of 
flour that is poured over rice and beans as part of the diet of the Northeast. 
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While the community maintained a level of autonomy and a set of productive and cultural 
practices unique unto themselves, their forced interaction with the Brazilian Navy never stopped 
being a source of abuse and marginalization for the people living there.  Initial oppression came 
in the form of the land grabs which displaced some and forced others to relocate their homes, as 
mentioned above.  In addition to these displacements, the construction of the naval villa 
physically split the community in half, creating a south end and a north end, which essentially 
borders the dam.  What is more, the Navy essentially continued the slave condition forced upon 
the populations present there—extending the tradition started by Coriolan do Bahia and the other 
slave owners in the area. 
The quilombo’s oldest resident remembers delivering the first child born to a naval 
officer in the area.  Over time she would come to attend to and deliver children for a number of 
the naval officers’ wives.  Much in the same way that her parents were exploited for the benefit 
of Coriolan do Bahia, she, her husband, her children, and the other members of the community 
were exploited for the growth of the Navy.  Her children and husband both worked on the 
construction of the naval base while she spent much of her adult life employed in the houses of 
naval officers.  This was hardly waged employment, however.  In addition to her midwifery, she 
washed and ironed clothes for the naval soldiers, for which she was paid so little that I once 
heard her exclaim the navy treated her as a slave, forcing her to work for free.  In addition to 
scant pay, her carteira was never signed.20  This further extends the hyper-exploitation present in 
such work, as it leaves no official record of employment and therefore does not lend itself to 
either retirement or a pension.  “Eles não têm coração”21 she explained to me, noting how hard 
                                                          
20 A carteira is a worker’s document that registers a person’s employment with the Brazilian Ministry of Work and 
Employment. 
 
21 They have no heart 
39 
 
this kind of work is on one’s body.  She noted that while she had worked for the Americans for 
six years, she had worked for the Brazilian Navy her whole life.  This she described as “tempo 
perdido”.22 
The Navy continued the hyper-exploitation of the Black populations present in the area, 
extending a condition inaugurated in chattel slavery.  The slave condition that the navy 
attempted—and continues to attempt—to force on the quilombolas extends beyond mere labor 
practices.  The gratuitous violence to which Black populations are exposed in modernity is very 
much present in Rio dos Macacos.  The navy practiced—and continues to practice—brutal, 
direct violence on the community.  This has taken several forms historically and presently.  A 
fact that the quilombolas of Rio dos Macacos always touch on is the number of expulsions that 
the navy induced in their community.  While it was estimated that there had been over seventy 
families present in the community prior to the expulsions, today there remain just over twenty 
households.  I was told that these expulsions took place through the 1980s, shortly after the dam 
and villa were built, and have continued on and off through the present day.  The actions taken to 
push the quilombolas to leave the community are numerous.  One quilombola described to me 
the way in which the navy burned their fields of crops, thereby trying to prevent them from 
providing for themselves.  In addition to arson, the quilombolas tell stories of the navy dropping 
plant-killing agents from helicopters onto their fruit trees, attempting to destroy the quilombo’s 
ability to sustain themselves.  While the community is resolved to replant their land, the navy has 
habitually returned to rip up the fields and destroy their crops when they do so.  Also, while a 
number of animals were raised for food production in the past by the community, the navy no 
longer allows the quilombolas to raise large animals, like cattle and pigs.  They prohibit this, 
                                                          
22 Lost time 
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despite the fact that the naval officers themselves raise animals like horses and cattle within the 
confines of the villa, including on quilombola land.  Fishing, which had always provided a 
source of sustenance for the community, has similarly been curtailed by the navy.  I was told that 
when the quilombolas attempt to fish in the naval dam, the navy will arrest or beat them.  The 
violence practiced by the navy goes beyond destroying practices of production, however.   
Attempts on the lives of quilombolas, as well as sexual violence have also typified the 
navy’s endeavors to remove Rio dos Macacos from their traditional territory.  A quilombola 
related a story of one of her brothers being shot by a soldier while in the quilombo, while another 
was assaulted and beaten by numerous soldiers before being taken to the naval jail, after which 
he was only released at the behest of his mother—a community elder.  In all of these cases, the 
police refused to open an investigation or look into the situation in any way.  I was also told 
about an instance in which naval soldiers forced a quilombola man to sit on an ant mound, 
allowing the large, red ants within to crawl all over his body and bite him.23  Quilombola women 
have also been raped by naval soldiers.  Given the sensitivity of this subject, I did not push 
further to get details of the cases—which were multiple.  However, these cases were discussed 
among the quilombolas from time to time and even brought up at public audiences with 
government officials.   
These violent attacks on the quilombolas continue into the present day.  Shortly before I 
arrived in Bahia in January, 2014, two members of Rio dos Macacos were beaten by naval 
soldiers as they were exiting the gate which grants access to the naval villa.  This event and the 
images of the beaten and bruised quilombolas led to increased public scrutiny regarding the 
                                                          
23 This harkens back to scenes from slavery days, when slave masters and overseers devised brutally inventive 
ways to torture their slaves.  This particular case reads as if it came from C.L.R. James’ (1963) description of slavery 
in Haiti 
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treatment of the quilombolas by the navy, and continued to be referenced throughout the judicial 
processes through which the quilombo went throughout 2014.  In August, 2015, a quilombola 
youth was assaulted by a number of naval soldiers, who beat him with pieces of wood and called 
the military police to arrest him.  The soldiers claimed that he had harassed one of their 
daughters, although this claim was later dismissed.  Attacking the lived spaces of the quilombo 
has also been a common tactic of the navy. 
Arson and the destruction of quilombo houses is another tactic the navy has employed to 
try and force the community from the land.  What is more, the navy prohibited—and continues to 
prohibit—the quilombolas from bringing in the cement, sand, and bricks they need to build 
permanent, stable establishments in the community.  On January 30, 2014, a quilombola family’s 
house was sacked and torn down by a group of soldiers, who had apparently acted under the 
orders of a superior officer.  This was an attempt on the part of the navy to prevent the return of 
the family, which had moved out of the quilombo for a time, but had decided to come back.  I 
was present in the quilombo the day this attack took place.  At the time the house was torn down, 
I was visiting a nearby quilombola family and upon hearing what was going on, I accompanied 
several other people to the site.  Relatives of the family were distraught and several feared the 
navy had arrived to murder the father of the family in question, as he had been assaulted by naval 
soldiers in the past.  Luckily, no physical harm had been done to any member of the family.  
However, the psychological damage was evident.  The family’s mother was in tears, while the 
father fought back tears as he explained to the naval officers that had arrived that nobody had the 
right to attack his house in such a way.  When their attempts at forcing the quilombolas from the 
land did not work, the navy resolved to make life miserable for those that managed to stay. 
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Figure 1.1 The quilombola house the Brazilian navy destroyed in January, 2014. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
Intimidation tactics and psychological warfare are rife in Rio dos Macacos.  Quilombolas 
report naval soldiers frequently walking through their community and taking pictures of 
quilombo houses or being found spying on houses from a distance.  Many quilombolas report 
being held up at, and not allowed to enter, the gate entrance to the villa, which is the only way to 
officially enter the villa and therefore the quilombo (as the villa surrounds the community).  I 
have heard stories of community members returning from work or school and being made to wait 
hours at the gate before they were finally allowed to enter.  Other quilombolas were not even 
allowed to go to school.  Several of the adult quilombolas today are illiterate, due to the fact that 
they were never allowed to study as children.  This enforced lack of study prevented quilombo 
members from knowing about and being able to access juridical tools that could help ameliorate 
their oppressed situation.  The ill will of the navy is further evident in the everyday remarks 
officers and soldiers make to the quilombolas.  One member mentioned to me that it is common 
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for the soldiers and officers to inquire about her mother (the quilombo’s oldest resident) by 
asking, “hasn’t your mother died yet?”  She conjectured that the navy believes that once her 
mother dies, it will be easier to uproot the community. 
As a result of these flagrant abuses, much of what Rio dos Macacos treasured about their 
community is now gone.  The casas de farinha, the terreiros, the extensive crop cultivation, some 
of the animal husbandry, and the fishing of the local rivers are essentially things of the past.  
After exploiting the labor and cooperative spirit of the quilombolas, the navy has endeavored to 
erase the community from their traditional land, continuing the centuries old Western practice of 
treating Blacks as property, demonstrating no regard for the quilombolas as active political 
subjects.  In this way, the navy continues to treat the quilombolas as slaves, through practices 
that attempt to preserve the slave ontology that views Black bodies as accumulated and fungible, 
without any human or political value (Wilderson 2010).  Rio dos Macacos faces an antagonist 
rooted in the sovereign practices of the Brazilian nation-state, one that is resolved to centralize its 
power at the cost of destroying a group that has practiced a unique spatial existence for over two 
hundred years and in the process established its own territoriality.  The case of Ilha de Maré 
exemplifies a different iteration of the genocide central to modernity.  Instead of confronting the 
enforcers of modern sovereignty, Ilha de Maré finds itself faced with the effects of “Progress” 
and the perpetuation of the modern ethic of dominating nature and submitting it to the benefit of 
(Hu)Man. 
Ilha de Maré 
Ilha de Maré is a quilombo and fishing colony located on an island in All Saints’ Bay.  
The fishing community is comprised of a number of different smaller communities—Santana, 
Bananeiras, Nevis, Botelho, Maracanã, Itamoabo, Porto de Cavalo, and Praia Grande, which, 
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collectively, are home to between 10,000-12,000 inhabitants.  Like the other traditional 
communities in the area, Ilha de Maré has a long tradition of self-subsistence.  Fishing is 
obviously a significant community practice, as the quilombolas fish both to sell in external 
markets as well as for internal consumption.  Planting crops is also something that is practiced by 
the community.  The community’s influence in the greater Salvador metropolitan is well-known, 
as it is said that most of the fish consumed in Salvador and the surrounding area comes from the 
fisherpeople of this particular island.  In the past three years, however, the community’s way of 
life has been greatly jeopardized. 
On December 17, 2013, the Singaporean vessel Golden Miller, which was transporting a 
shipment of chemicals, had its cargo catch fire.  With the chemicals already burning on board, 
the ship’s crew feared that the vessel’s fuel might also ignite and therefore jettisoned the 
petroleum into the Bay of Aratu.  Community members of Ilha de Maré say that they heard and 
felt the initial explosion of the chemicals on the ship.  In the subsequent days and weeks they 
reported a noxious odor in the Bay, which led to headaches and sicknesses among the population 
there.  While the explosion happened in mid-December of 2013, it was not until February of 
2014 that the government formally addressed the situation.  The initial effects of the explosion, 
however, pale in comparison to the devastation that the oil dumping has wrought on the 
fisherpeople.  Many community members have fallen ill as a result of the fuel that was dumped 
into the Bay.  Within a year of the spill, a 13 year old girl died of cancer; eight tumors in her 
body.  Other, older quilombolas describe pain setting into their joints.  Mundane activities like 
walking up the stairs are now becoming onerous.  These realities led a quilombola man to state at 
a public audience with local politicians that people used to live to be 100 years old in the 
community—now people were dying before the age of 25.  While sicknesses continue to develop 
45 
 
among community members, their way of life is all but disappearing due to the toxicity of the oil 
dumped into the Bay.  Fisherpeople report fish disappearing altogether, while the other marine 
life they depended on (shrimp, oysters, mussels, etc.) are becoming fewer and fewer. 
The mangroves in the Bay of Aratu remain an important topographic feature for the 
community of Ilha de Maré.  Recently, however, it has been reported that the people are 
becoming allergic to the mangrove mud—a previous source of health and bounty for the 
community.  Individuals report rashes among those that come in contact with the mud—possibly 
a further effect of the oil dumping.  This reality is an imminent threat to the “other world” that 
the community insists it lives in.  At a June, 2015 public audience attended by city councilmen 
and a number of university and professional scientists, it was revealed by these same scientists 
that the people of Ilha de Maré are being exposed to high levels of heavy metals.  All of the 
children tested by the scientists presenting at this meeting were found to have abnormally high 
levels of mercury in their blood, while 90% of the children tested had high levels of lead in their 
blood, as well.  In addition to this, the communities of Botelho and Santana both had high levels 
of cadmium among their population. 
Lest one think this particular case an anomaly, the people of Ilha de Maré have struggled 
against the effects of shipping in the Port of Aratu for generations.  In addition to the shipping 
brought by the Port of Aratu, there is also an oil refinery as well as a thermoelectric plant sited 
near the Bay.  As a result of these factors, pollution has been a recurring problem for the 
community.  The air, dust, and water of the island has been systematically poisoned, leading to 
the dying of fruit trees and other important crops that the community had previously cultivated.  
As such, the oil spill in the Bay is simply the most recent and perhaps most extreme iteration of a 
process that has been taking place since the Port, refinery, and plant were placed in the Bay.  
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“Developing” Bahia generally, and the Bay of Aratu specifically has led to the placement of 
industries which signal nothing less than the erasure of the quilombola fisherpeople of Ilha de 
Maré.  In this way, Ilha de Maré demonstrates another side of the project of modernity and 
modernization.  While Rio dos Macacos suffers from the sovereign arm of the state, Ilha de Maré 
feels the effects of a different iteration of “Progress,” in the form of the meio técnico-científico, 
which privileges a reliance on science and technology as well as the material and discursive 
accoutrement that accompanies this approach.  Their way of life remains under attack because, 
despite the long history of self-subsistence and quilombo autonomy, the corporations located in 
the Bay of Aratu recognize no political subjectivity present in the community and thus treat the 
space as if it were empty.  The case of Tororó demonstrates an example of a community that is 
struggling against both of these aspects of modernity. 
Tororó 
In the area near the land that Tororó now occupies, there existed five fazendas from 
which the community’s current inhabitants trace their origins.  The fazendas that were in the area 
were called Pombau, Bela Vista, Muribêca, Gameleira, Ponto de Areia, and Sapoca.  One of the 
landowners that possessed land and slaves that today form the antecedents of the quilombo of 
Tororó was named Benjamin de Souza and he bought part of the Fazenda Bela Vista in the late 
19th century, bringing his slaves with him.  Local knowledge has it that when Souza arrived in 
the area there were already runaway slaves that were living there who had escaped bondage to 
form their own communities.  This suggests that Tororó has its origins in pre-abolition 
quilombolas. 
After slavery was abolished and the community took form as a free one, it continued 
fishing, farming, and extractivist practices to sustain itself.  Like Ilha de Maré, mangroves are a 
47 
 
lynchpin of life in Tororó.  The centrality of fishing is evidenced in the stories told regarding the 
history of Tororó.  Past elders of the community such as Zeloba, Tomé, Pé do Serria, and 
Netinho were so knowledgeable about the Bay and its treasures that community members 
describe how they could look out into the water from a high vantage point and know exactly 
which schools of fish were arriving in the Bay.  Canoes would leave and come back full of fish, 
such that even after community members had all filled their buckets, there would be fish left 
over.  In addition to fishing from canoes, people fished from the shore with enormous nets—nets 
of such a size that it took twenty men securing each side to haul them in.  Shrimping trips would 
yield anywhere between ten to fifteen kilograms of shrimp.  These fruits of the sea formed some 
of the community’s most important goods.  In being able to sustain themselves from their local 
environment, the quilombo eschewed reliance on outside materials.  The commodities available 
to the community at that time were limited compared to the present day.  For instance, foods that 
today are staples—such as carne sertão—were essentially unavailable to community in the 
past.24  Basic, available foodstuffs included water, farinha, salt, and eggs.  In addition to this, 
money and currency circulation was very limited in the area.  Instead of buying commodities 
with money, people would trade—fish might be traded for salt, for example.  To prepare for the 
winter time, when fishing was slower and therefore not as productive, people would dry their 
catch in order to have it available on a long-term basis.  Houses were all auto-constructed and 
built from completely local materials.  These were casas de barro with palm leaves used for the 
roof and white sand from the beaches was used to cover the floors.25  Not having access to 
                                                          
24 Carne sertão is a dried, salted, fatty cut of beef that is eaten as a part of several meals in Bahia. 
 
25 Casas de barro are houses made of a wooden frame and filled in with dried mud siding—much like adobe 
houses. 
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electricity, candles were used to light the houses—electricity did not arrive to the community 
until about thirty years ago according to community members. 
The arrival of the navy in the area is noted as the moment when things began to 
drastically change for the community.  While it is said that relations between the navy and the 
community were initially relatively peaceful, the treatment the community received from the 
navy increasingly worsened over time.  Like the case of Rio dos Macacos, the introduction of the 
navy meant expulsions of families that had previously lived in Tororó, as well as the destruction 
of landscapes—built and natural—that had been central to the community’s reproduction.  For 
instance, while historically the quilombo had three water sources from which they drew only one 
is still in use by the community, because the Navy filled in the other wells in the 1990s.  In 
addition to this, the navy built a wall around areas from which the community had traditionally 
extracted fruits and vegetables.  If this was not damaging enough to the community, the navy 
took measures like cutting down their lime trees, stealing fish, nets, and fishing supplies from the 
fisherpeople.  There is even an account of soldiers assaulting a fisherman on the beach and 
leaving him there naked.  Conditions were such that beginning in the 1970s, and occurring 
through the 1980s, about ten different families left the community. 
In addition to the presence of the navy and the problems that this created, the construction 
of the Port of Aratu and the effects this has wrought have also weighed heavily on the conditions 
in Quilombo Tororó.  Several companies operate in the Bay of Aratu and have drastically 
changed the lived environment of the people.  At no point, I am told, were the community 
members of Tororó consulted about the arrival of these companies, nor was their opinion on the 
companies’ presence asked.  Among the companies that operate on the quilombo’s traditional 
fishing grounds are MFX, which works with Petrobras and manufactures steel cables; Dow 
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Chemicals; Ford automobiles, whose plant is actually in Camaçari, but who ships their cars to 
and from the Port of Aratu; and M. Dias Branco, which is a Brazilian food manufacturer. As one 
of Tororó’s leaders explained to me in a conversation, “Eles [as companhias] escolheram seu 
lugar para despejar desgraça”.26  The effects these companies have had on the livelihood of the 
quilombo have been devastating.  It was explained to me that the areas occupied by these 
companies historically served as key fishing areas for the community.  Aside from occupying 
key locations, parts of the Bay were dried up and destroyed altogether to make room for the Port 
and its bridge.  To accompany the large freighters that bring in Ford automobiles, the sea floor of 
the Bay was dredged, permanently altering the habitat of the sea life living there.  If the complete 
occupation and destruction of important fishing locations were not enough, the invading 
companies have caused significant damage to the sea life that remains in this particular part of 
the Bay. 
The mangroves have been poisoned by the industrial waste expelled by these companies 
such that much of the mangroves have died and the animals living in the mangroves have 
seriously deteriorated.  Sururú (mussels) are a central part of the Bahian diet, and a key food and 
income source for Tororó.  However, given the pollution present in the Bay, the sururú have 
declined in quality.  I was told that they now come out of the mangrove mud dead and soft—
unfit for consumption.  Shrimping has also taken a major hit since the arrival of the Port and its 
accompanying industries.  Whereas previously people would return from shrimping with 10-15 
kilograms of shrimp, today it is common to come back with only 1 kilogram or 80 grams of 
shrimp.  Even to those unfamiliar with the history of the quilombo and the displacement brought 
on by the presence of these businesses, the effects of industry in the area are evident.  On my 
                                                          
26 They [the companies] chose their place to dump damnation 
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first trip to Tororó I was convinced that there must be some kind of livestock farm nearby the 
quilombo, given the malodorous nature of the surrounding area.  Upon inquiring, I was informed 
that the smell was actually the result of the soy products that M. Dias Branco worked with—the 
same byproducts that pollute the marine life in the Bay. 
Tororó is perhaps the quilombo in Aratu that most clearly evidences the deleterious 
effects of both public and private intervention in the lives of the quilombos in the area.  
Struggling against the maneuvers of the Brazilian Navy to consolidate their power and influence 
in the area, as well as the Port of Aratu and the businesses it hosts, Tororó is essentially fighting 
a battle on multiple fronts.  The assumed a-political nature of the quilombolas of Tororó is made 
evident in the fact that the state never consulted them when offering incentives to the companies 
that arrived in the area.  The state clearly did not see any political figure with whom they had to 
negotiate on this topic.  Moreover, the community’s assumed a-spatiality is evidenced through 
the systematic and apparently necessary demise of their lived environment.  Both of these factors 
show that the quilombo’s existence is not recognized by private and public actors.  By 
“recognized” I mean that the quilombo’s way of life is clearly not deemed a truly political one by 
the Brazilian state or by private industries.  It is not recognized as deserving protection or of 
having a coherent body politic with whom to negotiate issues that affect the community’s 
population.  Instead, the space inhabited by Tororó is treated as empty.  Truly, all of the 
quilombos in the Bay of Aratu are treated as empty spaces by the state and private industry. 
This reality harkens back to European colonial practices, which were typified by treating 
indigenous and Black populations as if they were not politically or spatially present on the land. 
 Currently, all of the quilombos find themselves in a precarious situation.  While I go into 
the specifics of each quilombos’ situation in Chapters 4, for the sake of contextualizing my 
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arguments in Chapter 3 on the conditions of non-being faced by the quilombos, I must briefly 
describe the status of the commuities’ current struggles.  Rio dos Macacos continues to wait for a 
resolution to their territorial titling, as they have continually rejected the government’s insistence 
on the legal diminution of their land and implementation of topographical changes and 
development projects, which they believe will destroy their collective ability to provide for 
themselves.  Because Rio dos Macacos is intent on establishing the conditions for the future 
growth of their community, the quilombolas continue to insist that their territory not lack the 
resources necessary for their tradition self-subsistence practices, such as cultivable land and 
water sources.  Ilha de Maré continues to feel the effects of pollution and environmental 
degradation in their community as a number of illnesses and the disappearance of marine life 
adversely affect their population.  Despite the clear devastation this pollution has wrought in Ilha 
de Maré, the municipal, state, and federal governments have refused to acknowledge the effects 
the pollution has had on the community or offer any forms of remediation.  The quilombolas of 
Ilha de Maré remain treated as if they do not exist.  Finally, in Tororó, the confluence of 
environmental degradation from the industries in the Bay and the enclosure practices of the navy 
persist in their destruction of the quilombo’s way of life.  Still, Tororó has no set date for when 
the process of titling their territory with the government will take place. 
While the cases presented above are certainly grave and demonstrate nothing short of 
present-day primitive accumulation and, as such, genocide, the communities of Rio dos 
Macacos, Ilha de Maré, and Tororó remain resolved to maintain their territorial integrity and 
preserve their unique way of life.  The context in which the quilombos struggle, I argue, is one 
defined by the continuation of the condition of non-being, inaugurated in the Middle Passage as 
well as a new forms of the meio técnico-científico in the guise of the practice of extractivism and 
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its attendant technologies.  These communities continue to be viewed by the state as empty 
spaces while their members continue to be treated as if they are non-humans.  Still, the 
Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu remain steadfast in their practices of modern-day marronage 
as they seek to create worlds not defined by anti-Blackness.  In this way, the quilombos form 
part of a much larger Black struggle that has unique characteristics in Brazil.
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Chapter 2 
To understand the struggle of the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, it is necessary to 
give some background to the formation of the Brazilian nation-state and the history of Black 
struggle there.  This brief section describes the legacy of slavery in Brazil, paying close attention 
to the various ways anti-Blackness was articulated before and after abolition and how the 
assumption of Black non-being was a central component to the establishment of Brazil.  
Specifically, the role of the “racial democracy” in shaping narratives of miscegenation and 
nationhood in Brazil, and the way this discourse has been used to enervate a Black Brazilian 
identity, are identified in this section.  I also touch on the subordination of Black women in 
Brazil and how this forms a constitutive part of the nation.  In addition to exploring early 
iterations of Brazilian anti-Blackness, this section discusses the ways in which Black Brazilians 
sought to combat the technologies of oppression they faced, as oppression never occurs without 
forms of creative resistance.  I pay specific attention to the role of maroon communities in Brazil, 
known as mocambos or quilombos.  My focus on maroons is strategic, given that the 
communities found in the Bay of Aratu draw on the language and legacy of quilombos in their 
present-day struggles.  By contextualizing Brazil in the global landscape of anti-Blackness and 
Black geographical struggle, this chapter serves to highlight the legacy of anti-Blackness and 
marronage in Brazil.  These phenomena are central to understanding the current manifestations 
of anti-Black violence the quilombos face and how modern quilombos create their own 
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territorialities, as I argue that the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu demonstrate present-day 
forms of marronage amidst a society structured on the assumption of their non-being.
The Black in Brazil 
The figure of the Black was a fundamental component in the birth of Brazil—“o ‘ser 
negro’ foi produzido no campo das idéias a partir das necessidades políticas” and “apresenta-se 
como ontologia de um ser que sempre, sem começo nem fim, foi inferior, foi sombra e 
negatividade”1 (Santos 2002, 16-17 emphasis mine).  Hence, the Black filled the same role in 
early Brazil as it did in the emerging modern world.  In Brazil, as was the case around the globe, 
the Black’s non-being established the conditions for the (Hu)Man’s subjectivity, since “Without 
the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent, uncertain at best” (Wilderson, 2010, 45).  The modern 
Brazilian subject was and is only possible through the maintenance of the a-political figure of the 
Black non-being.  As the most degraded figure in society, the Black acted as the ontological 
anchor for the political subject.  This was made clear in the body and assumed a-spatiality of the 
Black Slave. 
The enslavement of Blacks in Brazil “led inevitably to loss of personhood.  The slave 
became a thing, an object, an item of cargo.  He entered a state that nullified not only his 
possessions but his being” (Mattoso 2002, 87).  This existence came into being through the 
Middle Passage, when Africans went into the cargo hold of the slave ship and came out of the 
same cargo hold as chattel property (Wilderson 2010, 38).  The new role of the slave “would be 
created by his insertion…into a society shaped by a white model” (Mattoso 2002, 88) which, in 
addition to attaching the Black body to an assumption of non-being also associated the Black 
                                                          
1 “the ‘black being’ was produced in the field of ideas for political necessity” and “presents itself as ontology of a 
being that always, without beginning or end, was inferior, was shade and negativity” 
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with “indeterminate space”, thereby creating an a-spatial figure (Wilderson 2010, 283).  In 
addition to the importance for metaphysical notions of being and space, the Black slave came to 
have a significant demographic impact on Brazil, as well. 
Slavery was a central institution to the foundation of the Brazilian nation.  Scholars 
estimate that Brazil may have received as much as 40% of the Africans brought to the Americas 
during the trans-Atlantic slave trade and Brazil was the last country to abolish the slave trade in 
1888 (Sepúlveda dos Santos 2008, 163).  That Brazil received such a high number of slaves and 
practiced slavery for so long meant the implementation of technologies of domination by the 
master class.  Enacting this domination required very specific social and spatial manipulation by 
those in power.  Brazilian anti-Blackness did not always take the form of spectacular, graphic 
violence.  Oftentimes Blacks, themselves, were encouraged and induced to anti-Black practices. 
Brazilian elites fomented major divisions between those of African descent in Brazil.  
This was done, in part, through rewarding “assimilated” Blacks.  “By exhibiting obedience, 
humility, and loyalty [that the slave] could then win” the master’s favor (Mattoso 2002, 148).  
These slaves, that were said to be “adjusted” insofar as they internalized the values presented to 
them by their masters, were differentiated from those thought to be problematic through their 
ability to master the “accoutrements of whiteness” (Walsh 2016, 4).  This led to “Social 
hierarchies within the ‘subjugated’ [that] were just as keenly felt as hierarchies within the 
‘ruling’ class” such that relations amongst slaves or between freedpersons and slaves were often 
hostile (Mattoso 2002, 107).   
For example, slaves born in Brazil were seen as being more assimilated than the African 
slaves.  By playing to “the expectations of white society, the creole separated [himself] from his 
black African brothers and tried to acquire a white soul” (Mattoso 2002, 200).  Another example 
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of divisions among those of African descent were a result of African “Ethnic and religious 
hostilities [that] were carefully fostered by slave owners” (Mattoso 2002, 205).  Still another 
example was the social and economic mobility afforded to the mulatto class.  Mulattoes were 
promised advancement in society on the condition that they adhere to a Eurocentric lifestyle and 
political agenda, so that “The industrious mulatto [could make] himself officially white” 
(Mattoso 2002, 195).  Those who lived in areas with high numbers of Afro-descendant peoples 
could socially ascend in society as long as they abandoned all practices and relationships that 
identified them as Black (Mattoso 2002, 198).   
If slavery inaugurated the existence of the Black in modernity, then captivity became a 
defining factor for populations of African descent globally.  The violences and truths that 
accompanied this captive condition existed, and continue to exist, in various permutations among 
Afro-descendant populations.  One of the ways this manifests itself is in regards to gender and 
the idea of family. 
Since “under conditions of captivity, the offspring of the female does not ‘belong’ to the 
Mother”, in modern figurings of the family, “African peoples in the historic Diaspora had 
nothing to prove, if the point had been that they were not capable of ‘family’ (read 
‘civilization’)” (Spillers 1987, 74-75).  This is to say that “though the enslaved female 
reproduced other enslaved persons, we do not read ‘birth’ in this instance as a reproduction of 
mothering precisely because the female, like the male, has been robbed of the parental right, the 
parental function” (Spillers 1987, 77-78).  Put in even franker terms, the female slave “could not, 
in fact, claim her child…because ‘motherhood’ is not perceived in the prevailing social climate 
as a legitimate procedure of cultural inheritance” (Spillers 1987, 80).  Black women are denied 
the potential for motherhood in modernity because, as Hortense Spillers notes, “’gendering’ 
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takes place within the confines of the domestic”, with the domestic sphere being denied to 
Blacks, given that the Middle Passage—the inaugural moment of Blackness—was “nowhere at 
all” (1987, 72).  These factors combine to form intersecting modes of oppression, such that Black 
women in Brazil faced and continue to face unique iterations of racist, gendered oppression 
which can never be understood as separate from each other (Crenshaw 2012, 1425).  The 
intersectionality of these oppressive factors historically and presently manifest themselves in 
specific ways in Brazil. 
The lack of spatial capacity of the Middle Passage brought about the denial of the 
domestic sphere, while the spaces of non-being into which Blacks have continually been 
forced—slave quarters, prisons, the hyperghetto, favelas—have maintained the condition of a-
spatiality.  A-spatiality, or lacking the potential to make space, also makes impossible the 
establishment of the domestic sphere and, as such, the establishment of gender.  Bodies, not 
subjectivities, are registered in this case, and “one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects 
are taken into ‘account’ as quantities.  The female in ‘Middle Passage,’ as the apparently small 
physical mass…is…quantifiable by the same rules of accounting as her male counterpart” 
(Spillers 1987, 72).  The degradation of Black female slaves occurred in Brazil just as it did 
across the rest of the Americas. 
Whether it was in the rural sugar, coffee, cotton, and mining sectors, where they were 
viewed and expected to behave as “good domestic animals” (Brown 2006, 79) or in the urban 
setting, where supposedly less rigorous domestic work nonetheless killed female slaves through 
atrocious hygiene, living conditions, and diets and subjected them to disease and high infant 
mortality (Cowling 2013, 26), slavery entailed the domination and subjugation of Black women.  
In short, while slavery, in general, meant that “os africanos escravizados não mereciam nenhuma 
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consideração como seres humanos”2 in the minds of the slave-owning class, the marginalizing 
factors of slave society meant that slave women were “automaticamente impedidas de 
estabelecer qualquer estável estrutura de família”3 (Nascimento 1978, 61).  Instead, widespread 
sexual exploitation and less than human treatment typified the lives of female slaves in Brazil 
(ibid).  The persistence of anti-Blackness in Brazil continued even after abolition, albeit in new 
expressions. 
Post-Abolition 
Unlike Haiti and the United States, where the slaves freed themselves from bondage 
(James 1963; Du Bois 1998), “abolition in Brazil was a gradual, drawn-out affair” (Skidmore 
1999, 70).  In addition to abolition materializing slowly, it is evident that the condition of Black 
non-being inaugurated during the trans-Atlantic slave trade continued in new formations even 
after slavery was legally ended.  Following the 1888 abolition of slavery in Brazil, the recently 
independent nation-state was faced with a predicament.  That Brazil might become a nation 
dominated by Blacks not only in numbers, but politically as well, remained a reality that the 
elites were determined to avoid.  Blacks represented a “heterogeneous” factor in society, as they 
were seen as opposed to the labor conditions necessary for a modern nation, making them an 
“inimigo domiciliar”4 that was both a stranger to public interests and forever at war with the 
general population (Azevedo 1987, 41-42).  Brazilian elites insisted that Blacks cared little for 
individual freedom and cast the ex-slaves as naturally lazy and prone to vagabundagem,5 
                                                          
2 The enslaved African did not deserve any consideration as human beings 
 
3 Automatically impeded from establishing any stable family structure 
 
4 Home enemy 
 
5 Vagabondage 
59 
 
marginality, and retrograde behaviors (Azevedo 1987, 51, 78-80).  In reality, these elites were 
reacting to the ex-slaves’ desire to establish their own productive and political practices. 
Abolition presented an opportunity for ex-slaves to break their relation of dependence on 
the former master class.  This took the form of Black small-scale production in which former 
slaves and other marginalized groups created and maintained their own means of subsistence.  
However, the desire for ex-slaves and the impoverished to work for their own self-subsistence 
was considered vadiagem6 among landholders and the propertied (Azevedo 1987, 127-130).  As 
a result, the propertied sectors of Brazilian society worked to prevent land reform during this 
time (Skidmore 1999, 70).  The figure of the Black presented a domestic enemy insofar as it had 
its own political and economic agenda and desire to create and maintain its own spaces 
independent of, and indeed inherently contrary to, the national space to which the elites aspired.  
This was a reality which could not be accepted by the ruling class.  To temper this possibility, 
Brazilian elites worked to redefine Brazil’s system of social stratification, such that Black 
populations would remain as the most marginalized sectors of society (ibid). 
Immigration 
Brazilian elites found their solution to Black Geographies in European immigration.  At 
stake were issues of economy and culture, as Europeans were accustomed to “modern” labor 
practices and offered a biological purifying factor in the midst of the Blacks that were seen as 
degraded by centuries of slavery (Santos, 2002, 84-87).7  As a result, European immigration to 
                                                          
6 Vagrancy 
 
7 The elites’ emphasis on establishing a modern nation was part of their feverish drive to realize a society rooted in 
“Order and Progress.”  Order and Progress was the mantra adopted by the Brazilian state in its attempt to become 
a modern nation, and today exists as the slogan emblazoned on the Brazilian flag.  “Order,” in this case, defines the 
stability of nature, while “Progress” marks its movement.  Progress could be achieved through rational Reason and 
represented the capacity for people to perfect their knowledge of social life (see Santos, 2002, 39) 
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Brazil more than quadrupled from 1886 to 1888, with most new arrivals coming from Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain (Skidmore 1999, 71).  Prevailing theories on national development argued 
that even as freedpersons, Blacks demonstrated an inferiority evidenced by their lack of industry 
and productive ability as well as their cranial size.  Furthermore, many believed that Blacks 
actually did not know how to be free and were inherently lazy, seeing all forms of work as 
punishment—and were thus not fit to be free workers in any society (Santos, 2002, 94-95).  Until 
Blacks could be civilized, Brazil needed “massas fortemente organizadas de produtores agrícolas 
ou industriais que, nos povos civilizados, são a base de toda a riqueza” (Santos 2002, 98).8  
European immigrants brought with them versatile work skill sets, excelling in a variety of areas, 
including agriculture, textiles, and metallurgy.  This set them apart from Black Brazilians, who 
elites viewed as physically inferior and incapable of serious work habits (Skidmore 1999, 71; 
73).  It was this “argumento de inexistência de um povo [que] é fundamental para a 
concepção…imigrantista”9 (Santos, 2002, 98-99).  Along with the emphasis on European 
immigration, the Brazilian nation focused on questions of “purifying” the country through 
miscegenation in the hopes that eventually Blacks would become extinct (Hordge-Freeman 2015, 
11). 
Multiracialism10 and Racial Democracy 
                                                          
8 “strongly organized masses of agricultural or industrial producers that, in civilized peoples, are the base of all 
wealth” 
 
9 “argument of inexistence of a people [that] is fundamental for an immigrantist conception” 
 
10 My introduction to the concept of multiracialism came from an independent study I did with Alvaro Reyes during 
the spring of 2013. 
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Despite national attempts to remove the legacy of Blackness from the Brazilian 
landscape, the preponderance of Afro-descendant peoples in the country necessitated a unique 
national discourse that operated on two fronts.  This discourse rejected the idea of a 
contemporary, visible Black subjectivity in the country, yet still acknowledged the past figure of 
the Slave as a constitutive factor of the Brazilian nation.  This past figure resides in the tacit 
acknowledgement of the presence of African descendants in Brazil—a presence which is at once 
accepted and disavowed through the idea of the Brazilian racial democracy.  In order to 
appreciate the ways in which the notion of racial democracy seeks to erase Blackness, there must 
be an understanding of the project of multiracialism. 
Multiracialism, as a discourse, focuses on “race mixture” in contemporary culture and 
society.  Importantly, this approach reinforces long-standing tenets of anti-Blackness in part by 
downplaying the lasting effects of slavery and enervating the idea of Blackness as a viable social 
identity (Sexton, 2008, 1-2).  Multiracialism attempts to delegitimize Black identity by arguing 
that such an identity is not “necessary” and should not comprise a political subjectivity (Sexton, 
2008, 6-7).  Multiracialism, therefore, works as a discourse to isolate Blacks on social, political, 
and economic fronts by making the Black identity obsolete. 
By tacitly acknowledging the presence and role of Blacks in society, multiracialism 
serves as a powerful tool to undermine Black consciousness and struggle.  The reliance on 
modernity’s tools is clearly evidenced in the case of Brazil’s “racial democracy.” 
Multiracialism has been a component of the Brazilian nation since its inception 
(Munanga 1999). Because of the high number of Blacks in Brazil, a national identity 
fundamentally opposed to a Black politics had to be created in order to protect against the 
possibility of widespread political organizing on the part of the marginalized Afro-descendant 
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peoples in the country.  In addition to cultivating divisions between Blacks, encouraging 
European immigration, and violently repressing expressions of Black culture and politics, 
Brazilian elites focused on celebrating and encouraging racial mixture nationwide.  Gilberto 
Freyre would expand on this supposed propensity for racial mixture in his landmark book Casa 
Grande e Senzala, published in English as The Masters and the Slaves (1986).  In this work, 
Freyre describes the origins and consequences of the “racial democracy.”  Racial democracy is 
the idea that there exists little to no racial animosity in Brazil and that the Brazilian nation is 
defined by its inherent racial mixture.  The sexual relations between the figure of the White 
(man) and the Black and Indian (women) meant that “the Portuguese triumphed where other 
Europeans failed; and the first modern society formed in the tropics with national characteristics 
and qualities of permanence” (Freyre 1986, 17).  As a result of this predilection for racial 
mixture, the hatreds that typified other slaveholding areas of the Americas, according to Freyre, 
were absent in Brazil (1986, xii) and every Brazilian, no matter their hue, “carries with him on 
his soul, when not on the soul and body alike…the shadow, or at least the birthmark, of the 
aborigine or the Negro” (1986, 278). 
Public figures in post-abolition Brazil championed the notion of racial mixture described 
in the idea of racial democracy by arguing that only through miscegenation could the Black have 
any value in Brazil.  As a nation, “o embranquecimento seria uma solução plausível para negros 
e brancos, para que os últimos não fossem destruídos pelo enegrecimento e para que os primeiros 
não sucumbissem à herança nefanda que o destino os reservou: o sangue africano”11 (Santos, 
2002, 127).  Thanks to the arrival of Europeans in the country, mestiçagem could become “o 
                                                          
11 “whitening would be a plausible solution for blacks and whites, so that the latter would not be destroyed by 
blackening and so that the former would not succumb to the nefarious inheritance that destiny reserved for them: 
African blood” 
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ponto de equilíbrio da sociedade brasileira”12 as argued by Gilberto Freyre (Santos, 2002, 149-
151).  This blood-mixing would produce “homens fortes, inteligentes e altivos”13 (Azevedo, 
1987, 75), with “O senhor representando a força, a virilidade, a brancura, a inteligência, o 
engenho, a crueldade sádica; e o escravo, a doçura, a sensualidade, o negror, a esperteza, a 
passividade masoquista”14 (Santos, 2002, 154).  These notions lent themselves to the idea of a 
racial paradise, in which mixture between races occurs naturally and without prejudice, 
“contribui não só para a invenção de uma nova ‘identidade’ para os negros, brancos, e mestiços, 
como também para a configuração de toda uma identidade nacional baseada em uma falsa 
democracia”15 (Santos, 2002, 160-161).  In reality, these aspirations of racial mixture were 
rooted in ideas of eugenics, cast as a “racial hygiene project” that would eventually remove racial 
challenges to modernity (Hordge-Freeman 2015, 10). 
Despite the apparent celebration of miscegenation, the ideology of racial democracy 
actually demands that each member of society “obedeça os limites estabelecidos pelo caráter de 
sua cultura, de sua origem, de sua étnia, de sua cor”16 (Santos, 2002, 161).  Furthermore, this 
idea of racial democracy privileges the creation of a “modern” subject whose constitution places 
it in a position to participate in the world as an active subject.  This is shown in the quote above 
that highlights the supposedly positive aspects of both White and Black Brazilians.  It was 
believed that the combination of these two groups would lead to a nation deserved of global 
                                                          
12 The point of equilibrium for Brazilian society 
 
13 “strong, intelligent and haughty men” 
 
14 “the master representing the force, virility, whiteness, intelligence, ingenuity, the sadistic cruelty; and the slave, 
the sweetness, sensuality, blackness, cleverness, the masochistic passivity” 
 
15 “contributes not only to the invention of a new ‘identity’ for blacks, whites, and mestizos, but also for the 
configuration of a whole national identity based on a false democracy” 
 
16 “obey the limits established by the character of their culture of origin, of their ethnicity, of their color”  
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political recognition.  This point of view also tacitly demonstrates the persistence of the notion of 
non-being, as it is against the inhuman Black that this potential Brazilian subject is measured. 
Taking into account the history of slavery, immigration, and anti-Blackness in Brazil, it is 
obvious that racial democracy was “biologically and culturally, politically and 
economically…set by and on the terms of white European descendants” (Goldberg, 2009, 200).  
Even though the notion of racial democracy is clearly a tool of anti-Blackness, it serves to 
prevent discussions around legacies of race and racial violence.  Indeed, the idea that 
racialization in Brazilian society is mild or even non-existence is a lasting hallmark of racial 
democracy, particularly among middle class Brazilians (Sheriff 2001, 5-6).  As a nationalist 
ideology, racial democracy not only influences the beliefs, actions, and discourses of Brazilians 
(Sheriff 2001, 7), it also profoundly affects international audiences’ understandings of Brazilian 
race relations (Hordge-Freeman 2015, 11).  While this discourse works to silence discussions on 
race, the specter of Blackness nonetheless remains salient in society.   
The ever-present focus on an identity that both acknowledges and rejects Blackness leads 
João Costa Vargas to describe the “hyperconsciousness of race” in Brazilian society.  This 
hyperconsciousness “is associated with the effects of the racial democracy ideology” and 
manifests itself in the outward insistence “that race is neither an analytically and morally valid 
tool, nor plays a central role in determining Brazilian social relations, hierarchies, and 
distributions of power and resources” (Vargas 2004, 444).  Despite this essential denial of racial 
awareness, Brazilian society “is in reality deeply immersed in racialized understandings of the 
social world” to the extent that “race” plays a large role “in determining one’s position in the 
historical structures of power and resources” (Vargas 2004, 446).  Indeed, “Brazilians are acutely 
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aware of racial differences and utilize those to (often tacitly) justify, think about, and enforce 
behavior and social inequalities” (Vargas 2004, 446). 
In sum, the Brazil of today is built on the attempted removal of any vestiges of Africanity 
and a radical Black subjectivity.  This is a product of Brazilian elites’ attempts to create a 
“modern” nation that protects against the influence of the Black “non-being.”  It is because of 
this that the Black generally occupies the space of memory in the Brazilian nation.  While 
Blackness’ effects are still evidenced in the country’s phenotype, the persistence of a unique 
Black subjectivity is not recognized in the Brazilian nation.  Still a largely unspoken (but 
nonetheless present) component of the country’s origin, the Black is not a viable political part of 
the Brazilian national landscape.  The threat to modernity has been banished to the nation’s 
collective past, present only as a distant memory and rarely spoken about17.  Despite this 
attempted erasure, Black spaces have a rich and continued history in Brazil. 
Pre-Abolition Black Struggle in Brazil 
 While Black Brazilians historically and presently occupy marginalized social and spatial 
positions in Brazil, they have nonetheless demonstrated, and continue to demonstrate, the fact 
that those deemed forgettable and a-spatial are always creating their own spatial formations 
(McKittrick and Woods 2007, 4).  As such, Brazil has a long legacy of Black Geographies, as 
Black struggles against the various forms of racist violence in Brazil were and are myriad.  I 
define Black Geographies as the geographical expressions of those that recognize the assumed 
non-being of Afro-descendant populations in society and seek to create the conditions for a 
                                                          
17 Not all vestiges of Blackness and Africanity have been completely erased.  Events like Carnaval and musical 
expressions like samba, when portraying a “civilized” and “disciplined” African society are not only accepted but 
encouraged, as “safe” Blacks are seen as being able to offset the more dangerous elements of society (see Graden, 
2006, 205).  Still, spaces geared toward a “radical” Black existence remain widely persecuted in Brazil. 
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world not defined by Black inhumanity.  These geographies are plural and occur globally in a 
variety of expressions.  Among the varieties of struggle found across Brazil before abolition 
were slave revolts, which persisted for centuries in Brazil, leading to the abandoning of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade and, possibly, to the ultimate abolition of slavery altogether (Graden 2006, 
10, 18-19).  Regarding the issue of gender, the record of Brazilian revolts shows women 
struggling against the intersectional modes of oppression they faced and playing central roles in 
the planning and execution of the uprisings.  Luiza Mahim, for instance, is famous for her role in 
the Malê Revolt of 1835 in Bahia (Campos 2003, 77).   
In addition to these revolts, efforts at building up the Black community were evidenced in 
the work of practitioners of Candomblé, who collectively put together unique built environments, 
work techniques, and systems of distribution and consumption (de Mattos 2008).  Again, Black 
women showed their centrality as political actors through their commitment to creating 
distinctive religious communities.  In particular, the case of Rosa Egipcíaca, who was a slave 
prostitute in Rio de Janeiro and later Minas Gerais, and eventually became a religious leader and 
writer, founding a convent for prostitutes and women of African descent in Rio de Janeiro, is a 
prime example of Black women’s contribution to wider Black struggle (Krueger 2002, 175-177; 
Mott 1993).  While these measures were undoubtedly transformative for Black Brazilians, 
perhaps the most radical form of Black struggle in early Brazil were the maroon societies. 
Quilombos (also known as mocambos) existed as political and spatial alternatives for the 
outcasts of Brazilian society.  These were communities in which runaway slaves, freedpersons, 
indigenous groups, and poor whites would gather to escape the oppressive conditions present in 
dominant society.  The quilombo, as a politico-spatial feature “foi, incontestávelmente, a unidade 
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básica de resistência do escravo”18 and existed across the entirety of the Brazilian nation-scape 
since “O quilombo aparecia onde quer que a escravidão surgisse”19 (Moura 1972, 87).  
Mocambos and quilombos, “Unlike individual acts of violence or simple escape…no matter 
what the ultimate goals or self-perceptions of their inhabitants, were joint acts against the 
existing social and economic order” (Schwartz, 1970, 333).  Moreover, these were spaces of 
alliances between different oppressed groups in Brazilian society, since “For the runaways and 
unreduced tribes there was a common ground of opposition to the European-imposed system and 
slavery which led naturally to cooperation”, despite “Portuguese attempts to turn the Indian into 
an ally against African resistance” (Schwartz, 1970, 325).  In addition to allying with poor 
Whites and indigenous groups, quilombos offered an important alternative to a society which 
constantly played Blacks against one another.  Rejecting the divisions created between different 
sectors of the Black population “quase sempre os quilombolas dispunham de aliados quer nas 
senzalas quer nos centros urbanos”20 (Moura 1972, 111).  Quilombos, therefore, worked with 
and brought together Blacks from all over Brazilian society.  The nature of these quilombos was 
truly a creative one.  In this way, the quilombos represented Black Geographies that sought to 
create wholly new political, territorial, and social relations that departed from modern notions of 
politics and subjectivity. 
Clóvis Moura names seven fundamental types of quilombos: Agricultural; extractivist; 
mercantile; miners; pastoral; service-oriented; and predatory (1993, 32-33).  Regardless of the 
kind of productive practices employed, “nos quilombos, o tipo de economia comunitária ali 
                                                          
18 Was, incontestably, the basic unit of resistance of the slave 
 
19 The quilombo appeared wherever slavery arose 
 
20 The quilombolas almost always had allies whether in the slave quarters or in the urban centers 
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instalado proporcionava o acesso ao bem-estar de toda a comunidade”21 (Moura 1993, 34).  
Agriculture was a common characteristic of all quilombos and, unlike plantations, they did not 
practice monoculture, but instead had a poly-culture that could satisfy their own needs and also 
lead to trade with outsiders (Moura 1993, 33).  Because of the threat these communities posed to 
the continuation and viability of colonial society, slave owners and political leaders employed 
various measures with the intent “to destroy them and to kill or reenslave their inhabitants” 
(Schwartz, 1970, 326).  Still, quilombos, by having multiple ways of providing for themselves, 
were able to survive amidst isolation and wars with slave catchers and colonial militias (Moura 
1993, 26).   
Quilombos, then, offer a prime example of radical Black Geographies in the sense that 
they simultaneously refused to succumb to societal assimilation or domination and also existed 
in a plurality—their existence was a fundamentally open one and not defined by an adherence to 
modern notions of politics, territory, or being.  Moreover, their internal economies and ways of 
life were all geared toward recognizing, respecting, and protecting the lives of those figures 
deemed non-beings in colonial society.  The need to express one’s humanity was possible in the 
quilombos of the past precisely through the socio-political arrangements that combated the 
inherent violence of Brazilian society.  Given the plurality of the methods certain sectors of 
Black Brazil employed to ameliorate their oppressed position in society—assimilation, revolt, 
reformist organizations—quilombos are unique in their employment of Radical Black 
consciousness and Geography.  Instead of seeking recognition within the modern edifice, as 
many did in a society structured on anti-Blackness, quilombos offered a truly radical break with 
modern notions of politics, relying on creating an emergent existence premised on the valuing of 
                                                          
21 In the quilombos, the type of communitarian economy installed there provided access to well-being for the 
whole community. 
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Black life.  Rather than relying on modern forms of politics and territoriality, which are 
dependent on sovereignty and domination, these communities used unique and creative methods 
of existing in relation to one another and the physical environment to create their respective 
territories.  The politico-spatial significance of quilombos continued in Brazil even after the 
immediate post-abolition period. 
The anti-Blackness of the Military Dictatorship 
As mentioned previously, the creation of the Brazilian nation was and is predicated on 
the establishment of a multiracial figure that at once tacitly acknowledges and disavows the 
presence of Afro-descendant populations among its populace.  While this manifested itself in 
unique ways in the different regions, Brazil cast itself both internally and internationally as an 
anti-racist, unified country where mestiçagem was the demographic norm (Bailey 2009).  With 
the coming to power of the military dictatorship in 1964, the silencing of overt race 
consciousness became even more pronounced.  The military coup which brought the dictatorship 
to power was the result of a conservative pushback against the government of João Goulart, who 
was proposing measures like land expropriation, the nationalization of oil refineries, and the 
enfranchisement of illiterate citizens (Alberto, 2011, 248-249).  While the military government 
was initially marginally tolerant of dissenting viewpoints, in 1967, a more hard-line 
administration took power, expanding state influence, shutting down Congress, censoring the 
media, and enacting government purges (Alberto, 2011, 249).  In 1969, the National Security 
Council declared that writing or speaking on the issue of racial discrimination was an act of 
leftist subversion and increasingly circulated pronouncements, publications, and cultural policies 
that proclaimed racial and cultural mestiçagem to be a pillar of national Order (Htun 2004, 65; 
89).  The dictatorship repressed Black thinkers, organizations, unions, student groups, and leftists 
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as subversives, while “backed by the threat of military force, the state’s idealization of 
mestiçagem stifled the claims to racial and cultural difference black thinkers had insisted on in 
previous decades” (Alberto, 2011, 245).   
As part of their championing of racial democracy, the military dictatorship used aspects 
of Brazil’s African heritage deemed “quaintly folkloric and politically unthreatening” to 
illustrate the country’s racial harmony (ibid).  The dictatorship used the ideology of mestiçagem 
“to promote a homoegenous, organic nation and to blot out claims to black cultural or racial 
distinctiveness”, arguing that “African cultural traits did not belong exclusively to African-
descended Brazilians, but were the shared patrimony of a mestiço nation” (Alberto, 2011, 253-
254).  In response to this, Black activists and organizations around the country began organizing 
against the notion of racial democracy that the dictatorship was so keen on emphasizing.  
Arguing that the claim of racial democracy was actually a purveyor or racism, these Black actors 
came to frame their struggle in terms of decolonization—“liberation from the political, 
economic, and ideological domination of an illegitimate white minority” (Alberto, 2011, 246).  
As is perhaps evident from this language of decolonization, these Brazilian activists drew on the 
global uprisings that were taking place at that time, including Africa’s decolonizing efforts and 
the U.S. Civil Rights Movements.  In espousing these values of liberation, Brazil’s Black 
militants rejected the “mixed identity” that the dictatorship insisted defined the country. 
The actions taken by Black activists in the wake of the repressions implemented by 
Brazil’s military dictatorship are termed “protesto negro” by Flavia Rios.  Rios gives a very 
specific definition of “protesto” here, explaining that “assume franco objetivo de ser evento 
público, cuja função é chamar a atenção da sociedade e das autoridades, preferencialmente 
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através dos holofotes ou das notícias impressas através das quais ganham mais visibilidade”22 
(2012, 42).  Specifically, “As manifestações de rua marcaram o retorno da política negra à cena 
pública brasileira nos anos 1970”23 (Rios, 2012, 43).  This is evidenced in the 1978 protest on the 
steps of the Municipal Theatre of São Paulo, where the Movimento Unificado Contra a 
Discriminiação Racial took a public space “como palco privilegiado de manifestações”24 (Rios, 
2012, 42).  This was a seemingly new approach by Black activists as Black organizations 
previously “por conta da repressão militar, esteve restrita a encontros, reuniões e seminários”25 
(Rios, 2012, 48). 
Obviously, a key point in the Black protests of the 1970s and later in the 1980s was that 
of racial discrimination.  To combat this reality, the movement “ergue-se a bandeira do 
igualitarismo, tema que ganhou centralidade no ideário do grupo mobilizado nas últimas décadas 
do século XX”26 (Rios, 2012, 44).  Civil liberties, such as the freedom from police violence, 
equal access to, and treatment in the workplace, access to education, and political representation 
were the basis of many of the Black movement’s demands.  Racism was thus cast in structural 
terms, needing concrete solutions, which was cast against the official line of the government at 
the time, which maintained its insistence on the immanence of racial democracy (Rios, 2012, 49-
50; 56).  To illuminate the nature of racism and the Black resolve to fight racist national 
                                                          
22 It assumes the frank objective of being a public event, whose function is to call society’s and the authorities’ 
attention, preferably through spotlights or printed news through which to gain more visibility 
 
23 The street protests marked the return of black politics to the Brazilian public scene in the 1970s 
 
24 As a privileged stage for protests 
 
25 Because of military repression, were restricted to encounters, meetings and seminars 
 
26 Lifts a banner of egalitarianism, a theme that gained centrality in the ideas of the mobilized group in the last 
decades of the twentieth century 
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assemblages, Black Brazilian activists turned to their own “realidade sócio-histórico-cultural”27 
(Rios, 2012, 46).  The Brazilian Black struggle was exemplified in the case of Zumbi dos 
Palmares.  For Black activists, Zumbi and other historical Black figures like Luiza Mahim and 
Negro Cosme were the figures that most accurately represented the abolitionist spirit of Brazil.28  
Contrary to this national myth, Brazil’s Black movement maintained that abolition had never 
truly taken place, that it actually persisted into the present day, and thus Zumbi—who had lived 
and died fighting the proliferation of slavery—was an appropriate symbol of Black resistance 
(Rio, 2012, 53-54).  Drawing on Zumbi meant “a renovação das energias utópicas dos ativistas 
negros e o fortalecimento de sua identidade coletiva ancorada nas memórias da escravidão”29 and 
the edification “do guerreiro palmarino como símbolo de resistência política e cultural”30 could 
be utilized nationally (Rios, 2012, 55).   
The organizing efforts of the Black Movement activists came to have concrete effects in 
the electoral realm of post-dictatorship Brazil.  Along with the occupation of public spaces, there 
came to pass important theoretical pronouncements from the Black Movement.  Part of these 
efforts was the emphasis on the ethic of quilombismo, articulated in the work of Abdias do 
Nascimento.  Nascimento was one of the preeminent figures of the Black Movement during the 
military dictatorship and the founder of the Black Experimental Theatre (TEN).  Exiled for part 
of the dictatorship’s reign, Nascimento divulged the struggle of Black Brazilians while at the 
                                                          
27 Socio-historico-cultural reality 
 
28 Luiza Mahim was a Muslim slave and mother to Brazilian poet Luiz Gama.  She took part in both the Malê Revolt 
of 1835 in Salvador, Bahia as well as the Sabinada Revolt in Bahia which took place from late 1837 through early 
1838.  Negro Cosme was a freed slave and quilombola leader in Maranhão during the early and mid 19th century.   
 
29 The renovation of the utopic energies of the black activists and the fortifying of collective identity anchored in 
the memories of slavery 
 
30 Of the palmarino warrior as a symbol of political and cultural resistance 
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same time linking their struggle to a broader global Black struggle.  The discourse of racial 
democracy “developed and refined myriad techniques of preventing Black Brazilians from being 
able to identify and actively assume their ethnic, historical and cultural roots” argued 
Nascimento, noting that Black Brazilians were not taught to associate with or valorize any aspect 
of their African heritage (1980, 141-142).  Far from only a struggle by those of African descent, 
Nascimento argues that quilombismo knows its struggle “cannot be separated from the mutual 
liberation of the indigenous peoples of these lands, who are also victims of the racism and 
wanton destructiveness introduced and enforced by the European colonists and their heirs” 
(1980, 148).  Thus, like the quilombos founded in the 16th century and after, Nascimento’s 
articulation of quilombismo is contingent on the participation and defense of other groups that 
have been subjected to the violences of modernity.  In short, it is a challenge to the effects of 
erasure in the modern epoch.  Quilombismo is rooted in the “exigency for enslaved Africans…to 
recover their liberty and human dignity through escape from captivity, organizing viable free 
societies in Brazilian territory” as evidenced in the original quilombos, which “rapidly 
transformed from the improvisation of emergency into the methodical and constant life form of 
the African masses” (Nascimento, 1980, 151).   
Like all radical Black movements, “Quilombismo is in a constant process of 
revitalization and remodernization, attending to the needs of the various historical times and 
geographical environments” (Nascimento, 1980, 153).  This suggests that, while there are unique 
aspects to all iterations of quilombismo, common characteristics underpin them all.  This 
common denominator is the “erection of a society founded on justice, equality and respect for all 
human beings; on freedom; a society whose intrinsic nature makes economic or racial 
exploitation impossible”—in short, “To assure the fullest human condition of the Afro-Brazilian 
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masses is the ethical grounding of Quilombismo, and its most basic concept” (Nascimento, 1980, 
160; 162).  These guiding principles of quilombismo informed the Brazilian Black Movement 
during and after the Brazilian military dictatorship. 
The Brazilian Transition to “Democracy” 
1985 marked the first time a civilian president had been elected in Brazil since 1964.  A 
constituent assembly was convened during 1987.  There were a number of delegates in the 
constituent assembly who were activists within the Black movement and who proposed that 
Black communities that could claim a lineage to quilombos should be granted titles to their land.  
The language of “remanescente do quilombos,” which connotes a past-tense and derivative form 
of existence, was the result of concessions that Black activists had to accept.  The constituent 
assembly was unwilling to accept their initial demand that all rural Black communities be given 
land, and so they jointly settled on the language of quilombos being included in the new 
constitution (French, 2006, 341; do Rosário Linhares, 2004, 823).  The fact that the Black 
Movement had fewer participants in the constituent assembly than did other marginalized 
communities may have been one contributing factor to their inability to secure explicit 
legislation for rural Black communities.  Another contributing factor may have been the fact that 
there were no members of would-be quilombo communities on the constituent assembly 
(Fiabani, 2005, 360).  What is evident, however, is that quilombo legislation was included in the 
constitution for the simple fact that those comprising the majority of the constituent assembly did 
not believe that there were many quilombo communities in existence, and that any titling could 
be handled in a relatively short amount of time (French, 2006, 355).  The constituent assembly 
clearly did not see quilombos as immanent spatial arrangements.  In this way, Brazilian society’s 
power brokers once again evidenced their understanding of Black Brazilians as a-spatial actors.  
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This legislation was nothing more than a formality for those writing the constitution, as they 
were unable to see Blacks in Brazil as active territorial subjects.  Instead, they chose to frame the 
law as a nod to a spatial formation that they assumed was extinct, demonstrating the belief that 
quilombos were strictly things of the past (Arêda-Oshai 2015, 260).  The constituent assembly 
viewed quilombos as erstwhile, vanquished spatial arrangements that had essentially no bearing 
on present-day Brazil.  It was through their inclusion of this supposedly irrelevant spatial figure 
that quilombos came into the Brazilian constitution of 1988. 
Quilombos were recognized as (potentially) legitimate political spaces in Article 68 of 
the Acts of Transitory Provisions in the Brazilian constitution.  The article reads “Aos 
remanescentes das comunidades dos quilombos que estejam ocupando suas terras é reconhecida 
a propriedade definitiva, devendo o Estado emitir-lhes os títulos respectivos”31 (Brazilian 
Constitution Art. 68 ADCT). Quilombola legislation has been amended and changed over the 
years.  In 1989 the Palmares Cultural Foundation was consolidated and “implicitly inherited the 
land issue of kilombo communities as a subject of its administration” (do Rosário Linhares, 
2004, 827).  The first thee cases brought before the Foundation took place in the early 1990s 
with communities in Maranhão, Pará, and Bahia.32  The Foundation was officially given this 
authority by Provisional Measure No. 1.911-11 in October of 1999, which placed this titling 
ability within the Ministry of Culture.  In 2001, then president Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
issued Decree 3.912, which purported to implement Article 68, but in reality made it more 
difficult for quilombos to become titled as it only recognized land that had been occupied by 
quilombos prior to abolition.  Proving this land tenure required specific historical documents to 
                                                          
31 To the remnants of quilombo communities occupying their lands are recognized definitive ownership, the State 
shall grant them respective titles. 
 
32 The case in Bahia is that of Rio das Rãs, to which I refer below. 
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which many quilombolas did not have access (Rapoport Delegation, 2008, 22-23).  Because of 
this, from 1999-2003, while the Palmares Cultural Foundation handled the titling of quilombo 
territories, only fourteen communities were titled, while thirteen of those fourteen were titled 
between 1999 and 2000. 
Quilombola Legislation Today 
In 2003, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva of the Brazilian Workers’ Party implemented an 
overhaul of quilombola legislation, creating the Secretaria Especial para Políticas de Promoção 
da Igualdade Racial (www.SEPPIR.gov.br) which assumed the task of, among other things, 
creating a new decree on the quilombo titling process (Rapoport Delegation, 2008, 23).  The 
result of SEPPIR’s efforts was Decree 4.887, released on November 20, 2003.  Among the 
measures introduced in the Decree was the ruling that quilombo communities would be 
characterized as such through self-definition; that this self-definition as a quilombo would be 
registered with the Palmares Cultural Foundation; that the National Institute of Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform (INCRA) would handle the identification, recognition, delimiting, demarcation, 
and titling of quilombo territories while regularizing such processes; and in the case of quilombo 
communities occupying the same location as areas of national security, borderlands, and/or 
indigenous lands, INCRA, the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Resources 
(IBAMA), the Executive Office of the National Defense Council, the National Indian 
Foundation, and the Palmares Cultural Foundation will take appropriate actions to guarantee the 
sustainability of the communities in question, while conciliating the interests of the State (Silva 
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et. Al 2003).33  In addition to these factors, state aid is available to quilombos in the form of food 
aid and infrastructural assistance for things like sanitation, water, and electricity. 
The tangible result of this Decree is a very long process through which quilombo 
communities must go in order to title their territories.  There are seventeen different steps a 
community must go through, in all, to have its territory titled.  These involve self-identification, 
a formal request by the community to the Regional Superintendent of INCRA to open 
administrative regularization procedures, the drafting of a technical report by INCRA which uses 
anthropological and historical data to delimit the community’s territory, the potential objection 
by other actors affected by the titling of the land, and, if necessary, the expulsion of non-
quilombo occupants (Rapoport Delegation, 2008, 24-25).34  The legislation makes clear that the 
state has a central role in defining who becomes an “official” quilombo.  As I show in the 
following section, this ultimately leads to the state attempting to manipulate quilombo territory 
into propagating capitalistic and sovereign assemblages. 
Presently, there are 2,422 quilombo communities culturally recognized in Brazil.  Of this 
total, 238 are territorially titled (www.SEPPIR.gov.br).  The titling process implemented through 
Decree 4.887 has created a situation in which it is not only difficult for quilombos to get their 
land titled, but can also lead to them losing their traditional territorial practices.  As the following 
section demonstrates, some of the difficulties that come with the territorial titling of quilombos 
                                                          
33 This final point is particularly important with regard to the case of Rio dos Macacos, which I examine below. 
 
34 The entirety of the seventeen steps are as follows: 1.) Initiating the procedure through a written report 2.) Self-
definition of the community 3.) Registration of the self-definition of the community with the Palmares Cultural 
Foundation 4.) Identification and delimitation of the territory by INCRA 5.) Production of the Relatório Técnico de 
Identificação e Delimitação (technical report, called the RTID) 6.) Publication of the summary of the RTID 7.) 
Contestations from outside parties 8.) Consultation with other federal agencies 9.) Judgment of the contestations 
to the RTID 10.) Publication of the definitive approval of the RTID, as well as of the recognition and declaration of 
the limits of the quilombo territory 11.) Analysis of the land situation 12.) Expropriation procedure 13.) 
Resettlement of non-quilombo occupants 14.) Demarcation of the legally constituted association 15.) Concession 
of the territorial title 16.) Registration of property by INCRA 17.) Registration of title. 
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are tied to Brazil’s role in the global economy.  By partaking of the trend of extractivism that 
currently prevails in Latin America, the Brazilian state continues to seek to dominate both the 
natural environment as well as those communities that depend on the environment for their 
survival and, in the process, enact further practices of erasure within Black communities, who 
remain treated as non-humans. 
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Chapter 3 
The late 20th century saw a plethora of social unrest in Latin America.  Protesting the 
neoliberal turn within many of their governments, the Latin American masses took to the streets 
and forests to register their discontent with the prevailing political, economic, and social regimes.  
More than simply critiquing the governments in power, many of these movements actively 
sought to create the conditions in which they hoped to live.  The uprisings took place all over 
Latin America—creating “open rupture with the prevailing naked logic of neoliberalism” which 
“forced open a space for counterhegemonic forces and figures within each of these countries to 
take state power” (Reyes, 2012, 1).  Brazil was no different in this regard as, following the fall of 
the military dictatorship, there occurred a struggle between “a liberal, free market, agro-mineral 
elite” and “a worker, peasant, rural worker and lower middle class nationalist bloc”, both of 
whom desired electoral power (Petras 2013).  The elites’ victory meant the coming to power of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 1990s, which led to deregulation, privatization, and 
restructuring, and, subsequently, the end of the industrial working class (de Oliveira 2006, 5).  
On the heels of this neoliberal moment, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Worker’s Party (PT) 
“came to office with the powerful backing of the trade unions, the MST, public sector unions and 
popular social movements” (Petras and Veltmeyer 2009, 23). 
This new government “reintroduced the state as protagonist capable of intervening in the 
economic arena and responding to claims made by indigenous and afro-descendant communities 
for administrative autonomy” (Reyes, 2012, 9).  In addition to this new focus on the 
marginalized sectors of society, this “progressive” government also ushered in a round of 
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redistribution regarding key sectors of the economy, such as mineral resource extraction.  
Whereas past forms of extractivism meant the limited role of the state and a reliance on “the 
market” to regulate production and distribution, the new forms of extractivism see a much more 
active state, which seeks to mediate privatization in order to redirect the flow of wealth 
mentioned above.  The state’s new role has meant a renewed focus on the Bay of Aratu as a site 
of national development, as the Port of Aratu and the Aratu Industrial Center continue to tie the 
region to the global economy, while the Brazilian navy remains rooted in the area as a protector 
of both establishments.  This commitment to participating in and protecting Brazil’s prevailing 
relation to global capital has meant both an intensification of already existing forms of 
marginalization for the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, as well as new kinds of oppression. 
Extractivist Economies and Social Assistance 
During Lula’s presidency, a number of social programs were put into place for the 
poor—a strategy Francisco de Oliveira terms “neo-populist” (2006, 19).  In addition to raising 
the country’s minimum wage, increasing university funding, and pulling more than 20 million 
people out of poverty (Anderson 2011), projects like the Bolsa Familia were and are vital to the 
image of the PT and Lula’s legacy in Brazil.  Reaching over 11 million families by 2006 and 
more than 12 million by 2011, the Bolsa Familia is a monthly payment given to poor families 
that can prove that their children have been going to school and are getting their health checked.  
This program has helped to paint the picture that “the state cares for the lot of every Brazilian, no 
matter how wretched or downtrodden, as citizens with social rights” (Anderson 2011).  
Unsurprisingly, these benefits must be paid for in some way, and Brazil funds their social 
programs through a dependence on extractivism. 
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The term “extractivism” comes from the fact that the national economies of Latin 
America continue a trend toward deindustrialization and a focus on the exportation of primary 
resources.  The emphasis on primary materials means that the exporting “of minerals and 
petroleum is increasing its pace, and governments insist on framing it as the motor of economic 
growth” (Gudynas, 2010, 1).  What is taking place in Latin America among these leftist 
governments is, in many ways, a continuation of older practices with a new veneer.  While Brazil 
has the most diversified export structure in South America, with primary commodities 
accounting for 47-49% of exports (Petras and Veltmeyer 2009, 5), the impact this approach has 
had on the economy and the general populace is dubious at best.  Considering the level of 
extraction of natural resources, minerals, petroleum-based products, and agro-fuels, Brazil is the 
biggest “extractivist” on the continent (Gudynas 2013, 2).  In particular, iron and soy are central 
to Brazil’s exportation of primary products (Gudynas 2013, 3; Fearnside 2001).  In addition to 
focusing on primary materials, Brazil has increasingly opened itself to foreign investment 
(Veltmeyer et al. 2014, 35) which has manifested in the foreign acquisition of “millions of acres 
of fertile lands, food processing plants, ethanol refineries and storage and shipping facilities” 
(Petras and Veltmeyer 2009, 23). 
In the Bay of Aratu, Brazil’s involvement in the relations described above are evident.  
The Aratu Industrial Center fabricates commodities from the soy, iron, and petroleum extracted 
in the country (Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Economico 2016).  The Port of Aratu sees the 
shipping of a number of primary materials and extracted resources, including aluminum, copper, 
coal, manganese, petroleum, ethanol, and propane (CODEBA 2016a).  Moreover, companies 
from as far away as Norway, Italy, Singapore, the Marshall Islands, and Liberia ship to and from 
the Port of Aratu, while companies from the United States, like Ford and Dow Chemicals, 
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remain active in the area (CODEBA 2016b).  Hence, we see why Reyes (2012) makes clear that 
this economic redistribution is not nationalization, as many who comment on the topic maintain, 
but rather a “renegotiation of the royalties due…from multinational corporations in proportion to 
the revenues gained through the production and sale of natural resources” (Reyes, 2012, 9). 
  This relation to globalized capital means that within Latin America there remains “a 
constant flow of surplus-value from the producers of peripheral products to the producers of 
core-like products” (Wallerstein 2004, 28).  Peripheral products are primary resources, such as 
the ones Latin American countries have exploited in the extractivist economies mentioned above.  
Producers of core-like products are generally countries in the global north.  In short, this core-
periphery relation between Latin America and the global north has meant the continuation of 
global unequal exchange (Wallerstein, 2004, 28).  A continued dependence on this form of 
production and flow of capital means a continued subordination of Brazil, its populations, and its 
natural resources, to the global economy—a relation which has essentially been in place since 
the days of colonization.   
The production practices that constitute this extractivism necessitate a specific kind of 
territorial assemblage.  Extractive economies often lead to what Gudynas calls “a process of 
geographic fragmentation” (2010, 5).  This fragmentation is typified by the fact that, while 
within the zones of extraction “a strong state presence is felt, [the zones] are surrounded by 
broad ‘deterritorialized’ regions where the state can’t guarantee its presence in an adequate and 
homogeneous manner.  For instance, there are limitations in the protection of the rights of 
citizens, health services, and the administration of justice” (ibid).  Often, extraction takes place in 
areas where there are previously-existing (indigenous, campesino, quilombo, etc.) territories.  
This leads to the decreased protection and security of these communities and the increase in 
83 
 
violence perpetrated against the land and the populations living there.  This violence takes the 
form of state actors, like the police or military, coming down on the communities, while it also 
entails the assault on populations through the destruction of the environment that is so necessary 
to their being.  This is indeed the case in Brazil, where violence against indigenous groups went 
up 237% in 2012 (Petras 2013).  The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu experience a similar 
situation, in which sovereign state actors protect the interests of capital, while ignoring and 
actively oppressing the quilombo communities, whose territories are targeted by land grabs.  In 
their particular case, the Brazilian navy is present in the area to protect the industries and 
shipping present in the Bay, all the while they terrorize and abuse Rio dos Macacos and Tororó, 
and offer no form of assistance to Ilha de Maré, despite the crisis occurring there. 
Despite the perceived benefits of neo-extractivism, and the apparent benefits it affords 
Latin America, “this new extractivism maintains a style of development based on the 
appropriation of Nature” and “still repeats the negative environmental and social impacts of the 
old extractivism” (Gudynas, 2010, 1).  In many ways, the extractivist approach in Brazil is a 
continuation of a colonial relation, as Black and indigenous groups are marginalized, displaced, 
and killed for the benefit of global capital, while the natural environment on which they depend 
is destroyed as part of capital accumulation.  Ilha de Maré is routinely poisoned by the presence 
of shipping in the area, while Tororó and Rio dos Macacos are habitually displaced and abused 
for the continuation of modern-day primitive accumulation.  These situations represent the 
persistence of a centuries-old practice of domination, inaugurated during the colonial epoch, yet 
they are justified in new ways in the context of present day Latin America. 
If anything is new about the Brazilian and Latin American contexts, it is that 
marginalized populations seem to be in control, as they are the moral compass of the country, yet 
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these groups are actually being sacrificed to “unfettered exploitation” (de Oliveira 2006, 22), 
since global capital continues to dictate the use of natural resources and the displacement of 
Black, indigenous, and impoverished populations.  In short, this is a new iteration of a familiar 
problem—the domination of the natural world and the continued precarity of those populations 
that depend on nature as a way of life.  It is not sufficient, however, to focus solely on the 
economic realm regarding the effects of these progressive governments. 
The continued domination of nature and the erasure of illegible subjectivities continues 
into the present in Brazil, as the natural environment is stripped of its resources through 
extractive industries and those populations deemed “Other” are erased as they try to prevent this 
devastation.  The case of the Bay of Aratu shows how the specifics of such a situation play out.  
The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu suffer new forms of anti-Black violence as a result of 
Brazil’s role in the global economy, as well as because of the continuation of the superfluosness 
of Black life in Brazil.  The quilombos find themselves faced with the sovereign power of the 
Brazilian state and capital—power that seeks the quilombos’ erasure as part of the apparent 
necessity for centralizing sovereign influence.  These registers of sovereignty manifest 
themselves in unique ways, yet what remains constant is the treatment of the quilombos as if 
they are empty spaces in need of the application of the societal norm.  In this case, the norm is 
defined by the reification of state territorial integrity and the propagation of capital. 
The Closed Nature of Sovereignty 
The struggles and spatial articulations of the quilombos in the Bay of Aratu evidence the 
reality of multiple territories, territorialities, and unique subjectivities.  This is, of course, 
completely contrary to the assemblages present in sovereign territory, where a central power—
that who decides on the exception—precludes the possibility of other ways of understanding and 
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relating to space.  In the case of the Bay of Aratu, the primary sovereign actor is the state, and 
more specifically the state organs imbued with the power to legally recognize territorial integrity.  
The state actors that enact the state’s sovereign agenda in the Bay of Aratu are the navy and 
INCRA.  Both of these organizations act in such a manner that reifies specific understandings 
and usages of space.  Specifically, the uses are geared toward capitalist accumulation and the 
fortification of sovereign military presence, as both of these factors work to help solidify Brazil’s 
position in the global economy and preserve of the functions of the meio técnico-cientifico.  In 
enacting these practices, they preserve the centrality of the Brazilian state as a sovereign actor 
while propagating the accumulation of land and capital inherent to the productive practices of the 
private corporations in the Bay. 
State Sovereignty 
The Brazilian navy qua sovereign continues to pursue an explicit agenda of erasure with 
regards to Rio dos Macacos and Tororó through their emphasis on eliminating those practices 
which allow both communities autonomy.  This destruction is seemingly necessitated due to the 
state’s creation and expansion of the armed forces—itself an articulation of sovereignty—and the 
ways in which this sovereign action collides with a set of alternative territorialities.  The crops, 
rivers, houses, places of worship, and areas of food preparation that comprise Rio dos Macacos 
and Tororó remain affronts to the Brazilian navy’s insistence on controlling the area as these 
components of the quilombos’ territory do not, and never have, required state intervention to 
benefit the communities.  Because both communities continue to defend their way of life and the 
physical components of their lived spaces, they have come under fire in the most literal sense of 
the word.  In order to preserve and expand Brazil’s role in the global political economic moment, 
the purveyors of Brazilian sovereignty have mobilized the sovereign right to violence wih the 
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intention of removing obstacles to the continuation of capital accumulation in the Bay of Aratu.  
Those obstacles are the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu and their territorital praxes. 
The brutal violence visited upon these communities—especially in the case of Rio dos 
Macacos—evidences the quilombos’ status as sites of exception that end up experiencing 
sovereign violence (Agamben 2005, 38-39).  In these locations, assassination attempts, arson, 
and rape can take place with impunity.  It occurs precisely for the fact that the Brazilian state 
neither respects nor recognizes the political and spatial being of the quilombolas.  Rather, they 
treat these quilombo spaces as present-day zones of total war, where legally “empty” space must 
have sovereign power brought into application in order to enforce the “norm” of perpetuating 
global capital (Agamben 2005, 24-25).  The Brazilian state, by destorying crops, preventing 
foraging, and essentially declaring war on these communities, has attempted to crush the 
alternative politics practiced in the quilombos.  The state, true to sovereign form, is attempting to 
destroy alternate centers of power as there can be no challenge to sovereign power in modern 
spaces (Schmitt 2005, 6-7).  This destruction is not a war against a recognized political entity, 
but rather an occupation of supposedly “empty” space.  The state simply cannot allow unique 
territorial arrangements so close to its own territorial fortifications.1 
At the same time that the navy wages war against an assumed a-spatial, a-political 
antagonist, other state organs use a different approach to centralize power in the Bay of Aratu.  
The destruction of crops and the prevention of foraging are coupled with the extending of food 
aid and promise of development projects—both of which come from the state and make these 
communities increasingly dependent on the influence of outside actors.  By finding ways to 
                                                          
1This is not to suggest that alternative territories that find themselves at a geographical distance from sovereign 
fortifications would fare any better.  The limitless accumulation of capitalism and its accompanying sovereign 
assemblages endlessly scour the world for new lands to appropriate.   
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make itself present within the quilombos, the state, under the auspices of goodwill and 
assistance, is attempting to reify its sovereignty by curtailing the autonomy of the communities.  
Along with the full assault against community subsistence, this “government assistance” serves 
to erode the autonomy of the communities.  By making the communities dependent on state aid, 
the Brazilian government creates the conditions for dictating otherwise independent aspects of 
the quilombos’ existence.2 
The role that INCRA plays in titling quilombo territory is another instance of the role of 
sovereignty in Brazil and the sovereign’s commitment to perpetuating capital.  INCRA’s actions 
demonstrate the ways in which the Brazilian state only recognizes specific kinds of geographical 
understanding.  By insisting that a state-sponsored team conduct the diagnostic that determines a 
quilombo’s territorial designation, the Brazilian state demonstrates the modern notion that there 
are only certain actors that are spatially competent.  As such, spatially legitimate actors are 
needed to quantify and calculate the spaces present in these communities, as the quilombos are 
regarded as unable to adjudicate this on their own (Schmitt 2003, 132).  In this case, the state is 
assumed to be the entity that not only understands, but also has control over, sovereign space 
and, thus, territory (Elden 2009, xxx).  While it may seem, at first glance, that cultural 
recognition by the Palmares Foundation and the ultimate territorial recognition of a quilombo 
shows the state to be somehow cognizant of an alternative geography, what is really taking place 
is the state coopting the language of radical Blackness (in their use of the term “quilombo”) to 
manipulate and ultimately mutilate any radical, unique sense of space.  As the case of Rio dos 
                                                          
2 The Brazilian government has already engaged in this kind of relationship on a national level.  Programs like the 
Bolsa Familia require families to meet government standards regarding the education and health of their children.  
While the Bolsa Familia has meant improved living conditions for many Brazilians all over the country, the fact that 
the government is able to dictate the behavior of populations based on distributing or withholding aid is an 
example of state control of its populace. 
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Macacos exhibits, territory is only legally recognized by the state insofar as it is state-defined 
and approved.  Should the state’s agenda be rejected, as is the case with Rio dos Macacos, a state 
of exception prevails.  What it takes to become state approved involves deferring to state 
agendas.  This would mean nothing short of the destruction of quilombola subjectivity, as state 
recognition entails the adoption of a legible modern politics, which is fundamentally opposed to 
valuing and protecting Black life. 
State support and recognition of these communities arrives pending quilombo 
involvement—albeit sometimes indirect—with private capital. Central to the territorial 
recognition of quilombos is the state’s insistence on introducing “development” projects and 
outside, capitalist influences into quilombos.3  In addition to this, the assistance programs which 
serve to destroy quilombo autonomy are intimately connected to the Brazilian government’s 
state-backed extractivist role in the global economy.  By offering things like food assistance to 
quilombos, the Brazilian state uses the wealth created through the destruction of the 
environments that constitute quilombo communities to assuage the effects of the poverty created 
in quilombos due to that destruction.  Through extractive measures and the national 
redistribution of wealth based on profits from this extraction, the Brazilian government is able to 
implement programs that force quilombos like Rio dos Macacos to participate in economies that 
negatively influence their way of life, all the while projecting itself as a benevolent actor. 
Sovereignty of Industry 
The case of Ilha de Maré evidences the effects of sovereignty in a slightly different 
manner than does that of Rio dos Macacos.  Rio dos Macacos exists as a unique territory that 
                                                          
3See Amorim and Germani (2005) to understand the ways in which the territorial recognition of Quilombo Rio das 
Rãs meant the implementation of development programs by the Banco do Brasil. 
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obstructs the expansion of sovereign territory, while also being subjected to social assistance 
programs that fortify global capital.  Ilha de Maré, on the other hand, is shown to be an assumed 
a-political, a-spatial entity due to its direct contact with sites and relations of global private 
capital.  Furthermore, the effects that global capital has had in Ilha de Maré serve to illuminate 
the state’s complete non-recognition of the quilombo as a political site.  Ilha de Maré, as a 
quilombo, is defined by its assertion that there is no separation between the community and the 
“natural world”—the environment in which the quilombo resides is one whole; not a separation 
between human and nature (see Chapter 4).  Because this is a central component of the 
quilombo’s politics and because development, progress, and modernization in Bahia and Brazil 
have meant the manipulation, destruction, and unalterable changes of the community’s 
environment—the “chaos” described in Milton Santos’ notion of the meio técnico-científico 
(1993, 16).  Thus, the modern politics of the state and private industry have meant a fundamental 
antagonism with the quilombolas.  This antagonism is not registered as a political confrontation 
in the eyes of the State, however.  If it is the sovereign who decides on the exception (Schmitt 
2005), then it is within the sovereign state’s ability to declare a crisis and acknowledge that the 
case of Ilha de Maré requires emergency action.  It abstains from doing so because such a move 
would more than likely jeopardize the continuance of capital circulation taking place in the Port 
of Aratu.  This exemplifies the modern sovereign state’s role in propagating the prevailing 
economic order and, ultimately, the state’s deference to the dictates of global capital (Hardt and 
Negri 2000).  In this case, the norm is clearly punctuated by the continuation of capital and 
commodity circulation.  Sovereign power, therefore, remains concerned with protecting that 
circulation in the form of ensuring that the Port of Aratu stays functional. 
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The assumed a-political nature—and subsequent a-spatiality—of the Black is evidenced 
in the pronunciations of the members of Ilha de Maré, who constantly articulate the fact that their 
plight is invisible to the government and the companies responsible for the explosion in the Bay 
of Aratu.  I heard the quilombolas state countless times, “é como a gente não existesse,”4 when 
commenting on the ways they are treated by the government. Through ignoring the ways in 
which industry has essentially assaulted the being of Ilha de Maré through its destruction of their 
environment, the government is demonstrating its role in the continuation of treating Black 
populations as a-spatial and a-political objects. With no meaningful action or statement being 
made in this situation, both the Federal and State governments comport themselves as if nothing 
happened—it truly does appear as if Ilha de Maré were inexistent.  The community’s reliance on 
their environment as a purveyor of their way of life is effectively ignored by both industry and 
the state. 
The environmental degradation wrought by the explosion in 2013 and the presence of the 
petroleum refinery and companies like Ford, M. Dias Branco, and Dow are part of the cost of 
doing business in the area.  It would, seemingly, be impossible for the capitalist growth of these 
companies to take place without such degradation occurring in unison, as these negative factors 
have accompanied the presence of industry in the Bay since industrial and shipping interests 
arrived there.  The violation of the environment where these development practices take place 
has meant, in essence, the violation of the subjectivities of the quilombolas.  The fundamental 
linkages between “necessary” capitalist accumulation and the destruction of the quilombola way 
of life make evident the ethic of erasure inherent in modernity.  Instead of understanding the 
destruction of a quilombo community as a crisis, state actors facilitate the functions of the Port of 
                                                          
4 It’s like we don’t  exist 
91 
 
Aratu.  Using sovereign power to facilitate the continuation of capital circulation and not 
invoking the sovereign power of naming a crisis regarding a struggling community are inherently 
linked.  On the one hand, the state’s refusal to acknowledge the situation in Ilha de Maré as 
affecting political subjects, all the while it lends its power to actions which continue to oppress 
the community, demonstrates the quilombo existing in a zone of non-being vis-à-vis the 
sovereign state.  On the other hand, the prevention of business at the Port of Aratu signals an 
exception in need of state intervention. 
The destruction of Ilha de Maré is not an exception but rather the norm, as the state-
backed continuation of shipping in the Bay of Aratu represents the legitimate occupation and use 
of an otherwise empty space.  This example speaks directly to Eduardo Gudynas’ (2010) 
description of the deterritorialization present in the extractivist economies of Latin America.  The 
protection of extractive measures—or in this case in the refining and transportation of those 
extracted resources—is treated as a more important process than the protection of the 
communities who suffer from this method of production.  It is because of this that the military 
police were mobilized to try and free the road to the Port of Aratu during the quilombo’s 
February, 2014 protest and blockading of the Port, while the state and federal governments could 
not be bothered to address the effects the oil spill has had on the community (see Chapter 4).  To 
the state, the blocking of the Port of Aratu was a reason to declare a crisis in need of sovereign 
intervention; the poisoning of the quilombo’s environment, however, is not a crisis. 
Tororó, as previously mentioned, essentially finds itself simulataneously facing the 
registers of oppression experienced in Rio dos Macacos and Ilha de Maré.  This quilombo stands 
in the way of the expansion of the sovereign state’s military, while it also exists as an 
environment in need of appropriation for the continuation of global capitalist accumulation.  
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Tororó faces the expansionary forces of the Brazilian navy at the same time it experiences the 
destruction of its environment. These effects lead to the actualization of a variety of forms of 
death in the quilombos. 
Social Death 
When the quilombos in the Bay of Aratu describe their communities as dying and claim 
that the Brazilian state and businesses want them dead, they are speaking of the concept of death 
in several manners.  On the one hand, they are threatened with premature physical death 
(Gilmore 2002).  This comes in a myriad of forms—sicknesses from pollution and environmental 
poisoning; assassination attempts; and expulsion from their traditional territory, resulting in 
exposure to the hyper violence of the urban areas of Salvador.  However, the premature ending 
of life is not the only specter of death that haunts the three communities profiled here.  The 
perpetual assault on the quilombos’ way of life is another form of death that is forced upon the 
communities.  This perpetual assault is a reality precisely because of the assumption of Black 
non-being and, hence, the ability to treat the quilombolas as if there is no life to mark in the first 
place (Wilderson 2010, 38).  The devastation that attends this condition extends beyond 
individual death. 
When the quilombolas state that their mangrove is dying; that their natural environment 
is being poisoned; that the mangrove mud is making them sick; that their traditional fishing 
grounds are being devastated; that the mussels and oysters have disappeared from their shores, 
they are acknowledging death in their community.  Their existence is fundamentally tied up with 
their environment.  To exist as quilombolas means that the rivers, trees, mangroves, mango trees, 
and fields of crops constitute a central aspect of their being.  This is evidenced, in part, in the 
Movimento de Pescadores e Pescadoras’ battle cry: “No rio, no mar: Pescador na luta!  Nos 
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açudes, nas barragens: Pescando Liberdade!  Agronegócios: Resistir!  As cercas nas águas: 
Derrubar!”5  These statements demonstrate that the sea, rivers, and water signify freedom for 
them.  Their subjectivity as quilombolas, rooted in an autonomous existence, unique 
understanding of the world, and constitutive of a territoriality (relation to territory) wholly other 
to that of the modern praxis espoused by the Brazilian state and private businesses, is under 
attack—is essentially dying under the assaults they experience daily.  When speaking out against 
these realities, they are calling attention to the assault on the “other world” in which they live.  
This “other world” is typified by a territoriality—or relation to territory—that entails power 
relations unique to the modern world.  These power relations involve the ascription of specific 
social meanings and relations to the physical environment and to those that comprise the 
territoriality in question (Delaney 2005; Raffestin 2012).  In particular, the notion of the human 
and natural environment as a single entity and the refusal to perpetuate relations of non-being 
define the territoriality of the quilombolas from the Bay of Aratu, as does the commitment to 
constantly innovating the practices that bring these defining relations into being. 
The actions and inactions of the Brazilian state and the private corporations present in the 
Bay of Aratu have led to a state of chaos for the quilombos residing there.  While the 
quilombolas are very clear in assessing their relation to the environment—stating that their 
communities and the environment are joined together as a single entity, the modern commitment 
to dominating nature crashes violently with the quilombos’ traditional way of being in the world. 
Modernity necessitates the privileging of a specific human relation to space and the perceived 
natural environment.  Space (and, more specifically, land) is to be quantified and calculated 
                                                          
5 The MPP is a national coalition of fisherpeople that struggle for the defense and recognition of artisanal fishing 
communities.  The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu are all active in the organization.  Their cry means: “In the 
river, in the sea: Fisherman in the struggle! In the weirs, in the dams: Fishing freedom!  Agribusiness: Resisting!  
Fences in the waters: Tearing down!” 
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(Elden 2009, xxvi), while nature is to be understood, dominated, and subordinated to the agenda 
of the (Hu)Man (Wynter 1976, 81).  Today, this relation is typified by territorial integration 
based on science and technique, which is precisely what the Port of Aratu signifies through its 
linking industry and transportation to modern territories (Santos 1993).  Furthermore, the ends 
toward which this territorial integration works is the position of an extractivist economy.  At the 
same time that the Port of Aratu signals Brazil’s continued commitment to a rational existence 
through “development” and Bahia’s desire to contribute to Brazil’s drive for civilization, the 
genocidal effects of these commitments on the Black populations in Bahia is clear.   
The ending of individual lives is unquestionably a part of the violence that modernity and 
its practitioners understand as central to rational spatial practice.  In this case, actively ending 
lives that adhere to an anti-capitalist, non-sovereign politics has the goal of preserving sovereign 
power and the unending practice of capitalist accumulation.  However, the ending of a collective 
life, rooted in a connection to, and immersion within, the surrounding world—a connection that 
signifies nothing less than a holistic, human-environment sense of being—forms a fundamental 
part of modernity’s self-perpetuating agenda, too.  What links the need to end these two forms of 
life—individual and collective—is the assumed non-being and illegibility of these lives.  Put 
another way, neither form of life—whether it be the figure of the individual Black person or the 
collective Black life of the quilombo—is recognized as a viable way of being in the world, and 
as such does not elicit acknowledgement from modern actors as being politically or spatially 
existent.  Two factors converge to prevent the quilombolas of Aratu from being seen as beings 
by the Brazilian state and its capitalist contemporaries: The inheritance of an assumed relation to 
non-being, which is present among all Afro-descendant populations; and a territorial praxis that 
runs contrary to modern notions of sovereignty and dominating nature. 
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The fact that the majority of the quilombos profiled here are of African descent means 
that they are already viewed as having a close relation to a legacy of assumed non-being, a 
reality that is further evidenced in the violence experienced by the general populace of Salvador.  
This is because, globally, Black populations’ “physical difference marks them as aberrational, 
offensive, [and] threatening” and thus leads to the Black as a phobic object (James 1996, 25).  
Even in Brazil, where the discourse and practice of racial democracy opens up the potential for 
those of African descent to move closer to political recognition via a commitment to anti-
Blackness, the African-descendant populations remain heavily scrutinized and held to strict 
standards of behavior in order to prove their assumed being (Hordge-Freeman 2015).  In addition 
to this, prevailing modern modes of governance and production refuse to acknowledge the 
quilombola subjectivity as a legitimate one. 
The state’s unwillingness to allow Rio dos Macacos and Tororó to continue their 
traditional ways of life amidst the land controlled by the navy reflects the state acknowledgement 
that an existence unique to the sovereign state takes place in the quilombos.  In addition to this, 
the quilombos remain openly tied to a socio-spatial practice that is dependent on the environment 
such that quilombola life and the environment are seen as one in the same.  From an abstract 
perspective this runs contrary to modern notions of being, as the modern human being remains 
committed to the subordination and domination of nature, with immediate human benefit—in 
this case understood through continued capital accumulation—as the ultimate ends.  From an 
empirical perspective in Bahia, the quilombolas’ way of life runs contrary to modern notions of 
development in that it is predicated on the preservation and respect of the environment. 
This way of life is certainly unlike modern practices of administering the Bay of Aratu, as 
the presence of the numerous companies in the Bay and the Port of Aratu have meant nothing 
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short of the complete exploitation and abuse of the environment there.  The arrival of the Port 
and the companies was seen as necessary for the development of the Bay of Aratu and the state 
of Bahia, in general and continues to be important for Brazil’s role as an extractive economy.  
This necessity has led to the destruction of a way of life, which is fundamentally dependent on 
the persistence of the natural variety found in the Bay.  To put it bluntly, the preservation and 
propagation of capitalist development in the Bay of Aratu is mutually exclusive to the 
continuation of the quilombolas’ way of life.  The state commitment to protecting the Bay of 
Aratu’s current role in capitalist accumulation means that they see the quilombo way of life as in 
need of erasure.  The endless accumulation necessary for the continuation of capitalism means 
that the quilombos’ territorialities—or their physical presence in, and relation to, their territory—
must be wiped out. 
From a collective standpoint, the practices that define these quilombo territories run 
contrary to what is deemed as necessary for the propagation of modern governance and capitalist 
accumulation.  The fact that the quilombos seek to remain autonomous, both in their own self-
governance, as well as in the realm of production and self-administration, represents a threat to 
the internal, sovereign coherence of the Brazilian state.  In sovereign governance, there is no 
room for a check to the power of the sovereign.  As such, the fact that the quilombos seek to 
preserve their independence from the influence of the state represents a reality that the modern 
state cannot allow to be, as this form of politics eschews a singular, sovereign power source.  
This reality is made clear in the actions of the sovereign actors in the Bay of Aratu and the 
quilombos’ attendant critiques. 
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Political Legibility and the Persistence of Slave Status 
The societal assumption of the non-being of the Black is revealed in the numerous 
statements made by the quilombolas about their slave status.  When the eldest resident of Rio dos 
Macacos labels her time working for the navy as “tempo perdido,”6 she names the a-spatial, a-
temporal condition which the purveyors of modern-day slavery try to force on her (Wilderson 
2010, 279).  Her relation to the navy is one in which the navy does not recognize her time spent 
laboring for them nor the life that the community has created in quilombola territory.  In addition 
to the elder’s assertion of lost time, the repeated statements by the leaders of Rio dos Macacos 
and Ilha de Maré that the senzala, tronco, corrente, chicote, and capitão de mato7 still exist in 
Salvador clearly shows how relevant the continuation of slavery in the present is for the 
quilombos.  The violation, murder, and persecution of the Black (individual and collective) body 
represented in the objects and spaces named above is clearly still at hand in the quilombos’ 
interactions with the Brazilian state and the various companies present in the Bay of Aratu.  
Drawing on these very devastating aspects of slave society to define the present leaves no doubt 
that the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu understand their current existence to be punctuated by 
the condition of non-being forced on the Black Slave. 
Further understanding of the zone of non-being is explained cogently by a young woman 
who spoke at Rio dos Macacos’ May, 2014 public audience.  The tears and cries of the 
community, she said, did not convince the government.  This is the reality of all of the quilombos 
in the Bay of Aratu, and a hallmark of radical Black geographies, as a whole.  The grammars of 
                                                          
6 Lost time 
 
7 These objects are, respectively, the slave quarters, whipping trunk, chain, whip, and slave catcher.  These objects 
are often used by the quilombos to describe their condition in Bahia. 
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suffering (Wilderson 2010) present in these instances fall on deaf ears, as the Brazilian state, and 
the purveyors of “progress” are unable to comprehend the essence of quilombismo.  What is 
being destroyed by the Brazilian navy, the Port of Aratu, the corporations in the Bay of Aratu—
in short, by the “rational” actors present in the Bay—is a way of life that receives no recognition 
from those destructive actors because understanding the suffering caused by that violence is alien 
to the supposedly “modern” subjects that commit it.  The grammar of suffering of the 
communities in question is underpinned by the assumption that there is no political or spatial 
capacity present within these populations.  The violence present here is not even understood as 
violence.  Rather, it is defended as the nature of human progress.  As Sadiya Hartman explains, 
“Incidental death occurs when life has no normative value, when no humans are involved, when 
the population is, in effect, seen as already dead” (2007, 31).  The storm of Progress in Bahia 
continues to propel the modern (Hu)Man’s existence into the future, wreaking devastation in the 
process (Benjamin 1986, 257-258).  The Black, the inheritor of a relation of accumulation and 
fungibility, is always already seen as linked to the a-political and a-spatial and thus experiences 
this devastation precisely because it is not seen as political life in the first place.  
While Brazilianness has allowed the discursive possibility for populations of African 
descent to shift towards a rational existence, those that eschew the politico-spatial parameters 
laid out by modernity’s truths remain in the position of les damnés.  To continue to espouse 
practices deemed irrational—interacting with the environment in a non-dominating manner; 
practicing collective governance; privileging anti-capitalist modes of production; and, ultimately, 
to refuse a politics that preserves the zone of non-being—means to continue to exist in an a-
spatial, a-political relation to society.  This is the continuation of the idea of “empty space” 
inaugurated during European colonialism (Galli 2010).  In short, Brazilian purveyors of 
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modernity continue to see this existence as evidence of the presence of the a-spatial, fungible, 
accumulated Slave.  Clearly, these communities know that this assumed a-spatiality is a violation 
of their viable political and spatial integrity.  Their existence is underpinned by an astute 
geopolitical analysis and clear territorial praxis.  However, discursively appealing to the rational 
logic of the state and private enterprises through the language of quilombismo is akin to 
articulating a non-language.  Simply speaking on this issue—trying to explain the meaning of 
it—is impossible because there is no analogous experience to which the oppressor can refer.  
Still, because of the explicit insistence on defending their way of life, the quilombos’ antagonists 
have responded by drawing on the language of quilombismo and recasting it in ways that make 
Black claims to space legible to modern actors. 
Demanding Visibility 
Quilombola legislation was put into place as a result of the demands of the Black 
Movement, who, through civil disobedience and protests, brought the political and territorial 
demands of Black Brazil to the national stage.  Still, this legislation was proof of the structural 
violence to which Black Brazilians remain subjected.  This legislation was included for the 
simple fact that those drafting the constitution did not believe there to be a significant number of 
communities that would claim to be related to quilombos.  In this way, the legislation and the 
circumstances surrounding it are further evidence of the assumed a-spatiality of the Black in 
Brazil.  Whereas the historical presence and contemporary existence of indigenous groups is 
acknowledged in the national discourse,8 quilombos seemed a non-existent spatial figure—
                                                          
8 This is at least partially evidenced in the fact that, while quilombo legislation is included as a transitory article in 
the Brazilian constitution (signifying eventual legislative obsolescence), Chapter 8, Article 231 of the 1988 
Constitution acknowledges the recognition of indigenous social organizations, customs, languages, creeds, 
traditions, and land rights (Brazilian Constitution).  As a part of the official text, this legislation includes indigenous 
rights as a lasting component of the 1988 Constitution. 
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something from the folklore of the past (Farfán-Santos 2015, 112; 117).  The communities that 
eventually came out as quilombos were, for socio-political purposes, invisible and not present.  
As such, when thousands of communities claimed to be quilombos, the Brazilian state was faced 
with a situation that seemed impossible: the potential for legally recognized, possibly semi-
autonomous Black territories cropping up across the national landscape.  This presented a 
challenge to the necessary land appropriation fundamental to the capitalist mode of production 
and to the concentration of political power in the state.  The Brazilian state had, in a manner of 
speaking, discursively produced the conditions for a crisis, in that it had acknowledged the 
possibility of a radical Black geography in the present moment—this despite its assumption that 
no such spatial reality was still in place.  To solve this crisis, the state has resorted to a policy of 
inaction and, when active, coercion.   
It is no mistake that ninety percent of the culturally certified quilombos remain 
territorially untitled, nor is it a mistake that communities like Rio dos Macacos remain in the 
precarious position of losing the land necessary for its territorial praxis, should it accept 
government titling.  The state has addressed the quandary introduced by the Black Movement’s 
unexpected influence on the Brazilian constitution by finding ways to make sure that potentially 
radical territorialities are folded back into the state as legible geographies.  These legible 
geographies are those which contribute to capital accumulation or the reinforcement of sovereign 
governance.  In this way, Brazilian society persists in its efforts to erase those radical becomings 
that sprout from the crevices of power (McKittrick 2006, 43).  Whether it comes in the form of 
the capitães de mato of the colonial era, the espousal of the ideology of racial democracy, the 
cynical renderings of the 1988 Constitution, or the intimidation and delay tactics of the current 
government, Brazil remains focused on perpetrating genocidal violence against the potential for 
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Black radical being.  One of the central tactics used for solving the conundrum of the 1988 
constitution and the threat of a radical Black Geography is that of coopting and transforming the 
concept of the quilombo and essentially re-defining what it means to be a quilombola in Brazil.   
State Cooptation of “Quilombos” 
The Brazilian state unwittingly introduced a fundamental contradiction into its 1988 
constitution, by providing for the potential of a multitude of autonomous territories in the 
country.  Because of this, significant measures have been taken to ensure that the territorial 
titling resultant from Article 68 ADCT contributes to the persistence of global capital 
accumulation and the preservation of certain aspects of state sovereignty, and does not detract 
from either.  The Brazilian state seeks to achieve this through a monopoly on how a quilombo is 
defined.9  By drawing on the language of radical Black struggle, the state appears to be 
acknowledging the uniqueness of Black Geographies, while at the same time seeking to 
undermine any potential for autonomous existences.10  I take the case of Rio dos Macacos to 
show the ways in which the Brazilian state employs a “neoliberal multiculturalism” to colonize 
the language of radical Blackness in an attempt to destroy radical Black territorialities.  The 
language of quilombismo and the resurrection of the spatial figure of the quilombo has served to 
unite thousands of Black Brazilian communities in a common struggle against the various violent 
expressions of Brazilian society.  A central part of this struggle is the claim for territory.  As I 
show in the following chapter on the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, quilombismo (an 
                                                          
9 For a discussion on the ways in which the appropriation of signification reflects the essence of a society, see 
Gyorgy Markus’ (1993) article “Culturs” in Dialectical Anthropology 18.  Markus demonstrates the ways in which 
the word “culture,” while maintaining aspects of its original signification through the years, ultimately takes on 
entirely new meanings based on the ideas of truth and being present in the societies that adopt the term. 
 
10 For a discussion on the utilization of a word’s significance for a political ends, see Erich Auerbach’s chapter 
“Figura” in Scenes From the Drama of European Literature (1984).  
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iteration of marronage) as an ethic recognizes the political viability of myriad territorial 
expressions.  In short, quilombos give rise to an open subjectivity; a subjectivity that 
accompanies various territorial permutations (Theodoro et al. 2015, 226).  The role that 
sovereignty plays in modern practices of politics and territory, however, dictates that this open 
subjectivity remain nullified.  Modern territory remains understood as bounded, closed, and 
under the control of a sovereign actor that completely “understands” and dominates the physical 
environment with which it comes into contact (Elden 2009; Schmitt 2005).  It is the 
subordination of non-sovereign space to sovereign power that the Brazilian state seeks to achieve 
through its current relation to Brazil’s quilombola movement. 
Given the violent history of colonial and state militaries regarding quilombo communities 
and the reality that attention to those historical facts is nationally prevalent, the state cannot enact 
present-day quilombo subordination through widescale military campaigns or wars of destruction 
(although the cases of Rio dos Macacos, Alcântara in Maranhão, and Marambaia in Rio de 
Janeiro certainly seem to be similar to past practices).11  Similarly, an all out discursive assault 
on quilombos, given the increasing connectivity among quilombo communities around the 
country would run the risk of further uniting these populations against the explicit racism of 
Brazilian society.  Instead, the Brazilian state chooses to employ what Stefano Harney and Fred 
Moten call “governance”, that is, the cultivation of politics that can be turned into labor-power 
(Harney and Moten 2013, 54). 
                                                          
11 In the late 1980s, Quilombo Alcântara experienced a number of expulsions and threats to their autonomy from 
the Alcântara Launch Center (CLA), which is part of the Brazilian Aeronautic Command 
(http://www.cpisp.org.br/comunidades).  Quilombo Marambaia, located on an island in Rio de Janeiro, found itself 
in conflict with the Brazilian navy beginning in the 1970s and 1980s.  Like Rio dos Macacos, the quilombolas of 
Marambaia were prevented from accessing public services and blocked from their foraging and subsistence 
practices (http://www.cpisp.org.br/comunidades).  The cases of Alcântara and Marambaia are both notorious for 
the violence that the quilombolas there experienced. 
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The Brazilian state, through professing to officially recognize and include quilombo 
communities as part of Brazilian society, “drills” into the political existences of autonomous 
Black communities as part of its state “responsibility” as a sovereign, territorial actor.  The state 
apparatus nominally seeks to bring order and sense to these quilombo communities through its 
exclusive ability and right to understand and delimit quilombo territories.  Of course, this is not 
to suggest that it is only the state that stands to benefit from this arrangement.  As shown above, 
the Brazilian state’s connection to national and international capital is a central part of this 
governance.  Nonetheless, it is through state organs that this “drilling” takes place, and it is the 
“gregariousness” of Brazil’s quilombos that serves as the impetus for such drilling (Harney and 
Moten 2013, 56).  By engaging the state with claims of quilombo status and territorial demands 
(being “gregarious”), these communities open up the possibility of the state dividing their 
territory and introducing measures and arrangements that reproduce capitalist relations 
(“drilling”). 
The extent to which the quilombo movement would grip Brazil with its territorial claims 
was clearly never anticipated by the country’s constituent assembly in the late 1980s.  The 
thousands of (official) territorial claims made by quilombo communities across the country 
signal the potential for veritable land reform in Brazil, as these autonomous groups attempt to 
preserve their territoriality by appealing to the quilombo identity.  This quilombo identity, 
however, is understood and reified in different ways by the Brazilian state when compared to the 
quilombo movement itself.  In order to propagate the accumulation of capital and fortify certain 
aspects of state sovereignty, the Brazilian state has turned to a policy of neoliberal 
multiculturalism.  Neoliberal multiculturalism, according to Charles Hale, “includes the limited 
recognition of cultural rights, the strengthening of civil society, and endorsement of the principle 
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of intercultural equality”, such that, when these measures are merged with neoliberal economic 
policies, they can lead to “a deepened state capacity to shape and neutralize political opposition” 
(2005, 10).  In Brazil, the federal government used quilombos as a means for “greater visibility 
and political capital” by incorporating and synthesizing “ethnic pluralism” in a way that 
evidences “a multiethnic country [with] the state as the manager of this diversity” (Leite 2012, 
257).  By bringing together discourses on ethnic and racial equality with a political economic 
approach that seeks to make spaces useful for capital accumulation, the Brazilian state employs a 
neoliberal multicultural approach to the quilombola question in Brazil. 
The case of quilombo legislation is interesting in that it was not born of an overt attempt 
to capture autonomous communities in the folds of neoliberalism or the state—the legislation 
was implemented as a compromise for the Black Movement and a result of the state’s belief in 
the non-existence of Black geographies in Brazil.  Still, the implementation of the territorial 
recognition of quilombos has lent itself to several of the factors mentioned above in Hale’s 
definition.  The inclusion of quilombo and indigenous communities in the 1988 constitution 
continues Brazil’s long history of professed multiracial tolerance.  This approach to inclusion is 
slightly different than the stated nature of racial democracy, which sought to evidence racial 
harmony through miscegenation.  Today, Brazil continues to define itself as an inclusive society 
by nominally granting groups like quilombolas and indigenous groups cultural and territorial 
recognition, thereby demonstrating its commitment as a nation to promoting its national 
differences.  Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the Brazilian state is using 
the language of inclusion and multiculturalism to further an agenda of capital accumulation and 
circulation at the same time that it enervates quilombo communities’ ability to reproduce their 
lives as autonomous communities.  In reality, then, quilombo legislation continues the practices 
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of land expropriation and control and the precarious nature of Black Brazilians (Leite 2008, 965).  
The case of Rio dos Macacos stands out as a prime example of this fact. 
The Nature of Quilombismo 
The situation in which Rio dos Macacos currently finds itself essentially amounts to 
INCRA stating that, in order to receive territorial recognition, they accede to the joint exigencies 
of the Brazilian navy and INCRA, itself, which demand that Rio dos Macacos give up nearly two 
thirds of its current landholdings and allow the state to implement “development” projects on the 
land that is left to the community.  The quilombolas have been very clear that to go this route 
would effectively mean the end of their life as a quilombo community.  Accepting the 
government’s reduction of their land would mean an immediate inability to plant crops, no 
access to water sources, and the unfeasibility of allowing previously expelled quilombolas to 
return.  In other words, crucial factors that make Rio dos Macacos identify as a quilombo would 
no longer be possible if the community were to accept the standing government land proposal.  
Despite the fact that INCRA’s current proposal promises the erasure of Rio dos Macacos’ 
quilombola subjectivity, the legalese of the territorial certification would cite a process in which 
the Brazilian government is acknowledging the existence of a community that is culturally and 
spatially unique in the Brazilian landscape.  Were the Brazilian government successful in getting 
Rio dos Macacos to acquiesce to their demands, their effective use of the language and practices 
of multiculturalism would assist capital accumulation on two fronts. 
First, it would strengthen the Brazilian navy’s presence in the area, as the land they 
would acquire from Rio dos Macacos would be used for the navy’s benefit—either to expand the 
naval villa, or for the training of naval troops.  The navy’s presence in the Bay of Aratu, as stated 
on their website, is a strategically important one, as it is near an area of “desenvolvimento 
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industrial”12 (www.marinha.mil.br/).  The various factories, thermoelectric plant, oil refinery, 
and port located in the Bay could all be considered part of an industrial assemblage, as they all 
serve different functions for industrial capital.  Hence, the expansion of naval power in the area 
means further protection for these various national and multinational corporations represented in 
the Bay of Aratu.  Secondly, the success of this multicultural legislation for the government 
would mean the imposition of “development” projects in Rio dos Macacos’ land.  While INCRA 
has not, to my knowledge, stated the nature of these development projects, the implication of 
discourses of development suggest an attempt at introducing some aspect of capitalist production 
into the community.13 
Rio dos Macacos, through its demand that the government recognize its territory, has 
found itself in a situation in which the government seeks to take advantage of this 
“gregariousness” by turning quilombola politics into labor power (Harney and Moten 2013, 54).  
That is, quilombola politics are turned into a process that can be employed to create surplus 
value.  Surplus value can be created either directly through the proposed development projects or 
indirectly through the strengthening of the Brazilian navy.  By placing its actions in the context 
of multicultural acceptance, the Brazilian state is seeking to further certain aspects of its own 
sovereign territorial control and promote the accumulation and circulation of capital, at the same 
time that it completely destroys the ability for Rio dos Macacos to maintain its autonomous 
existence and lauds itself as a tolerant, progressive entity.  The Brazilian state’s ability to capture 
                                                          
12 Industrial development 
 
13 Again, the case of Quilombo Rio das Rãs—also located in Bahia—shows one of the ways in which the 
“development” of a territorially certified quilombo rarely benefits the quilombo, itself.  The cattle forced on Rio 
das Rãs by the Bank of Brazil required the community to finance its production practices in unprecedented ways. 
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an otherwise autonomous space and use an aspect of its struggle to further pursue a rational 
existence is, in part, a result of struggles over signification. 
Neoliberal multiculturalism is, obviously, based on the state’s ability to engage a 
conversation about its acceptance of at least some culturally variant sectors of its populace (Hale 
2005).  In the case of Brazilian quilombos, the state found itself at an impasse, as quilombo 
settlements were and are, above all, spatial entities.  In order to address the situation in a way 
that would at once acknowledge the spatial aspect of quilombos while also allowing the state to 
realize its commitment to capital and preserving the necessary aspects of its own sovereignty, the 
state apparatus had to create spatial arrangements that were amenable to its sovereign 
obligations.  To establish these spatial arrangements, the Brazilian state has asserted itself as the 
only entity able to name and understand space.  “Quilombos,” legally, have become the sole 
purview of the state, such that state organs name quilombos both culturally and territorially.  
Attempting to hold a monopoly on identifying quilombos has meant that the Brazilian state has 
tried to effectively redefine the quilombo as a spatial unit, as is evidenced in the case of Rio dos 
Macacos. 
By not recognizing quilombos as spatial actors per quilombo claims and practices, and 
insisting on having the last word on legal territorial recognition, the state conserves its position 
as the entity with the power to territorially name and delimit (Delaney 1998, 13).  Furthermore, 
because territorial recognition of quilombos remains based on the translation of quilombo 
practices into the language of modern, “rational” actors (those anthropologists and technical 
actors who detail their findings to INCRA), the Brazilian state continues the modern practice of 
assuming the exclusive possibility of truly understanding the land and its proper usages.  By 
applying this approach to the spatial concept of a quilombo, the Brazilian state is attempting to 
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re-create the quilombo as a spatial entity that is the sole purview of the state.  This signals the 
state’s attempt to create a condition in which Black struggle serves the purpose of consolidating 
mechanisms of modernity, most obviously including sovereign power, capital accumulation, and 
subordinating nature for the uses of the (Hu)Man.  This approach signals a shift in Brazilian 
society and governance. 
Enforcing a Conservative Black Geography 
No longer focused solely on the physical killing of radical Black actors (although this 
does certainly still occur), the Brazil of today has become part of a regime that seeks to 
reproduce itself through the capture, appropriation, and subordination of radical elements with 
the ends of creating an inescapable societal arrangement.  Unable to erase radical Black 
subjectivity through projects like the ideology of racial democracy, the Brazilian champions of 
modernity have attempted to create a situation in which any articulation of a Black Geography be 
a conservative Black Geography.  In an attempt to forestall this radical Black analysis from 
becoming radical Black action, the Brazilian state encourages Black Geographies—as 
geographies that acknowledge the legacy of non-being and seek to remove address the effects of 
the nonbeing—that reinforce modern notions of sovereignty and progress.  By allowing 
quilombo communities to claim territory and then seeking to manipulate that territory for 
practices appropriate to sovereign, capitalistic reproduction, the Brazilian state acknowledges 
Black attempts to ameliorate the violences they continue to face at the same time the state seeks 
to set the possibilities for the resultant Black territorial expressions.  I term this a “conservative” 
Black Geography because it draws on the Black desire to end the condition of non-being by 
using the exact same mechanisms—sovereignty and exclusive understandings and demarcations 
of space and politics—that establish the zone of non-being in the first place.  State involvement, 
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therefore, creates geographies that openly acknowledge the violence Blacks face in society, yet 
continue to reify political and spatial violence against those same populations.   
The state cooptation of the language of Radical Black politics is significant in that is it 
part of the sovereign attempt to dictate the conditions under which Black populations live.  Given 
the climate of urban life in Salvador, the ceding of control over one’s life as a quilombola could 
have devastating effects, as the expressions of sovereignty outside the quilombos entail distinct, 
yet equally destructive forms of anti-Black violence. 
Anti-Black Violences of Bahia 
While the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu face the deleterious effects of Brazil’s 
“progressive” government and its extractivist policies, Salvador, itself, remains a site of 
gratuitous violence for Afro-descendant peoples.  This violence takes form in many ways.  
Specifically, I discuss the prevailing economic practices mentioned above, in the seemingly 
arbitrary premature ending of life Black populations experience globally, and through the 
marginalization of Black women.  Blacks in the Salvador metropolitan area continue to face the 
death-dealing violence that typifies the modern American nation-state (Smith 2015, 384).  This 
“geography of death in Brazil has everything to do with transnational necropolitics” which 
targets Black bodies as sites of violation and death (Smith 2013, 177).  Urban Salvador remains a 
site where “There is a breakdown between legal, written inclusion and state practice of national 
inclusion.  The evidence for this is the indiscriminate manner by which black people are killed, 
beaten, tortured, and violated by the state with impunity” (Smith 2015, 385).  In Bahia I split my 
time between the quilombo communities and an urban favela, where I had an apartment.  My 
experiences living in the favela inform this section of the dissertation.  As a person of African 
descent, I often found myself accepted in the quotidian spaces of Salvador.  That is to say, I was 
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not viewed as aberrant or out of place in the city, given my appearance and linguistic abilities.  
As a result, the quotidian violence of Salvador, as manifested in the actions of police officers and 
drug dealers were often carried out in front of me, as if I were just another Brazilian that is 
accustomed to such behavior.  It seemed to me that the perpetrators of this violence often did not 
think twice about my presence, as I do not “stick out” as American.  As a result, I was witness to 
different forms of anti-Black violence in Salvador.  In addition to this, the fact that I lived in a 
favela gave me insight into how impoverished populations live in the city—a fact that informs 
my understanding of labor exploitation and violence in Salvador.  This section demonstrates how 
anti-Blackness manifests itself in the everyday practices of life in Salvador.  It is precisely 
against these entrenched oppressions that the quilombos struggle. 
Sovereign Violence in the City 
The common wisdom in Salvador is that one is probably more likely to be killed by a 
police officer than by a drug trafficker.  In many ways, the state-sanctioned military police and 
the armed portions of trafficking groups are both expressions of sovereignty in Bahia.  Both 
figures operate in a sovereign manner, seeking to control the territories in which they are located 
and standing outside their respective rules of law to enforce their expected norms (Schmitt 
2005).  Both purveyors of sovereignty elicit caution among those with whom they come into 
daily contact.  The neighborhood I lived in is home to different drug trafficking factions.  While 
their activity was considerably quieter than that of other neighborhoods around Salvador, the 
presence of these groups was nonetheless evident.  Armed members of these groups were known 
to occasionally skirmish, fighting over control of the trafficking in the neighborhood.  On nights 
when this occurred, word of mouth alerted many before the gun shots began and people 
remained indoors until the feuding was over.  Occurrences like this were rare, albeit striking.  
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Much more common in the neighborhood I lived in, and in the city as a whole, was the specter of 
police violence. 
The arrival of the police in any neighborhood is as much a cause for concern as the 
promise of violence between drug traffickers.  This is because the Brazilian police—especially 
the military police—operate in a manner reminiscent of the colonial epoch, when Black bodies 
could be tortured and terrorized with impunity (Smith 2013, 191).  Word spread quickly 
whenever the blue and silver SUVs of the military police would swoop into the neighborhood, as 
police presence carried with it specific causes for concern.  One of the first things I learned when 
I started traveling to Salvador almost ten years ago was that you never left the house without 
some form of personal identification.  This rule was explained to me during my first stay in 
Salvador.  At that time I was living in Graça, a well-to-do neighborhood in the inner city of 
Salvador.  A friend of mine from Águas Claras—a favela located in the outskirts of the 
municipality of Salvador—invited me to his house to meet his family.  During my visit to Águas 
Claras, I noted that his mother asked him if he remembered his “documentação”14 every time we 
left the house—even if we were simply going to the store.  I did not see why he needed a 
reminder, given that he constantly had his I.D. with him.  When I asked him why they seemed to 
make such a big deal about carrying identification with them, he explained to me that you were 
basically as good as dead if the police stopped you and you did not have any I.D. with you.  They 
would assume you were a drug trafficker, he said, and would beat you, throw you in the back of 
their trucks, and you would never be seen again.  He told me in no uncertain terms that I would 
do well to bring some form of identification with me whenever I went anywhere in Salvador, as I 
did not “look American.”  This was common wisdom to everyone residing in Salvador, as I later 
                                                          
14 Documentation 
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found out.  Years later, in another favela community in Salvador, a friend of mine was taking me 
from his house to his parents’ house for dinner.  As we left, his wife asked him if he had any I.D. 
with him.  He did not, and went into his room to retrieve it, but not before his wife admonished 
him, shouting “Você está jogando com a vida!”15  Over the years, subsequent trips to the city 
made the reality of police violence even more evident to me. 
My first personal encounter with police occurred in 2012 while on the highway with a 
group of friends.  After turning the wrong way on a road, we were pulled over and ordered out of 
the car.  In our panic at being stopped late at night by the military police, we were not able to 
immediately comply with the order to get out of the car.  After twice ordering us out of the car, 
one of the police officers outside began counting, “Um, dois…”  Finally, we were able to unlock 
the doors and get out of the vehicle.  It was not until we all had exited the car that it became 
evident to me the situation we were in.  All five police officers on the scene had automatic rifles 
trained on us.  It was clear that had we not made it out of the car when we did, they would have 
opened fire—hence the countdown that the officer had initiated.  One of the officers frisked us 
while the others stood watch.  It was then that I was greeted by what I would later realize was a 
common (and humiliating) frisking tactic by the police—a quick, sharp smack to the testicles 
under the auspices of searching for weapons stashed in one’s crotch.  When a member of our 
party would not consent to putting his hand on his head in a timely manner, the officer reviewing 
all of us grabbed him roughly and began hitting him.  After checking everyone’s I.D., they 
eventually let us go.  When we related the story to other friends after the fact, they all assured us 
that we were lucky to have escaped that situation with our lives, given the hour that it occurred 
                                                          
15 You’re playing with life! 
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and our initial tardiness in exiting the car.  I have also been witness to people that were not let off 
so easily. 
During my 2014 stay in Salvador, I was returning to my apartment from the Federal 
University of Bahia, which is located in the neighborhood of Ondina.  As the bus I was on 
rambled down the road mere feet from the coastline, a military police truck pulled us over.  
These occurrences are known as “blitzes” and are quite common in the city.  A police officer 
climbed onto the bus and ordered all of the males off, demanding we bring our belongings with 
us.  Two officers stood by, automatic rifles at the ready, while a third officer reviewed all of us.  
First, we were made to hold open any bags, backpacks, etc. that we were carrying while the 
officer looked through them.  Next, we had to stand with our legs spread, arms-length from the 
bus, with our palms up near the windows on the side of the bus.  The reviewing officer frisked all 
of us, one by one, including the traditional testicle smacking.  After being reviewed, we stood on 
the sidewalk, waiting for the police to finish with their search.  When the review was over, the 
police grabbed two young men, who both looked to be about fifteen or sixteen, and told the rest 
of us to get back on the bus.  As we filed back on the bus, I watched as the police spoke words I 
could no longer hear to the two young men who were now standing near the back hatch of the 
police officers’ truck.  What infraction, if any, they had committed was anyone’s guess.  They 
did not get back on the bus before we left. 
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Figure 3.1 “Blitz” carried out by Brazilian military police on a public bus. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
A separate occasion in 2014 gave me insight into the thought process of one particular 
military police officer in Salvador.  While it would not be fair for me to associate his beliefs with 
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all members of the military police in the city, it was nonetheless a disturbing experience that 
brought to mind many of the anti-Black tropes that define the Brazilian nation.  The situation 
occurred during a trip I made to the beach.  It was early evening and the sun was starting to 
lower when my friend and I were approached by a man carrying a large Styrofoam cooler.  He 
introduced himself and asked if we wanted to have beers with him.  As he handed us each a beer 
he explained that he had a day off of work and had been at the beach since the morning.  It 
seemed to me that he had probably been drinking that whole time, as he was very clearly 
intoxicated.  When I asked him what job he was getting a day away from, he said he was a police 
officer.  As our conversation continued on, he admitted to my friend and me that his job was 
frequently a violent one. 
“Eu já matei três caras,”16 he stated frankly, and posed the rhetorical question, “tô 
errado?”17  My friend and I uncomfortably did not respond to this question and tried to change 
the subject, but he continued describing his job and its demands.  He was not in the wrong for 
killing anyone, he stated.  “Os vagabundos têm que morrer,”18 he slurred, looking at us 
unfocusedly.  My friend and I finished our beer, thanked him, and left the beach, as it was now 
dark. 
This police officer’s belief that “vagabundos” had to be eliminated is precisely the 
sentiment Brazilian elites expressed in their attempt to modernize post-abolition Brazil.  While 
not explicitly a racial term, “vagabundo” nonetheless carries with it a history of anti-Blackness, 
as it was the good for nothing ex-slave “vagabundos” who threatened the newly forming 
                                                          
16 I’ve already killed three guys 
 
17 Am I wrong? 
 
18 Good-for-nothings (vagabonds) have to die 
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Brazilian nation with their backwards ways and inability to adapt to rational ways of living in the 
world.  The “vagabundos” that the police officer described above was talking about were never 
explicitly defined racially or occupationally.  Whether the “good for nothings” that he had, in his 
mind, so rightfully killed were drug traffickers, some criminal element, or simply people he had 
a problem with was never disclosed to me.  Still, the lack of value placed on the life of his 
victims, the idea that they needed to die, presumably for the benefit of society, is exactly the 
approach Brazil has historically taken towards Afro-descendant peoples.  As an enforcer of the 
sovereign right to decide on the exception, this police officer was able to end the life of those 
that live in violation of the societal norm.  There remains a legacy in Brazil of those in contempt 
of the norm being Black Brazilians, specifically, as “The black subject in Brazil has been 
constructed over generations as the internal enemy (captives, terrorists, criminals)” (Smith 2013, 
181).  
Articulations of the sovereign ability to declare an exception is clearly at play in the 
actions of the police and drug traffickers described above.  Both factions seek to realize 
territorial sovereignty through the elimination of those factors that threaten their self-
preservation as political entities.  For drug traffickers, this means eliminating rival traffickers—
the collateral damage to those living around them, caused by the attendant violence, is but the 
cost of preservation.  For the police—state actors—the exception is found in the spaces inhabited 
by the dangerous sectors of society—the “vagabundos.”  State violence is a constant reality for 
the residents of Salvador.  The exception is, truly, a permanent condition in Salvador, as the 
city’s inhabitants seem constantly under threat of assault from the police.  Something as 
mundane as forgetting one’s I.D. can result in death—a death, but not a sacrifice (Agamben 
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1998)—as the dangerous sectors of society must be killed.  What is more, the deaths that result 
from these sovereign decisions are usually suffered by the Black population of Salvador. 
The purpose of my anecdotes above is not to provide examples of violence that are 
contingent on any specific transgressions.  I am not trying to itemize the things that can lead to 
the ending of Black life in Salvador.  Rather, I am attempting to demonstrate how the city’s 
Black populations face the specter of life-ending violence on a daily basis due to the societal 
assumption of Black non-being.  Because anti-Blackness and the assumed non-being of Black 
populations in Bahia are the norm, the social death of these populations looms as a justification 
for the physical ending of Black life.  In short, death is a constant reality for Blacks. 
Labor in the City 
In Salvador, I stay in a working-class favela neighborhood outside the city-core.  Over 
time, I have become more and more familiar with the conditions under which the people there 
work.  Aside from this neighborhood, I have friends in a number of other parts of the city with 
whose work life I am also familiar.  If I had to use one word to describe the work environment of 
those I know in Salvador, it would be “strenuous.”  Nearly everybody I know works eight to ten 
hour days, six days a week, with Saturday as a half-day.  Despite the frequency of work, it is 
evident that wages are low. 
It was explained to me by various people that the cost of living in Salvador is not high, 
but that it is hard to make ends meet, given the low wages that workers earn.  It is evident to me 
that measures like the Bolsa Familia certainly help support working families, yet wages alone are 
often not sufficient to cover family needs.  Families frequently must make sacrifices regarding 
what they spend their hard-earned money on.  I have seen children pulled out of the private 
schools they were attending because their parents could no longer afford the tuition and 
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additional costs such as books, uniforms, and writing utensils.  I have seen families subsist on 
bread and soup for the final weeks of the month, biding their time until the next paycheck arrived 
because their salary was not substantial enough to provide them with a full month of the beans 
and rice they would normally eat.  While wages are low, working conditions themselves demand 
tremendous physical commitments. 
In the neighborhood where I lived, the bus stop would be packed from 6:00 AM until 
around 9 AM with people leaving for work.  The highways during this block of time were 
always, without fail, gridlocked as people from all over the city headed to their respective jobs.  
Depending on where one works, commutes can take up to two hours during rush hour.  The 
evening rush hour is just as bad, as buses are literally so crammed full of commuters that the 
doors will not close all the way.  Between the hours worked and the hours spent in traffic, 
families often get little time to spend together.  It was not uncommon for me to see situations in 
which, during the work week, people left for work, came home, ate, went to bed, and started the 
process all over again without having any personal time to spend with their loved ones.  In 
addition to being extremely time-consuming and low-paying, jobs in Salvador often take heavy 
tolls on the body.   
Manual labor like carpentry, construction, and domestic service often end in serious 
physical debilitation for laborers.  I met people that were forced to retire from their jobs before 
their fiftieth birthdays because of multiple hernias and work-related injuries suffered while on 
the job.  Baianos are worked until they can literally work no more.  This hyper-exploitation and 
complete disregard for the physical status of workers is reminiscent of the brutal working 
conditions slaves faced in Brazil.  Labor practices are clearly another way in which the assumed 
slave status of Black Brazilians continues.  The violation and breaking down of Black bodies 
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goes on unchecked; it is the norm in Salvador’s labor market.  Being witness to this proved to me 
the ridiculousness of the Brazilian adage that the people of Bahia are lazy and do not like to 
work.  This is, clearly, racially influenced “common sense” which echoes the claims of Brazilian 
elites who saw the ex-slaves of Brazil as retarding the industrial potential of the country because 
of their aversion to work.  My experiences in Bahia showed me that the people there not only 
work, they spend the majority of their time at their job or in job-related travel.  The 
marginalizing effects of the labor market have unique effects across gender lines, as well, as the 
intersecting modes of anti-Black, gendered racism, started during slavery and colonialism, 
continue into the present moment. 
Gendered Marginalization 
Traditionally, Black Brazilian women are associated with service sector labor practices.  
Among other forms of employment, domestic work, tourism, and sex work have been associated 
with Black women in the popular Brazilian imagination (Perry 2004; Harrington 2015).  These 
forms of labor carry with them social stigma as well as relations of economic dependency.  
These employment practices mean that Black women must frequently leave their neighborhoods 
and families to attend to and care for the wealthier (and often whiter) sectors of society in 
Salvador.  During my time in Bahia, I took note of the many forms of employment taken up by 
Black women.  The focus on extractive industries has meant the abandonment of industrial 
production and, as such, narrows the field of employment opportunities in Brazil (de Oliveira 
2006, 15).  Because of this, Black Brazilian women remain marginalized through mechanisms of 
race, gender, and labor. 
Jobs like domestic work and childcare, as well as tourism work, like preparing for and 
working at the World Cup games, were common among many of the women I met.  These jobs, 
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unsurprisingly, meant long hours and extreme physical duress.  In addition to this, I came to 
know many women who were employed in other service-sector jobs, call centers chief among 
them.  Call centers seemed to offer women without a college education the opportunity for 
steady employment in Salvador.  Attending to call lines for companies as diverse as CitiBank, 
Itaú, and Bank of Brazil, call centers provided a steady, if meager, salary for many women in 
Bahia.  Still, this was far from a perfect arrangement, as these jobs were subject to the whim of 
supervisors and the market, alike. 
Stories of disagreements with bosses and significant layoffs following the 2015 economic 
crisis in Brazil showed me the ways in which already precarious existences could become all the 
more problematic.  As noted above regarding women’s historical roles in struggle, the presence 
of difficult labor relations do not mean that Black women exist solely as marginalized figures, or 
that they have no consciousness of the oppressive factors they face.  As both Perry (2013) and 
Harrington (2015) demonstrate, these otherwise oppressive labor arrangements give rise to 
various forms of political organization and resistance.  Still, the situations in which Black women 
in Bahia often find themselves regarding work are more often than not far from ideal.  In 
addition to the marginalizing effects of labor, Black women in Salvador remain treated as 
derelict in their relation to their own families.  As was the case during slavery, the Black family 
remains treated as an impossibility, given the lack of value placed on Black life. 
The Black Family? 
It is not satisfactory to focus solely on the question of labor when it comes to exploring 
the gendered nature of anti-Blackness in Brazil, and in Salvador, specifically.  As the Manifesto 
da Marcha das Mulheres Negras of 2015 states, “No decurso diário de nossas vidas, a forjada 
superioridade do componente racial branco, do patriarcado e do sexismo, que fundamenta e 
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dinamiza um sistema de opressões que impõe, a cada mulher negra, a luta pela própria 
sobrevivência e de sua comunidade”19 (2015).  The anti-Blackness and imposed oppression 
Black women face in Brazil continues on similar registers to those started during slavery, 
suggesting that Black women have, indeed “receberam uma herança cruel”20 from the colonial 
epoch (Congresso das Mulheres Brasileiras 1975).  Part of this inheritance is the attempted 
systemic prevention of the Black family. 
Between 2003 and 2012 the homicides by firearm nearly quadrupled—increasing from 
1,241 homicides in 2003 to 4,512 homicides in 2012—among Blacks in Bahia (Waiselfisz 2015, 
81).  These deaths made up nearly ninety percent of the 5,147 total homicides by firearms in the 
entire state of Bahia in 2012 (Waiselfisz 2015, 30).  Still, none of these statistics name the dead.  
They cannot explain the grieving of the families of Salvador and Simões Filho who, collectively, 
lost 1,790 people to death by firearm in 2012 (Waiselfisz 2015, 41, 56), nor can they console the 
mothers and fathers of the 3,262 young people (ages 15-29) across the entire state of Bahia who 
were killed in gun violence in 2012 (Waiselfisz 2015, 67).  These statistics do not mark a 
familial loss or a rupture in the everyday life of the people of Bahia.  They fail to capture any 
sense of loss because Black life is still treated as a game of numbers.  In the event that any kind 
of familial relation is mentioned regarding Black physical death, it is always in a way that 
emphasizes the dereliction of Black parenting.  Black mothers are often cast in pathological 
terms, representing threats to the well-being of the entire community (Carby 1992, 741).  
Mainstream, day-time television shows like Na Mira and Se Liga Bocão are examples of this.  
                                                          
19 In the daily course of our lives, the counterfeit superiority of the white racial component, of patriarchy and 
sexism, founds and dynamizes a system of oppressions that imposes, on every black woman, the struggle for 
survival and community 
 
20 Received a cruel inheritance 
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So, too, are the pronunciations of Bahia’s elected officials.  In a February 3, 2016 edition of the 
online periodical Bahia.Ba, Bahia’s governor, Rui Costa comments on the fact that, in the first 
month of 2016, 117 homicides had been committed in the city of Salvador: “Não é pobreza que 
leva ao crime: A exclusão, a falta de amor e carinho e a falta de esperança é que levam um jovem 
ao crime”21 (http://bahia.ba/ssa/tratratratratratra-dados-confirmam-salvador-como-cidade-
violenta/). 
Black life is still tabulated and measured; numerically counted.  What is being lost is not 
a son or a daughter, nor any other familial constituent.  Rather, what is being lost is bare life—
life which is not killed or sacrificed, but instead simply biologically ended.  In this modern 
understanding of Black non-subjectivity, the lack of a familial structure and the assumed absence 
of Black political subjectivity mean that the progenitors of those disposed bodies can only weep 
or mourn over the bodies—they cannot save them, as they have no legitimate claim to their 
progeny (Hartman 2007, 80).  It is this “truth” of modernity, the formula that neither allows 
Black women to claim or protect those to whom they give life, against which the quilombolas of 
the Bay of Aratu so ferociously fight.
                                                          
21 It’s not poverty that brings crime: Exclusion, lack of love and caring and lack of hope is what brings a young 
person to crime 
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Chapter 4 
Throughout Brazilian history, the organized struggles of Afro-descendant populations 
have been vital to resistance against the genocide that typifies the modern epoch.  As mentioned 
above, Brazil’s legacy of Black struggle takes many forms and contributes to a variety of Black 
Geographies.  Again, Black Geographies are the geographical expressions put into place by those 
that recognize the effects of anti-Blackness and seek to create social and spatial relations that are 
not typified by that violence.  In Brazil, marronage, in the form of quilombos, historically 
presented important forms of Radical Black Geographies—geographies that reject a reliance on 
modern spatial organizing tools like sovereignty and the maintenance of the idea of non-being.  
Quilombos were some of the world’s earliest forms of Radical Black Geographies as they 
essentially coincided with the arrival of Africans as slaves in Brazil and entailed social and 
spatial relations that valued and protected the lives and politics of those deemed “non-beings.”  
For centuries, quilombos existed as one of the main antagonists to the Brazilian colony and, later, 
to the nation-state.  It was precisely these radical forms of Black consciousness and geographies 
that the Brazilian national project, rooted in notions of racial mixture and anti-Blackness, sought 
to expunge. 
With anti-Black violence still very much a central component of the Brazilian national 
landscape, the Black political activists of the 1970s and 1980s sought to reinvigorate the term 
“quilombo” as a rallying point for Black struggle in the country.  Their resurrection of the word 
“quilombo” attached itself to the continued practice of quilombismo among various Afro-
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descendant communities in the country.  The present-day quilombo movement is a concatenation 
of the persistence of the ethic of quilombismo among communities across the entirety of the 
Brazilian landscape and the strategic use of the term by Black activists of the late 20th century, 
who sought to name a radical Black praxis.  The use of the term “quilombo” at a national level 
has linked together the struggles of many seemingly disparate communities.  By entering into 
this struggle under the banner of “quilombo,” communities recognize the linkages that they 
share—that of the preservation and defense of a radical Black life and, I argue, the creation of 
present-day marronage.  As such, the term is once again being used to designate those 
communities that reject the ethic of erasure inherent to Brazilian society, as they seek to 
territorially preserve their way of life through unique and always changing praxes, power 
relations, and understandings of the physical world.  The dictates of sovereign governance and 
global capital, however, demand that the emergence of autonomous communities across the 
entire nationscape not take place. 
The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu reject the state’s insistence on being the sole 
identifier of quilombismo.  Because they understand that their struggles, as quilombos, entail the 
protection of their way of life, they refuse to allow the state to define the nature of their 
territories.  In the actions and pronunciations of the quilombolas of Rio dos Macacos, Tororó, 
and Ilha de Maré, it is evident that they recognize the conservative Black Geographies promoted 
by the Brazilian state as an affront to their way of life.  This mutilated geography acknowledged 
and encouraged by the state is an example of what Abdias do Nascimento describes as “certain 
mechanisms the dominant society concedes to [Black Brazilians’] protagonism, intending them 
as instruments of control” (1980, 154).  In this case, these instruments are part of neoliberal 
multiculturalism and the attempts by the state to nominally acknowledge the quilombos while 
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simultaneously destroying their territorialities.  It is precisely because these quilombos are the 
creation of attempts to not be controlled by dominant society that they recognize the genocidal 
ends toward which the state works.  In addition to recognizing and critiquing these state 
measures, the quilombos employ unique social practices that continually re-establish their 
quilombola subjectivity.  This section is comprised of statements and actions from the 
quilombolas that I witnessed and experienced firsthand.  All of the descriptions of the 
quilombolas here are from my personal engagements with them.  I discuss practices regarding 
labor and gender, specifically. 
Quilombola Labor and Gender Relations 
When I say that the quilombolas of the Bay of Aratu protect themselves against the 
hyper-exploitation present in the labor practices in Salvador, I do not at all mean to suggest that 
the quilombolas do not work or do not work hard.  To the contrary, from what I witnessed during 
my time in the quilombos, labor practices were quite rigorous and required a significant time 
commitment from the community members.  Still, several factors make the quilombola’s labor 
and productive practices unique. 
For one, they do not answer to a boss who appropriates the surplus value squeezed from 
their efforts.  The quilombolas answer to no authority figure who sets the parameters for their 
workdays and decides whose efforts are satisfactory.  As such, there is no fear of being fired or 
removed from employment and made to face the possibility of being unable to support oneself.  
Furthermore, the product of quilombola labor is not the boss’s—it is that of the collectivity.  
Because of this, the quilombolas are not forced to do more work than is required for their own 
needs.  Related to this, the means of production are not divorced from the quilombolas in a way 
that at once employs them and consumes them (Marx 1981, 424-425).  Instead, the means of 
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production and means of subsistence come from the same sources for the quilombolas.  Their 
dependence on, and for respect for, nature means that the means of production simultaneously 
provide the communities with a form of subsistence. 
While planting fields of manioc, corn, beans, and squashes and hauling nets of fish, 
digging in the mud to extract crabs, and scouring the mangrove roots for shellfish all certainly 
entail hard work, none of these actions contribute to the enrichment of an owner of the means of 
production.  Neither the quilombolas, nor some other authority figure “own” the source of the 
quilombos’ mode of production or subsistence, and, as such, there is not a typical relationship of 
exploitation present in the quilombos.  This is quite contrary to the case of much of the rest of 
Salvador.  Laborers around urban Salvador can be separated from the means of production at the 
whim of their employers, and thereby lose access to means of subsistence for themselves and 
their families.  They can also be seriously underpaid, such that their long hours yield scant 
remuneration.  The quilombolas in the Bay of Aratu, on the other hand, are able to provide for 
themselves and subsist from the very environment in which they live.  Whereas many of those 
living in Salvador are forced to labor for the gain of others, often times not even making enough 
to provide for their basic needs and the needs of their dependents, the members of the quilombos 
can proudly proclaim, “Ninguém passa fome aqui.”1   
While much of the urban populace of Salvador must sell their labor power in order to 
purchase amenities like light, water, and gas, the quilombolas can rely on the fruits of their own 
territory to provide cooking fuel and housing materials; and although many of those living in 
urban Salvador would certainly perish without access to a wage from which means of 
                                                          
1 Nobody goes hungry here 
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subsistence are purchased, the quilombolas assert, “Se não tiver [dinheiro], não morre.”2  A 
fundamental aspect of quilombola life is reliance on their environment to collectively provide for 
the community.  The “environment” in this case is the confluence of all the factors that make up 
the world the quilombolas live in.  The quilombos’ unique conception of the world leads to a 
unique territoriality which creates new relations to territory and eschews many of the truths and 
taken for granted aspects of life that define Salvador.  The labor practices of quilombola women, 
specifically, stand out as a unique aspect of the quilombos’ world. 
The role that women play in the quilombos is another example of the ways in which 
quilombola life departs from the societal norms in Salvador.  This is an important fact, given the 
numerous, interlocking ways in which Black women are marginalized in Salvador.  Just as in 
historical Black Brazilian struggles, Black women today—expecially in quilombos—are central 
actors in the struggle against anti-Blackness.  My experience with the Quilombos from the Bay 
of Aratu suggests that Keisha-Khan Perry’s assertion that Black women are the “foot soldiers” of 
Brazil’s Black movement is correct (2013, xv).  I would argue further that Black women are 
simultaneously foot soldiers and leaders of the quilombola struggles in the Bay of Aratu.  I am 
not suggesting that quilombola men are entirely absent from the political struggles of quilombo 
life.  Rather, I am noting the fact that women make up the majority of those that both plan and 
enact the political expressions in the quilombos.  This fact is openly acknowledged by the 
quilombolas, who begin their meetings by always greeting the women first and taking care to 
privilege the presence of women in public statements.  They do this explicitly because they 
collectively recognize that women make up the greatest number of those active in their struggles. 
                                                          
2 If you don’t have it [money] you won’t die. 
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Both Keisha-Khan Perry and Kia Caldwell note, respectively, that “the knowledge that 
black women gain from the built environment and their social conditions informs their creative 
struggles in building more democratic…landscapes” (Perry 2013, xvii) and “individual [Black] 
women attempt to reconstruct their subjectivities by contesting dominant aesthetic norms” 
(Caldwell 2003, 18).  These arguments demonstrate how Black women in Brazil draw on 
oppressive aspects of their lived experiences in attempts to create the conditions for a more just 
world.  The oppressive aspects of life that Black Brazilian women deal with are part of a society 
in which “Black women are overdetermined as promiscuous, violable, and poor” (Smith 2014, 
114) and therefore exist outside “the social contract and, by extension, outside the moral order” 
(Smith 2014, 107).  This marginalized condition leads to Black Brazilian women being socially 
excluded through assumptions deviance and being perpetually “out of place” and therefore 
spatially superfluous (Williams 2013, 26).  The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu recognize this 
register of oppression and therefore articulate their struggles and highlight the values of 
quilombola life by emphasizing the ways in which the Black population of Salvador is 
systemically marginalized.  As Caldwell (2007) notes, the marginalization faced by Black 
Brazilians and Black women, specifically, are not necessarily spectacular, uncommon 
occurrences.  Rather, oppressive factors can be of the mundane sort—occurring as “informal and 
everyday aspects of Brazilian citizenship (Caldwell 2007, 2).  Everyday labor practices and 
economic dependency seem to be one of the main forms of oppression against which quilombola 
life protects. 
Quilombola Women’s Labor 
Unlike gendered divisions of labor, in which women are frequently forced to take jobs 
that leave them exposed to a variety of harassments from their employers, the quilombolas of the 
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Bay of Aratu were very clear that they set the conditions for how and when they worked.  The 
collection of shellfish, for instance, was scheduled around the high and low tides of the sea.  
When the tide was low, the roots of the mangrove were exposed and thus the clams, oysters, and 
mussels that formed an invaluable part of the quilombos’ diet and income were able to be 
collected.  Fishing days were decided collectively among the communities.  Various members 
would confer within their respective quilombos, or would coordinate with members from 
neighboring quilombos, to establish a day and time when they would go fishing.  Fishing the sea 
and rivers and collecting shellfish among the mangroves, then, did not require the approval or 
oversight of some “qualified” supervisor who would ultimately determine the competence of the 
quilombo fisherwomen.  Instead, the quilombola women decided among themselves, and in 
conjunction with the natural rhythms of the sea and rivers, when and where an appropriate time 
to work was.  This rule applied to the cleaning and preparing of their bounty as well. 
At a meeting I attended with the members of Ilha de Maré, Rio dos Macacos, and Tororó, 
one quilombola woman expressed that, to her, being quilombola meant sitting in front of her 
house with her daughter, removing the shellfish from their shells.  They could do this, she said, 
while conversing and taking their time—this was a special time for her family.  This image 
stands in stark contrast to the descriptions I heard from women outside the quilombos who work 
in call centers and doing domestic work, where breaks and conversations were few and far 
between, and the emotional and physical stress of the jobs could cause any number of personal 
breakdowns.  In addition to this, spaces like the mangroves offered women a unique space in 
which they could gather amongst themselves.   
While fishing practices that required heavy lifting were often undertaken by fishermen, 
the gathering of shellfish, shrimp, and crabs were often the purview of fisherwomen.  This means 
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that the centrality of fishing to quilombola life, and the communal access to the mangroves, offer 
unique spaces where women gather willingly in groups to conduct important social reproductive 
practices.  This not only reifies quilombo subsistence and economic efforts, but also works to 
maintain a social arrangement in which quilombola women create spaces in which they can 
collectively gather of their own volition.  Given the exploitation many women in Salvador face, 
the importance of this fact cannot be overstated.  Another important social relation defended 
vehemently by quilombola women is their ability to redefine what it means to be a Black mother 
in Bahia. 
Quilombola Motherhood 
Among the many aspirations voiced by the quilombola women in the Bay of Aratu, one 
of the most commonly articulated desires was to maintain a community that was viable for their 
children and their future progeny.  When making these claims, it was not unusual to hear these 
women juxtapose their desired quilombo life to the problems that Black peoples face in the urban 
areas of Salvador.  Life in the quilombos was preferable to life in the city, according to these 
women, because of the violence city life brought with it.  It is because of this that the women of 
Ilha de Maré stated “a gente já sabe como é tratado o jovem negro neste estado”,3 at public 
audiences with city politicians.  Contrary to these outside violences, the quilombos protected 
against the various forms of violence—some of which I mention above.  The quilombolas—
particularly quilombola women—take it upon themselves to defend their territory and ensure that 
future quilombola generations inherit a world that is not defined by the brutal anti-Black violence 
that so many face in Salvador.  By taking action to preserve territorial configurations that value 
                                                          
3 We already know how Black youths are treated in this state 
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and protect Black life—by committing themselves to quilombismo—the women of the 
Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu are recognizing and rejecting one of the fundamental aspects 
of modernity’s anti-Blackness.  The ways that the quilombos as a whole protect against these 
forms of anti-Blackness materialize in a variety of ways.  If territories are imbued with specific 
power arrangements and social meaning, then quilombo territories are, in part, defined by 
structures that recognize the agency and power of a collective family committed to protecting 
those seen as inhuman by the purveyors of modernity.  This means that quilombos recognize the 
role of mothers and fathers in protecting those they bring into the world, a task that entails 
defending the very territory from which such a subjectivity is born.  Because of this, the struggle 
of the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu preserves the life of its members at the same time that it 
protects the physical and ethical components of its territory. 
Quilombola self-defense 
The violence typified by the competing sovereign actors in the city of Salvador is one of 
the main factors that the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu seek to avoid through their politics.  
As this chapter demonstrates, the quilombos are very proud of the fact that they have not allowed 
drug trafficking in their territories.  By preventing traffickers from taking root in the community, 
they avoid some of the problems that are present in the urban areas of Salvador where trafficking 
is a reality.  Additionally, during my time in the quilombos I never once saw the military police 
present there.  I am certain this is not always the case—police have surely been in the 
communities at some point—but given the amount of time I spent in the communities, I was 
surprised that I never saw the military police present.  This does not signify that there are not 
other sovereign actors that the quilombos must deal with.  Especially in the case of Rio dos 
Macacos, the presence of the navy means that there are times when specific sovereign actors 
132 
 
present themselves in quilombo territory.  Nonetheless, the quilombos remain resolved to not 
allow these sovereign actors uncontested power to decide on the exception. 
The diligence that the members of Rio dos Macacos show in patrolling their communities 
at night show that they are committed to attempting to prevent the navy from deciding on, and 
addressing, a state of exception.  Through these measures, the quilombos reject sovereign power 
in their territories.  Instead, their territoriality is punctuated by a collective governance of 
cooperation.  No one actor or body of actors stands outside the law to decide on the exception 
(Agamben 2005; Schmitt 2005).  Rather, the quilombos collectively organize and act on 
decisions and actions within their territory.  Furthermore, no sector of quilombo society exists in 
a permanent state of exception where they can be eliminated as part of a necessity (Agamben 
1998).  Quilombolas are valued as quilombolas—there are no dangerous, expendable sectors that 
can be killed without being sacrificed.  By remaining committed to protecting their territories 
and, thus, their way of life, the quilombos offer a form of protection from the violence that 
pervades much of urban Salvador, where the sovereign right to end life, practiced by the police 
and drug traffickers goes largely unchecked.  In addition to the quilombos placing a value on life 
that is unique to the hierarchy of humanity present in modern, sovereign territory, the productive 
practices in the quilombos are also unique to that of the rest of Brazilian society. 
The approaches that the quilombos in question take to defend their way of life vary.  
Above, I describe some of the unique aspects of life in the quilombos, touching specifically on 
issues of labor and gender in the context of anti-Blackness in Bahia.  I now turn to a closer 
examination of the ways that the quilombos enact their distinct territorialities.  These concrete 
articulations of the communities’ relations to their territories offer us examples of how the 
quilombos realize alternative ways of existing.  These methods include working with 
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“sovereign” actors, such as organs of the state and international groups like the United Nations.  
The other methods of resistance employed by the quilombos include civil disobedience, 
cooperation between different communities, and strong internal organization.  Each community 
articulates these forms of struggle in unique ways. 
As I have gone to lengths to describe radical Black movements, and maroon/quilombo 
communities in particular, as existing apart from the tradition of sovereignty, it may seem 
contradictory to see quilombo communities work with sovereign state and ultra-state actors.  
However, working with sovereign actors is actually a very common characteristic of maroon and 
quilombo communities.  As radical Black movements are premised on their ability to analyze the 
situations in which they find themselves, it is often the case that, recognizing the power relations 
present in a situation, these movements find it necessary to negotiate with the sovereign actors 
against whom they struggle.4  In these negotiations, what is taking place is the recognition of the 
sovereign actor as a figure which wields a certain kind of power in a situation.  This in no way 
suggests that the movement in question sees itself as part of the sovereign apparatus, nor that it 
wants to become a sovereign actor.  Rather, as is evidenced in historical cases, as well as in the 
cases of the quilombos of Aratu, when radical Black movements engage with sovereign actors, 
they are essentially seeking to establish a relation in which their way of life can be preserved to 
the greatest extent possible.  Far from seeking to become part of the sovereign state or ultra-state 
organization, these movements seek to use multiple methods to preserve their ways of life—
including institutionalized methods.  In so doing, these movements present the possibility of 
using technologies recognized by the sovereign as a way to exercise non-sovereign power.  
                                                          
4 Engaging with colonial and state powers was not unusual for the original maroon societies.  The maroons of 
Jamaica and Suriname battled British and Dutch troops, respectively, for many years before being awarded titles 
that recognized their communities’ independence. 
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Again, this evidences a close analysis of the situation with which these movements are presented.  
The case of Rio dos Macacos demonstrates this fact clearly, as they continue to reject proposals 
put forward by the Brazilian state that promise to reduce their territory to a level that would 
prevent their reproduction as a community. 
In the following section, I focus much attention on the case of Rio dos Macacos.  This is 
because I met the members of this community before I met the members of Ilha de Maré and 
Tororó.  Hence, I spent more time in Rio dos Macacos and with its members during my 
fieldwork than I did with those of the other two quilombos.  This in no way suggests that the case 
of Rio dos Macacos is more important than the others—it is simply a symptom of how I spent 
my time in Bahia.  Also, all of my descriptions of public audiences, protests, and meetings in this 
chapter come from my firsthand accounts of the events in question.  What I describe here are 
events in which I was present and participated.  Hence, the explanations of mood, tone, and 
behavior in this chapter are all as I experienced and understood them, making the descriptions 
wholly dependent on my own choice of placement and representation in the text. 
Rio dos Macacos 
The case of Rio dos Macacos clearly demonstrates the fact that spaces of Blackness and 
Black Geographies remain unrecognized as legitimate political spaces by the practitioners of 
Western reason.  Instead, Black Geographies—particularly Radical Black Geographies—remain 
in a close relation to spaces of non-being.  This manifests itself in the rendering of the spaces as 
a-political and thus as sites of exception, open to the total war that modernity and its adherents 
continue to visit against Black bodies.  That Quilombo Rio dos Macacos lives the reality of the 
continuation of this total war within an assumed a-political space is evidenced in several ways.  
When stopped by the guards at the entrance to the villa and questioned about one’s destination, it 
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is necessary to say “vou para a roça.”5  There is no address, nor legal title to which the quilombo 
has claim.  In addition to the lack of a legal registration of housing, none of the quilombolas—
with the exception of the oldest members—are recognized as legally residing on the 
community’s lands.  It is because of this that an order of removal was able to be leveled against 
the quilombo in 2012, as they were described as “invaders.”  Many quilombolas lament the fact 
that they have no legal residence, as they must have their mail sent to their friends and family 
who live in fixed, recognized addresses.  The designation of the community as existing in the 
“roça” suggests a space devoid of human presence, a place open to the agenda of those able to 
dominate the (human and natural) wilderness.  The roça (or mato) was the supposedly unsettled 
spaces in which the capitães de mato would search for, capture, and kill quilombolas during the 
days of slavery.6  This a-political space was one in which actions against those seeking and 
realizing their freedom could be killed and detained with impunity.  The force of law could take 
place in the roça without homicide or sacrifice occurring.  Hence, the veracity of the statement 
made by the quilombola leader during the community’s protest at the villa’s entrance regarding 
the navy’s view and treatment of the quilombo, “os escravos existem!  A senzala, o tronco e a 
corrente existem no Quilombo Rio dos Macacos pela Marinha de Guerra do Brasil!”7  In their 
attempts to defend their unique territory and protect against the continuation of the assumed 
condition of non-being, Rio dos Macacos employs a variety of methods. 
                                                          
5 I’m going to the roça 
 
6 Capitães de mato were essentially bounty hunters and hired guns that were used to track and capture runaway 
slaves and quilombolas.  Their name connotes one who has control or authority over an otherwise uncontrolled, 
empty space.  In addition to this, capitães de mato were traditionally known to be of visible African descent 
themselves, and are usually described as mixed-race in the literature discussing them. 
 
7 Slaves exist!  The slave quarters, the trunk, and the chain exist in Quilombo Rio dos Macacos because of the 
Brazilian Navy! 
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Rio dos Macacos and the state 
The case of Rio dos Macacos did not become national news until relatively recently, 
despite the fact that their community and struggle has been waged for over two hundred years.  
The process for cultural and territorial recognition began in the 2000s, thanks in large part to the 
assistance of one of the community leaders from Tororó.  Tororó, suffering from a similar 
situation to Rio dos Macacos with respect to the navy, and already familiar with the process of 
applying for cultural and territorial recognition, resolved to help Rio dos Macacos.  As a result, 
Rio dos Macacos received its cultural recognition from the Fundação Cultural Palmares in 2011 
and thereafter entered into the process for territorial recognition.  With the cultural recognition 
came food aid, which was necessary in light of the fact that the navy actively sought to destroy 
their autonomous food production.  While this emergency food relief helped to temporarily 
ameliorate the quilombo’s situation, the process of territorial recognition has been a long and 
protracted one for the community.  A resolution has yet to be reached. 
Cultural recognition of a quilombo is essentially bestowed based on their self-
identification as such, but the territorial recognition of a community is dependent on a report 
made by the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA).  This report is 
the product of a team of specialists that analyze and measure the land historically and presently 
occupied by the quilombo.  When this is done, INCRA comes up with a demarcated portion of 
land which they deem as comprising quilombola territory.  In the event of competing interests for 
the land in question, there is an opportunity for objections and reevaluations of the potential 
quilombola territory.  Because of this, the situation of Rio dos Macacos has essentially arrived at 
a stalemate.  The initial report by INCRA claimed that there were 301 hectares of land to which 
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the community can lay claim as necessary for their way of life.8  Despite this 301 hectares 
acknowledged by INCRA, the navy has continually protested and obstructed the quilombo’s 
right to the land.  As such, the amount of land officially offered to Rio dos Macacos has been 
significantly less than the originally stated 301 hectares.   
The first revised territorial proposal offered to Rio dos Macacos by INCRA was seven 
and a half hectares of land in an area outside of the traditional territory of the community.  Along 
with this offer came the government’s promise to build housing for the quilombolas.  The 
quilombo rejected this proposal.  The second government proposal, presented in a public 
audience in December of 2012, was for twenty-one hectares of land within the community’s 
traditional territory, and would have involved the uprooting and resettlement of almost all of the 
families in the quilombo.  This proposal, too, was rejected by the community.  A third territorial 
proposal made in an October 2013 public audience was for twenty-eight and a half hectares of 
land, in the form of the first two proposals combined.  Unsurprisingly, this, too, was rejected by 
the community.  I was present for the fourth government proposal, made in March of 2014.  It 
should be noted that at this meeting, further demands had been made by the community.  
Specifically, they were now demanding the construction of their own road which would allow 
them and their visitors an independent entrance and exit to the community.  This was partially 
the result of the abuses they and their familiars had suffered at the hands of the naval soldiers at 
the gate entrance to the villa.  The assault the soldiers had committed against two quilombolas in 
2013 was the final straw which forced the community to make this demand. 
                                                          
8 This is despite the fact that the original amount of land historically claimed by the quilombolas was around 900 
hectares. 
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At the March, 2014 public audience, INCRA presented itself as having gone to lengths to 
do right by Rio dos Macacos.  The representative from INCRA began the meeting by discussing 
how hard they had worked on this proposal and how they had, so regrettably, missed out on 
Carnaval because they had committed so much time to this new offer to the community.  They 
prefaced the proposal by saying that they greatly respected the history and struggle of Quilombo 
Rio dos Macacos and that this offer they were making was taking into account both the legacy of 
the community as well as the respect they needed to give the navy.  The issue of the navy was 
one of national security, they explained, as this was the largest naval base in the country.  As 
such, they had to respect both the villa and the dam, which were already established and 
represented important interests.  They then presented their newest proposal—eighty-six hectares 
of land.  This newest offer very visibly ignored the current living conditions of the quilombo’s 
oldest family, as it necessitated the resettlement of the community’s oldest resident and all of her 
children and grandchildren.  Those present from the community immediately began to protest.  
There was no access to water, they argued.  How were they supposed to continue their traditions 
of fishing, which had already been curtailed thanks to the abuses of the navy?  The 
representatives from INCRA assured the quilombolas that this would not be a problem—they 
would simply build lakes and river tributaries for the community and stock them with fish.  In 
addition to this, they promised to engage with the community in helping to “develop” the land 
they would get.9 
                                                          
9 This is not the only case in which a quilombo has been offered titled land with the promise of assistance in 
“developing” it.  See Amorim and Germani (2005) for a description of Quilombo Rio das Rãs of Bahia, whose 
territorial titling led to a complete overhaul of community leadership, legal representation, and the 
implementation of cattle farming by the Bank of Brazil—an agricultural practice with which the community had no 
previous experience.   
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INCRA stated that the community would have sixty days to accept this proposal, after 
which time the titling process would begin.  The disappointment among the quilombolas was 
palpable.  The community’s lawyer claimed that this timeframe was essentially forcing the 
quilombo to operate “com uma faca no pescoço”.10  A representative from the Secretary of 
Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR) made an intervention at the end of the 
meeting by saying that the approach INCRA was taking, in suggesting that the interests of the 
state (in the form of the navy) and the people (in the form of Rio dos Macacos) were mutually 
exclusive, was casting the people as the enemy.  She calmly argued that this approach to politics 
was supposed to have ended when the military dictatorship ended and that there needed to be an 
accord reached that benefitted both.  After this pronouncement, the meeting was adjourned.  This 
proved to be just another round in what was already a long struggle. 
The community was dissatisfied with the government’s proposal for multiple reasons.  
First, it proposed to uproot the oldest family in the community.  Unable to attend the meeting, the 
community’s eldest member became incensed when she heard that the government proposed to 
move her and her family.  She greeted this news with her oft-repeated phrase, “Só saio daqui 
morto!”11  Another point of discontent was the fact that there was no water source present in the 
government’s proposal.  Community members were adamant that there be water sources present 
in whatever territory they accepted.  In discussing the implications of the latest proposal and 
what to do about it, the community was assisted by their lawyer and a group of architects that 
work with traditional communities in Bahia.  The decision the community came to evidenced a 
sharp analysis and commitment to protecting their future.   
                                                          
10 With a knife [held] to the throat 
 
11 I’ll only leave here dead! 
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The state’s tactic of territorial titling appeals to the community to make themselves true, 
modern political subjects through state recognition, and to remove themselves from the space of 
exception.  This claim is bolstered by the government through its offer to help the community 
“develop” their territory.  Not only will the community then be politically recognized, its space 
will also be a container for rational economic practices.  When government representatives 
threaten Rio dos Macacos with further stalling of their territorial titling process, what they are 
really threatening is to preserve the community’s relation to the state of non-being.  They are 
threatening to continue to maintain the quilombo in a situation in which modern-day capitães de 
mato can arrive and visit their various violent articulations upon the quilombolas without fear of 
reprise.  By offering territorial—and thereby political—titling to the community in exchange for 
the essential destruction of traditional quilombo life, the Brazilian government appears to be 
giving the quilombo the option of shifting itself from bare life to political life.  The government 
seeks to capture the quilombo in modernity’s notions and forms of governance, essentially 
inducing them to accept a conservative Black Geography which, while recognizing the present 
wretched condition in which the quilombolas live, entices them to seek respite in modern notions 
of being. 
The government promises that accepting and abiding by modern notions of territory, such 
as the reliance on sovereignty (in this case, of the nation-state) and the implementation of 
rational economic planning (in this case, state-backed capitalism), will result in shifting from a 
state of non-being to one of political recognition.  This is the understanding at root of the 
realization of a Conservative Black Geography; while recognizing the existence and effects of 
zones of non-being, this conservative approach seeks a solution through the same ontological 
mechanisms that created this relation of non-being.  However, Rio dos Macacos commitment to 
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struggle, and their analysis of the situation, has resulted in a stalemate, as the quilombo 
recognizes the imminent destruction of their territorial practices, and, as such, their community, 
should they accept the government’s terms. 
After the March, 2014 meeting, it was resolved that they would reject the offer of eighty-
six hectares and work to create a counter-map, in which they would propose their own territorial 
claim to the government.  In the past, the community had simply rejected INCRA’s offer and 
waited for them to return with another one.  This time they would create their own map and 
rationale and present it at the next public audience to the representatives of INCRA and the navy.  
What proceeded was a series of community meetings with the team of architects and lawyers in 
which they worked to graphically represent their cartographic knowledge in a way that would be 
legible to the government.  Maps were hand drawn on enormous sheets of white paper by the 
architects and community members together as members took turns explaining lived spaces, 
cultural spaces, what fish could be found in which sections of the river, where there had 
previously existed casas de farinha, terreiros, and the houses of families that had been expelled.  
The role of the outside actors was crucial.  Several quilombolas explained before and after this 
meeting that they knew their territory deeply, they simply did not know how to technically 
represent it in map form.  They therefore welcomed the lawyers and architects, who helped to 
transfer this intimate quilombola knowledge onto maps that INCRA and the navy could 
understand.   
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Figure 4.1 Mapping project undertaken in Rio dos Macacos. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Mapping exercise in Rio dos Macacos. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
After digital renderings of these maps were made, community members place colored 
pins in the areas of the map that represented lived and formerly lived spaces to delineate who 
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lived there and how their families were comprised.  Central to the community’s map were the 
claims that no families would be moved and that they would have already-existing water 
resources within the territory—they would not wait for water to be built into the quilombo.  This 
first claim was premised on the fact that the community felt as if the navy and government were 
trying to create divisions within the quilombo by moving certain families and not others.  The 
second claim was rooted in a desire for the community to reclaim resources and subsistence 
practices that had been lost to them due to the navy’s violence.  When the final product was 
complete, the meetings shifted toward strategizing who would present the map to the government 
and how they would do so.  The community’s lawyers helped them craft their presentation in a 
way that couched their struggle in terms that could be understood by the government 
representatives present there. 
 
Figure 4.3 Rio dos Macacos mapping exercise in preparation for public audience. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
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It was not until two months later, in May of 2014, that the community would have the 
opportunity to present its counterproposal to the government.  In that time, there had been a 
judicial order decreed by a local judge which ordered the evacuation of the quilombolas from the 
land on which they lived.12  Nonetheless, the quilombolas remained in their territory and moved 
forward with their plan to present the counter-proposal to the government.  For this meeting, the 
quilombolas had resolved to do more than simply present their own map to the government.  In 
front of several arms of the government as well as local news sources, the quilombolas made the 
public audience their own on this day. 
The meeting started with a capoeira demonstration by the quilombo’s capoeristas.  The 
capoeristas are a group comprised of, and led by, the community youth, with participants ranging 
in age from fourteen to sixteen.  They had practiced for months leading up to this public 
audience in order to perform.  “Vamos mostrar a capoeira, a cultura do nosso território e como é 
importante,”13 explained one of the community leaders as the capoeristas took the floor.  As the 
bass sound of the berimbau, dobrao, and baqueta strummed through the room and the pandeiro 
kept the rhythm, the capoeristas comprising the circle clapped their hands in unison while those 
in the middle performed the athletic cartwheels, high kicks, and timely ducks and dodges that 
typify capoeira.  Initially, only the youth participated, but as the performance continued on, some 
of the community elders began to take part in the performance as well.  Next, a dance troupe 
from the community presented.  Dressed in orange, flower-patterned outfits, this group of young 
women performed a number of dances in the back of the meeting room.  When the performances 
                                                          
12 This was not the first time this had occurred.  The judge in question, Evandro Reimão, had ordered an identical 
evacuation in 2012, based on the navy’s claim that the quilombo had invaded the navy’s territory.  Both evacuation 
orders occurred just prior to a territorial proposition from the government. 
 
13 We’re going to show capoeira, our territory’s culture and how it is important 
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were over, the meeting began with INCRA again putting forward its ornamental 
acknowledgement of the efforts of Rio dos Macacos and its commitment to finding a solution 
that would be agreeable to both the community and the navy.  The podium was left open for 
remarks from anybody that wanted to make them.  One of the community elders—a man that had 
married into the quilombo—went up to speak.   
He immediately railed against the navy and the crimes they had committed against the 
community, stating that the navy had done away with almost everything that had previously been 
there.  He stated that he was a proud quilombola, having lived in the community for over thirty 
years, and that the navy ought to be ashamed for everything they had perpetrated.  He shouted 
that his wife had been raped by naval soldiers, quickly asking pardon from his wife as well as 
those present for having to mention this fact.  “You don’t have to ask pardon!” several 
quilombolas shouted back to him.  He continued on, explaining the history of the community; 
which fazendas the community had come from, who had owned the fazendas, which water 
sources they had used, etc.  After finishing his intervention, the representatives from INCRA 
were given the opportunity to speak. 
146 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Quilombo fruits and community products at Rio dos Macacos public audience.  Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
INCRA unveiled a new proposal which they seemed to think would surprise the 
community.  This newest proposal, of 104 hectares, did not call for the removal of the 
quilombo’s eldest family.  It allowed them to remain on their land and included another small 
parcel of land that had been left out of the previous proposal.  The rest of the land was not open 
for negotiation due to its proximity to the dam.  The importance of state security was again 
repeated by the government, stating that what the navy had built needed to be protected.  In 
addition to this, the need to reserve land for training space for the soldiers was also brought up.  
They explained that soldiers currently had to leave the state to conduct their training—reserving 
this land in question would facilitate training for the soldiers in Bahia.  One of the INCRA 
representatives added a somewhat impatient qualification, as well, stating that the government 
was essentially reaching its limit with the amount of land it was willing to offer the quilombo.  In 
short, this was the maximum amount of land Rio dos Macacos would get.  The community had 
anticipated this approach by the government.  In previous meetings the quilombolas had 
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discussed the fact that there were notable elisions with regard to the land the government had 
offered them in its previous proposal of eighty-six hectares.  They correctly assumed that the 
government would try to come back with a new proposal which they would pitch as being far 
more generous than past offers.  Having expected this move by the government representatives, 
the quilombo moved forward with its own counter-proposal.   
Standing before the audience comprised of journalists, local politicians, representatives 
from the navy, and members of INCRA, the counter-map was projected onto the presentation 
screen and two women quilombola leaders explained their territorial demands.  The quilombo 
was demanding 280 hectares of land, more than twice what the government was offering and just 
short of what the original INCRA report had demarcated as quilombola territory.  With the land 
they were making seven demands of the government with regard to their community’s situation: 
Integrity of the quilombola territory; food security and income generation; rights to water 
security; preservation of natural water sources; shared use of the naval dam; preservation of the 
community’s sacred sites; and the implementing of policies guaranteed to Brazilian citizens. 
Regarding the quilombo’s territorial integrity, one of the community leaders explained 
that the quilombo was one territory and could not be divided.  This was undoubtedly in response 
to the navy’s attempts to divide the quilombolas both territorially and internally; here the 
community was rejecting the military’s divisive agenda, insisting on the unity of quilombola 
territorial integrity.  The second demand was couched in terms of needing to sustain themselves 
through access to land for planting and water for fishing.  The third demand—for access to 
water—was couched in similar terms as the second point.  Water was needed for fishing, 
watering animals, and irrigating crops.  The fourth point was invoked as a preservation of the 
traditional practices of the community, as it was explained that the quilombolas had always 
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preserved and maintained access to the rivers surrounding their community.  The second, third, 
and fourth demands, therefore, focused on the quilombo’s legacy of self-subsistence, which is so 
important to them.  Presenting the fifth point, regarding the use of the dam, one of the 
quilombola leaders explained that the community could not take administrative control of the 
dam, but, considering their need for water, they wanted to negotiate terms of use of the dam with 
the navy.  On the map they produced, they had strategically left out most of the land surrounding 
the naval dam, as they recognized the navy’s fixation on the dam as a strategic location of 
national security.  Still, they demanded access to part of the land around the dam so that they 
might fish there as they had done in the past.  The sixth point touched on the locations which 
were central to the community’s practice of Candomblé, asserting that these spaces needed to be 
preserved, as Candomblé and its built environment of the terreiros have been vital cultural, 
religious, and distribution sites for the community.  The seventh and final point put forward by 
the community demanded that, as a community, the quilombolas be allowed electricity, basic 
sanitation provisions, access to healthcare, education, and a community center.  Their demands 
for this land were rooted in their desire and expectation to grow as a community, as they hoped 
to pass their land and customs on to their children and their children’s children.  This was 
something they did not see as possible with seriously diminished land.  This final demand was 
very much rooted in the future aspirations of the quilombo, demonstrating that, contrary to 
popular Brazilian notions of quilombos, modern-day marronage in Brazil is a viable option for 
the future of Black populations there. 
Given that a major part of the quilombo’s future was the return of the nearly fifty families 
that had been expelled during the height of the navy’s aggression, it was necessary to maximize 
the amount of land the quilombo received.  How, the quilombolas queried, was a community of 
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around seventy families going to survive on 104 hectares of land, which amounts to less than two 
hectares per family?  Where would they plant their cassava, their bananas, their cocoa?  How 
would they be able to collect their dendê or squash?  Any hope for future generations and a 
population increase would essentially be impossible.  By diminishing the quilombo’s land, they 
explained, the government was essentially saying to the quilombo, “você não pode parir mais.”14  
Furthermore, they argued, much of the land left out of the government’s proposal were areas 
vital to the extractive practices of the community.  The community’s commitment to self-
sustenance was dependent on this area, which was completely absent from all of the 
government’s proposals.  To further prove the quilombo’s history on the land and the losses they 
had already suffered at the hands of the navy, a second counter-map was presented to the 
audience.  This map showed the land loss that the community had already sustained, representing 
the entire 900 hectares that had been occupied prior to the navy’s incursion and land grab.  How 
could the government ask for more land, given what they had already taken from the 
community? 
INCRA representatives were visibly surprised and frustrated by this move from the 
quilombolas.  One representative exasperatedly hurled a veiled threat at the community, 
explaining that, given the fact that elections were upcoming, the community needed to seriously 
consider their best option—if the current presidential administration was ousted, there was no 
telling how much longer the titling process might take.  This comment meant more than simply 
noting the possibility of a delay in territorial titling.  In saying this, the representative was 
acknowledging the fact that further delay in the titling process meant that the quilombo would 
remain open to the predations of the navy.  This representative was signaling the government’s 
                                                          
14 You can no longer give birth 
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ability to allow the navy to continue its abuse of the quilombolas; a particularly heavy threat 
considering the content of the opening statements made by the quilombola elder.  
 After this initial pronouncement by INCRA, the meeting was again opened up for 
comment.  A man who identified himself as a former professor of political science at the Federal 
University of Bahia (UFBA) stood up and vehemently commented on the fact that the approach 
the government was taking, in protecting military interests over those of the population, was 
exactly in step with the military dictatorship that had run the country for over twenty years.  He 
went on to argue that by offering a small amount of land to the quilombolas, the government was 
not dooming them to immediate erasure, but rather to eventual destruction—“Não morre hoje, 
mas morre amanhã,”15 he exclaimed.  After the ex-professor’s intervention, a member of the 
architectural team that aided Rio dos Macacos in making their map spoke.  She began by saying 
that, despite the titling process’ reliance on maps, what was being discussed was not hard data, 
but rather the life of the community in question, emphasizing the humanity of the community as 
more important than modern, abstract cartographical representations.  She further critiqued the 
cartographic representations of INCRA, stating that the river which was represented as being in 
the community in the newest government proposal was not, indeed, there.  She based this on her 
own familiarity with the area, as she had surveyed the quilombo territory several times with the 
quilombolas.  Following her was the same community elder that had spoken at the beginning of 
meeting.  He demanded that the abuse of the government stop, eventually breaking down into 
tears as he shouted what the navy’s presence meant for the community: “É estupro! É tiro! É 
vergonha!”16   
                                                          
15 You don’t die today, but you die tomorrow 
 
16 It’s rape!  It’s shots [bullets]!  It’s shame! 
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The next speaker was a young woman who identified herself saying that while she was 
not from Rio dos Macacos, her roots were there.  She began by addressing the elder whose 
speech had preceded hers, saying that the tears and cries of the community did not convince the 
government; that the government used many weapons against the quilombo.  These weapons 
were not reduced solely to arms, rather the community’s ignorance also served as a means of 
oppression for the navy.  Why, she asked, did the quilombo have to apologize and ask pardon 
after being raped, prevented from planting, and treated like animals?  Finally, one of the 
quilombo’s lawyers spoke.  He started by frankly saying that the quilombo was hesitant to 
believe anything the navy said or promised, given the lies it had told in the past.  He cited the 
navy’s 2012 claim that the community had invaded its territory—a claim used as the impetus to 
order the quilombolas’ expulsion—as an example.  He went on to say that it was not clear why 
the navy was making such a big deal about the threat to “national security” that the quilombo 
posed vis-à-vis the dam, given that the navy had donated significant amounts of its land in the 
Bay of Aratu to the company M. Dias Branco.  Why was the question of security brought up 
when it came to Rio dos Macacos, but not when it came to a large corporation?  The Chief 
Minister of the Ministry of Defense, Antônio Lessa, closed the meeting by saying that he was 
glad the community had offered a counter proposal, although it was much different than what the 
navy had in mind.  This tactic by Rio dos Macacos served to confront the navy in a space defined 
by state power, yet it also simultaneously drew on the quilombo’s unique political and territorial 
understandings.  By presenting cartographical representations based on their own territorial 
knowledge, showing the state’s anti-Black agenda through making demands that run counter to 
state expectations and yet remain vital to the quilombola subjectivity, and creating spaces for the 
expression of quilombo cultural practices like capoeira and dance, Rio dos Macacos used a space 
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of state sovereignty to at once critique state racism, as well as assert the territorial viability of 
their community. 
The quilombo’s way of life is very much dependent on their own sense of place and 
territorial practices amidst a society predicated on their destruction.  Still, they choose to 
confront the state in spaces like the Federal Public Ministry because they recognize that such 
spaces codify the proceedings that take place therein as legitimate.  In the same vein, the 
quilombo chooses to represent their territory with cartographical renderings and legal speech that 
state actors understand, in order that these same state actors recognize that there is, indeed, a 
claim to territory being made.  Meeting the state in these ways prevents state actors from 
ignoring completely the quilombo’s territorial claims, forcing them to take note of the 
community’s aspirations.  The quilombo understands that their own territory and territoriality is 
completely illegible to the Brazilian state, as their relation to, and understanding of, their 
territory exist in concepts wholly other to that of the sovereign state.  At the same time, however, 
they do not let this fact deter them from confronting the state with their territorial agenda.   
In recognizing the state’s inability to see them as legitimate politico-spatial actors, Rio 
dos Macacos draws on the assistance of those they know can help them represent their territorial 
claims in ways that the state would understand.  The architects’ and lawyers’ involvements in the 
quilombo’s struggle served to paint the quilombolas’ claims in a way and a language that the 
state is capable of comprehending, and, as such, forced the state to consider the community’s 
claims.  This is a tactic the quilombo has employed since about 2010, when it first brought its 
case to the federal government.  Their struggle, obviously, preceded their entrance into the legal 
process to have their territory recognized, however, given the kind of violence they found 
themselves facing in the late 2000s, they felt it necessary to enter into negotiations with the 
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government, in an attempt to preserve their traditional territory.  This timeframe further 
demonstrates that the territorial struggle of the quilombo cannot be conflated with their 
interactions with the Brazilian state.  The engagement with state technologies of power are but 
one aspect of the quilombo’s much larger struggle, as is further demonstrated later in this 
chapter. 
Over a year later, no action had been taken on the part of the government with regards to 
responding to the quilombo’s counter-proposal, nor in the construction of the community’s 
private road into the quilombo.  On the afternoon of July 7, 2015, various representatives from 
the government, including a woman from the office of the President of the Republic, a technician 
from INCRA, and a representative from the Secretary for the Promotion of Racial Equality 
(SEPROMI) visited the community to update them on the status of the government’s role in the 
territorial titling process.  Immediately the quilombolas launched into their critique of the 
government and its failure to recognize the community’s demands.   
They argued that the government had never responded or acknowledged the community’s 
counter-claim of 280 hectares.  Again they reiterated that 104 hectares was not a sufficient 
amount for their community to survive into the future.  For one, they claimed, much of the 104 
hectares being offered by the government was Mata Atlântica, which is land protected under 
environmental legislation—how could they survive on that?  When their kids got married and 
had kids, where would the families live then?  Furthermore, they were frustrated with the fact 
that they had yet to receive basic services in the community, such as water, electricity, and 
plumbing—was the government planning on holding these things hostage until they accepted the 
offer of 104 hectares?  They clarified that they were not suggesting the government do 
everything for the community, rather, they were bringing attention to the fact that the navy was 
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still not allowing the quilombolas to address their own needs.  The quilombolas were still 
prevented from bringing house-building materials past the guards at the villa’s gate.  This led to 
them continuing to live in precarious housing, with all of the problems this brought with it.  For 
instance, one quilombola rhetorically asked, how many snakes do we have to kill in our homes 
before we’re allowed to build decent houses?17 
A community elder came to the front of the room, claiming that the government and navy 
had no respect for the quilombo.  The quilombolas built both the dam and the villa, he 
emphasized.  They had labored as slaves for the navy, and yet they still received no respect.  
Community members continued on, explaining that they were aggressive with government 
officials that came to the quilombo because they were tired of broken promises.  The issue 
should have been resolved a long time ago, they argued, but it was still in process because the 
government continues to do whatever the navy wants.  Despite the difficulties, the quilombolas 
maintained that the struggle was going to continue, as they had a right to their territory.   
Continuing on, they registered their lack of faith in other promises the government had 
made.  They had no facts or information with regards to how the government planned to build 
lakes or river tributaries in their territory.  What is more, they argued, it was not necessary to 
build water sources, as the area was one that was rich in bodies of water.  They asked why there 
had been no news on the building of the community’s personal road.  The government retorted, 
saying that it was ready to begin construction on the northern end of the community, but that the 
necessary surveys had not been done on the southern end of the quilombo yet.  The families that 
lived on the north side of the quilombo stated that if there were no southern road, there would be 
                                                          
17 Snakes and other dangerous animals are common visitors in casas de barro.  Stories of community members 
killing poisonous snakes and toads in their houses are far from unusual. 
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no northern road either—the quilombo was one single community, and no families would be 
treated differently.  The government used this as an opportunity to threaten the quilombolas, 
saying that if the community did not want the roads, that was perfectly fine; they did not need to 
be built.  The quilombolas again protested and the government responded by promising that they 
would both begin construction on the north side of the community and begin the necessary 
processes to eventually build on the south end. 
Throughout the meeting, the government agents never directly responded to the 
quilombo’s critique that they were ignoring the community’s counter-proposal of 280 hectares.  
Instead, the representatives kept saying that the community had every right to demand what they 
thought was a fair amount—but in the meantime the government was going to proceed as if 104 
hectares was the ultimate amount the community would receive.  Put another way, the 
government was going to move forward with the process of titling 104 hectares of quilombo 
land, with the understanding that, down the road, the community could continue to petition for 
increases in their territorial claims.  Taking this route and assuming everything went to plan, the 
government representatives promised the community a title to its land by December, 2015.  The 
quilombolas, again, asserted that 104 was not sufficient and again the government officials 
offered a veiled threat, stating that if this was not satisfactory to the community, they could stop 
the process altogether and then see how long it would take them to get titled.  The meeting 
closed with the government promising to send a team of technicians from INCRA to measure the 
104 hectares the government was willing to cede the quilombo.  This would be done the 
following week in order to quickly establish the physical parameters of the community’s 
territory.   
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The following week, however, the quilombolas received an unexpected shock when they 
discovered that INCRA had measured the land prior to the scheduled meeting, and in so doing 
had completely left out a family that was currently settled in the community.  This neglected 
family was distraught, stating that they had been in all of the original territorial measurements 
that had been made in the community.  The land which was being offered in this mapping left 
absolutely no room for the families that had been displaced from the territory and wished to 
come back.  In addition to these actions, which promised to seriously minimize the families that 
could live in that section of the quilombo, the land that INCRA included in their map of the 
southern portion of the quilombo was land that was essentially inhospitable for planting.  It was 
explained to me that the good land was mapped out of the quilombo, which would prevent them 
from being able to plant for and sustain themselves.   
If this were not enough, this poor land was also part of an area that was protected by 
environmental laws, meaning that if the quilombolas decided to try and plant, they would be 
legally prohibited from doing so.  Some expressed fear that if they accepted this measurement of 
the government, it would lead to this part of the quilombo being totally isolated, with no way of 
providing for itself, as the villa remained in place, cutting the quilombo into two parts.  
Essentially, it would mean the imminent end of this portion of the community.  This necessitated 
a rejection of the measurement by the community and new rounds of community meetings on 
how to remedy the situation.  This problem has yet to be resolved. 
Regardless of the government’s repeated promises of territorial recognition and the 
protection it insists this will afford the community, the members of Rio dos Macacos know that 
they cannot continue their way of life if they lose more than two thirds of their land, particularly 
when the land that would be left to them is not fit for cultivation.  A limited amount of land 
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would mean a crowding of living spaces as formerly displaced members of the quilombo came 
back to live.  This would also mean putting extreme pressure on the cultivable land that the 
community would have access to.  A crowded living situation would also force the community to 
“build up,” or engage in a more urbanized form of settlement.  “Eles querem que a gente vire 
favela,”18 was an expression I heard numerous times from members of the quilombo, describing 
what the acceptance of the government’s terms would ultimately mean.19   
Aside from signaling the impending destruction of their traditional farming and foraging 
practices, becoming an urbanized favela brings with it the specter of involvement with the 
undesirable aspects of urban life in Salvador.  These undesirable aspects are usually associated 
with the violence that comes along with the presence of police, drug use, and drug trafficking.  
To many quilombolas, allowing the community to become more connected to the surrounding, 
urbanized community would mean inviting new articulations of anti-Black violence into their 
lives. 
Despite the frustrations they face in doing so, interacting with the government in these 
capacities was and still is a necessity for the community.  In these engagements, the quilombo is 
not so much demanding inclusion in the state apparatus as it is using a juridical arrangement to 
both bring attention to the abuses the navy has visited upon it, as well as attempting to protect its 
own territory, albeit with an imperfect tool.  By appealing to the legislation on quilombola rights, 
Rio dos Macacos is able to bring focus to a situation which had previously been unknown to 
outside actors.  Moreover, by engaging with certain outside actors, like their lawyers and the 
                                                          
18 They want us to become a favela 
 
19Here the term “favela” does not mean the formation of unregistered housing, the way it did in the past.  Rather, 
it is the word used to designate the auto-constructed settlements in the generally poorer areas outside of the city 
center of Salvador.  Thus, “favelas,” in this sense of the word, are extremely common housing structures in 
Salvador and its surrounding metropolitan area. 
158 
 
architectural team, the quilombolas are able to produce cartographical representations that are 
legible to both their oppressors and the sovereign power of the state.  While these maps will 
never exist as a true representation of the spatial being or understanding as quilombolas, it 
nonetheless serves as a means of temporarily holding off the navy’s aggressions.  The quilombo 
is thereby using representations that are legible to the government in their negotiations.  This 
means representing space in a way that is quantifiable and calculable, despite the fact that the 
quilombo does not understand its territory in this way.  By using the language of the modern 
subject, Rio dos Macacos acknowledges the power of the sovereign state at the same time that it 
seeks to live a non-sovereign existence.  The quilombo’s ability to bring their struggle to the 
public is not reserved to the realm of government meetings, however.  Recognizing the power of 
ultra-state actors as well as the influence that media outlets can bring to bear on situations also 
influences quilombola actions. 
Rio dos Macacos and ultra-state actors 
During my fieldwork, I was witness to Rio dos Macacos engaging with ultra-state actors, 
while also using certain tools and relations that they felt would bring ultra-state actors into their 
struggle in a manner beneficial to their struggle.  This meant engaging with the United Nations, 
as well as a number of media sources.  In February, 2014, a special commission from the United 
Nations visited Salvador.  This commission was led by Dr. Raquel Rolnik, UN Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing.  This commission visited several different communities 
throughout all of Salvador during their brief time in the city.  One of these communities was Rio 
dos Macacos.  The UN group arrived in the community early in the morning.  Along with Dr. 
Rolnik came several photographers and video assistants who documented the meeting.  Initially, 
Dr. Rolnik interviewed the community’s eldest member, asking her about life before and after 
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the arrival of the navy.  The quilombola elder discussed everything from the community’s 
productive practices to her own personal life as a wife and mother.  Dr. Rolnik’s line of 
questioning kept returning to the issue of when life for the community became “bad” due to the 
navy.  This was a topic which she seemed intent on understanding and documenting.  When the 
questions shifted to the future hopes for the community, younger members of the quilombo took 
over responding. 
What the community wanted, they stated, was their territorial title, the 301 hectares they 
currently had, the right to plant their land, the right to fish the rivers, and the right for the 
expelled families to return.  They did not want to take any of the navy’s land, they simply wanted 
to live on the land they had now without any problems.  At this point, several women whose 
families had been driven out of the quilombo spoke up.  One explained that her grandfather had 
had a casa de farinha in the quilombo.  She wanted to return to the territory, she said, because her 
grandfather had had land there and it was thus due to her.  Others that had been expelled came 
forward, discussing how things had been before the navy arrived—how they had produced 
almost everything they consumed, had had their own houses, terreiros, and casas de farinha 
before the navy had destroyed all of it.  Another community elder came forward to discuss some 
of the quilombo’s history with the commission.  He explained that the community had its roots 
back in the days when slavery was still practiced.  The fazenda owner (Coriolan do Bahia) did 
not mind the fact that his slaves essentially started their own independent community.  In this 
way, the quilombo had been established while the community’s antecedents were still nominally 
enslaved.  He claimed that it was after Coriolan do Bahia had died that the land had been sold to 
the navy.  Before leaving, Dr. Rolnik explained that the housing conditions she saw in the 
quilombo were among the worst she had seen during her time in Salvador and that there was no 
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excuse for the people having to live in such a situation.  After this, her and her group left the 
quilombo, heading to visit another community in the city. 
Later that afternoon, the quilombo traveled to the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) to 
hear the results of the visits that Dr. Rolnik had made during her time in Salvador.  The various 
communities that she had visited were given time to make a short presentation on their 
situation.20  Dr. Rolnik finished the meeting with a long-winded speech describing the UN’s idea 
of just living conditions.  She acknowledged that while there was no guarantee that anything 
would come of the report, she was most certainly going to present the UN with everything she 
had seen and heard while in Salvador.  She argued, however, that the most important thing in 
these situations was that other people hear about what was going on.  She concluded her speech 
by saying that, without engaging with the UN and telling their stories, there was no way that 
others would ever hear about their situations.  While Rio dos Macacos appealed to the United 
Nations with the understanding that this was one way to bring further scrutiny to their situation 
and offered some potential for reprieve, the community also reached out to other outside actors. 
I spent a significant amount of time filming different things in Quilombo Rio dos 
Macacos.  I was told by the quilombolas that it was important that I share their story wherever I 
went.  When I offered to put the videos on YouTube and translate the images into English and 
Spanish, they accepted wholeheartedly.  I was told that certain activities—such as the counter-
mapping project—were not to be shared publicly, due to their strategic importance to the 
struggle against the navy.  However, events like the public audiences, protests, traditional 
community practices, and quilombola commentary on their situation were all open for 
                                                          
20 The other communities present at this talk were Condomínio da Mangueiras, Moradores do Cassange, Gamboa 
de Baixo, Nosso Bairro 2 de Julho, Moradores de Preguiça, an association of residents from the Pelourinho, 
Movimento Sem Teto da Bahia, and Associação de Moradores do Centro Histórico. 
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divulgation.  With their blessing I was able to create a YouTube channel for them and post the 
videos I recorded of them and the struggles of which they were a part. 
My efforts are hardly the only ones that attempt to bring the quilombo’s story to a wider 
audience, however.  YouTube contains perhaps tens of videos about Rio dos Macacos’ struggle, 
including everything from personal interviews to footage of the community partaking of its daily 
practices.  Social media outlets like Facebook and Twitter are used by those connected to their 
struggle to spread breaking news about their case.  During my time with the community, I also 
met several groups that were working on film projects about the community.  One group was 
putting together a special for TeleSur, an alternative news outlet based in Venezuela.  I 
encountered a man from Bahia who had received funding from the state government to carry out 
a documentary on the quilombo, as well.  He was frequently at community meetings and events, 
recording what they were going through.   
Local news sources were also frequently covering quilombo news.  News outlets like A 
Tarde made several trips to the quilombo in 2015, with the intention of mounting a story about 
the history of the community and its current land claims.  On July 20, 2015, the A Tarde article, 
authored by Tatiana Mendonça and titled “Terra Partida” (Divided Land), was published.  The 
piece focused on the stark contrast between the lived spaces of the quilombo and the neighboring 
naval villa, discussing the ongoing relations between Rio dos Macacos and the navy.  The article 
also discussed some of the history of the community, as well as the abuses and aggressions it 
suffered at the hands of the navy—abuses which, the article states, have gone largely unreported.  
Overall, Mendonça’s piece is a sympathetic one, touching on the inequalities present in the 
community, when compared with their antagonists.  Indeed, media attention to the case of Rio 
dos Macacos has been fairly constant, as newspapers like A Tarde have consistenly covered 
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stories about the quilombo since 2013.21  The divulgation of the quilombo’s story is an attempt to 
bring wider attention to the community’s struggle.  The intent to bring outside actors in to assist 
is a clear indication that the quilombo knows the state is not the only sovereign actor in the 
world.  Their interaction with the United Nations, for instance, demonstrates Rio dos Macacos’ 
knowledge of the international hierarchy of sovereignty, as they seek to use the UN’s authority 
against the Brazilian state.   
The quilombo’s appeal to the United Nations demonstrates its awareness of the fact that 
certain intranational organizations have power and influence over state actors.  It was mentioned 
to me several times by the quilombolas that they hoped that the UN would make some kind of 
intervention or judgment regarding their situation which would benefit them.  Because of this, 
the quilombo took the time to interact with Dr. Raquel Rolnik and her team when they arrived in 
Salvador.  Such an approach reflects the quilombo’s analysis of the current global geopolitical 
climate.  Clearly, the community understands that sovereignty is not solely the purview of state 
actors.  Again, while they do not rely on a sovereign approach to their own internal politics, they 
do acknowledge the influence that certain sovereign actors do have, and, in some cases, seek to 
use those actors’ faculties for the benefit of the quilombo.   
In a similar manner, Rio dos Macacos also seeks to use the international public as a 
forum for articulating their struggle.  Occasionally members of the quilombo described to me 
how they believed that the more the international community learned about their struggle, they 
more likely an ultra-state organization like the United Nations would get involved in their 
struggle for territory.  More commonly articulated, however, was the sentiment that the 
                                                          
21 Journalistic reports about Rio dos Macacos such as this are not uncommon.  Stories about the quilombo 
appeared in both print and broadcast news sources.  Nonetheless, it is not clear to me how these efforts had an 
effect on public understandings of the community’s situation.  The people in the neighborhood I lived in, for 
instance, did not appear to have any knowledge of Rio dos Macacos or the other Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu. 
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community wanted as many people as possible around the world to know what they were going 
through.  They explained to me that increased visibility meant possible beneficial intervention by 
influential parties.  The translation and spreading of their situation was the only thing they ever 
asked of me during my time there.  Clearly, international attention was something the 
quilombolas believed was important for their cause.  The quilombo, therefore, attempts to 
leverage one form of sovereignty against another.  In addition to appealing to outside actors in a 
targeted manner, Rio dos Macacos often made their discontent visible to the public eye through 
their own actions. 
Rio dos Macacos and civil disobedience 
Following the January, 2014 destruction of a quilombola house in Rio dos Macacos, 
images of the quilombo’s protest reached YouTube and mainstream news sources in Bahia.  
More important than these media representations, however, was the quilombo’s ability to 
obstruct the navy’s everyday activities and bring public attention to their struggle.  As soon as 
the quilombo was alerted to the fact that a house had been destroyed, all members immediately 
began organizing.  Several members took me to the scene of the aggression and told me to begin 
filming while they explained what happened.  “Estamos vivendo um militarismo,”22 exclaims a 
quilombola woman in the YouTube video that captured this day.  “[Os fusileiros chegam] para 
derrubar, acabar com tudo…como é que pode?”23 she continues, ultimately asserting, “todo 
mundo tem direito a viver!”24  Another quilombola man berates the naval officers that were 
                                                          
22 We’re living a militarism 
 
23 [The soldiers arrive] to tear down, to finish with everything…how can this be? 
 
24 Everyone has a right to live! 
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summoned to the area in wake of the attack on the house; “Oi, comandante, eu quero, no dia aqui 
que eles paguem todinho!”25 he shouts as he stomps around the debris of the fallen house.  While 
some members of the quilombo remained near the destroyed house with the now displaced 
family, other quilombolas moved to protest the action and disrupt the functions of the naval villa 
itself.  At the gate where residents and visitors enter the villa, one quilombola drove his car into 
the entrance, parking so that nobody could enter or exit.  Quickly the community gathered there, 
demanding that the navy provide the materials necessary to rebuild the house, and that they begin 
construction on a new entrance which the community would use for access to the quilombo.  
Until this was done, they explained, they would remain in the entrance, and nobody would come 
or go.   
During this protest, I continued to film, while different community members made 
statements about the conditions they lived in, and their resolve to combat the violence they faced.  
“Os escravos existem!  A senzala, o tronco e a corrente existem no Quilombo Rio dos Macacos 
pela Marinha de Guerra do Brasil!  A Marinha de Guerra do Brasil trata nossa comunidade como 
uma verdadeira senzala,”26 one quilombola woman asserted as she looked into the camera.  She 
continued, “Agora mesmo, a gente está aqui e a gente só vai sair daqui quando a casa estiver de 
pé e quando botarem os tratores na estrada para puder fazer.”27  She went on to state that while 
the soldiers’ commanding officer said that he had not ordered the destruction of the house, “eles 
falaram que quem mandou eles vir e derrubar a casa foi o comandante.  Se o comandante não 
                                                          
25 Hey, commander, today I want them to pay for it all! 
26 Slaves exist!  The slave quarters, the trunk and the chain exist in Quilombo Rio dos Macacos because of the 
Brazilian Navy!  The Brazilian Navy treats our community like true slave quarters 
 
27 Right now, we’re here and we’re only going to leave when the house is back up and when they bring tractors to 
make the [alternate] entrance 
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tem a capacidade de mandar os homens dele, quem é que mais vai mandar?”28  She summarized 
the community’s feelings on their situation by stating, “A gente não quer nenhuma militar da 
Marinha lá dentro do nosso território.”29   
Another quilombola spoke over the phone, registering her feelings on the navy’s actions 
and the quilombo’s position; “a marinha não é dono do mundo,”30 she asserted forcefully.  “A 
gente está aqui tentando resolver problema e eles vêm para fazer uma merda,”31 she continued, 
“eles estão dando uma retaliação…para meter medo.”32  This, however, would not deter the 
quilombo, she vowed.  “A gente não tem medo de morrer, não!  Quem está aqui tem cento e 
oitenta, duzentos anos na terra.  São terroristas mesma!  A marinha do Brasil é terrorista—pode 
jogar para todos os jornais!  É terrorista a marinha do Brasil; principalmente a marinha de Aratu!  
A marinha da Bahia é terrorista com quilombola!  Pode falar para o mundo inteiro!  A marinha 
de Aratu é a vergonha da marinha brasileira.  É uma desgraça!  Só pensa em bater em mulher, só 
pensa em bater em pobre e lascar quilombola.”33 
After hours of protesting in the hot summer sun, a naval truck arrived loaded with bags of 
cement to help rebuild the house that had been torn down.  With the arrival of the truck, the 
community desisted in their occupation of the gate entrance, and allowed the comings and goings 
                                                          
28 They said that who had ordered them to come and tear down the house was the commander.  If the commander 
doesn’t have the capacity to order his men, who else is going to order them? 
29 We don’t want any military [person] from the Navy inside of our territory 
 
30 The Navy isn’t ruler of the world 
 
31 We’re here trying to resolve problems and they come to do shit 
 
32 They retaliating…to scare [the quilombo] 
 
33 We’re not scared to die!  Those here have 180, 200 years on the earth.  They’re terrorists, all right!  The Brazilian 
Navy is a terrorist—you can put that all over the news!  The Brazilian Navy is a terrorist; principally the Navy in 
Aratu!  The Navy in Bahia is a terrorist with quilombolas!  You can tell the whole world!  The Navy of Aratu is the 
shame of the Brazilian Navy.  It’s damnation!  It only thinks about hitting women, it only thinks about beating poor 
people and screwing over quilombolas. 
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of those in the villa.  It is important to recognize that this protest was more than simply a 
publicity stunt, aimed at getting the public’s attention.  While several journalists did arrive to 
cover the event, even more important was the quilombo’s resolve to hold the navy accountable 
for their actions.  This is evidenced in numerous pronouncements by the quilombolas, who 
vowed not to leave until the house was rebuilt and asserted that everyone has a right to live.  By 
occupying the entrance to the naval villa, the quilombolas were interrupting the quotidian 
engagements of their oppressor, in much the same way that the navy continually obstructed the 
quilombo’s attempts at living their own way of life.  In so doing, the quilombolas were forcing 
the navy to recognize the oppressive nature of their actions, and, contrary to the navy’s wishes, 
obligating them to address their aggression against the community.  An action which would have 
otherwise gone unnoticed or un-addressed by the navy became an action which resulted in the 
obstruction of the navy’s mundane existence. This realization was not lost on those that live in 
the villa.   
After the protest was over and we headed back to the quilombo, I found myself in an 
argument with a resident of the villa and one of the quilombolas.  The villa resident registered 
her anger with the fact that the community would obstruct the gate in such a way, stating that 
those living in the villa had done nothing to the quilombolas.  She went on to angrily state that 
the land had never belonged to the quilombo in the first place and that they had no right to 
prevent people from getting to their homes.  Through these statements she showed the navy’s 
and general public’s inability to recognize the quilombo as a legitimate lived space.  While there 
were people residing on the land, she clearly did not see them as worthy of recognition as 
political subjects.  To her, the presence of the quilombos was obviously subordinate to those she 
deemed truly political subjects—the people living in the villa.  She rejected the notion that 
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quilombola life was equal in value to the life of those living in the villa, evidencing the societal 
assumption that Black life has no politico-spatial value. 
 
Figure 4.5 Rio dos Macacos’ blockade of the naval villa in Janaury, 2014. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
Like the social movements of Latin America (Zibechi 2012; Reyes 2012), Rio dos 
Macacos forces their oppressors to acknowledge their existence and spatial presence through 
protesting.  While public attention was garnered with this tactic, Rio dos Macacos also 
demonstrated their ability to organize and realize a collective action against the navy.  Such a 
maneuver demonstrates the power that the quilombo as a collective organization has.  This 
collective approach is also present in the community’s internal organization. 
Rio dos Macacos internal organization 
While the modes of struggle noted above entail the quilombo interacting with outside 
actors, one of the means of struggle which remains central to their continuation as a community 
is found in their own internal activities.  These are the aspects of quilombo life which often 
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remain unseen to the public, but which are invaluable for the social reproduction of Rio dos 
Macacos.  While the actions geared toward reaching outside actors rely on the influence which 
these actors have vis-à-vis the Brazilian government and navy, the internal activities practiced by 
the quilombo focus on self-reproduction and analysis, as well as self-sustenance.  These internal 
actions involve a myriad of practices, from food production, to self-defense, to community 
meetings.  While they vary in nature, they all nonetheless take place at the grassroots level 
between those that comprise the quilombo.  These are the practices that comprise the unique 
power relations and social arrangements that establish the quilombo’s unique territory. 
Productive Practices 
As is evident in the community’s history, the ability for the quilombolas to produce what 
they consume and to have control over their own means of production is vital to their identity as 
a quilombo.  It is precisely this aspect of quilombo life that the navy has continually targeted 
through their destruction of crops, poisoning of fruit trees, and prevention of quilombola fishing.  
It would be inaccurate to say that these measures by the navy have not had devastating effects on 
the community.  Whereas before the community had its own crops and foodstuffs, today the 
quilombolas are forced to receive government food aid to fill in much of what they consume.  
Before, the quilombolas had their own casas de farinha; today, they receive portions of already-
made farinha from the government—farinha which I am told is of a lesser quality than what they 
used to make.  In the past, the quilombo cultivated its own beans—a staple for all meals in 
Bahia; today, their beans come as part of the cesta básica.34  While they used to communally 
distribute fish among community members after long days and nights on the rivers and shores 
                                                          
34A cesta básica is government food aid that is offered to traditional communities that have achieved cultural 
recognition as such. 
169 
 
near their community, today they are often forced to go to the super market and buy the frozen 
fish sold there.  Despite these setbacks in their ability to produce for themselves, however, the 
quilombolas have remained intransigent in their willingness and ability to continue to self-
sustain.   
Regardless of the fact that the navy remains insistent on destroying their crops, the 
quilombolas today continue to clear and plant their land.  Community members work side by 
side with hoes, shovels, and machetes to clear underbrush, cut down bamboo trees, and remove 
weeds from their land.  Manioc, mangoes, jackfruit, guava, African palm, cocoa, cajá (hog 
plum), avocados, and jenipapo are all still cultivated on quilombola land.  From these are made 
an assortment of juices, foods, and dendê—all products which are consumed within the 
community.  Some quilombolas even make their own licor from cajá and jenipapo which they 
then sell to people outside the community.35  The quilombo’s ability to maintain these 
agricultural practices is truly incredible when one considers that, in addition to the navy’s 
aggressions, there occurred in 2015 a series of torrential rains, which destroyed much of the 
quilombo’s crop.  One quilombola, who had spent most of 2014 clearing her land in order to 
plant, assured me that, regardless of the destruction the rains had wrought, she would clear her 
land and plant it again. These productive practices are whole-community endeavors, as well.  
Community members work together to help clear, plant, and harvest the land on which they 
work.  One quilombola whose husband had recently died, was aided by several other members in 
the clearing and planting of her land.  Another quilombola family was aided by the community in 
their harvest of their cajá, which was then distributed among community members in order to 
                                                          
35Licor is an alcoholic drink that is typical in the Northeast of Brazil.  It is made with cachaça (sugarcane liquor) and 
any variety of fruit juices.  Selling this drink can be especially lucrative during regional festivals like São João. 
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make juice and licor.  Still others help with the collection of dendê and its transformation into 
azeite.  This same refusal to succumb to the difficulties thrust upon them is demonstrated in the 
quilombo’s ability to shelter themselves.   
In addition to destroying the houses which already existed in the community, the navy 
has gone to lengths to ensure that no more quilombo houses would be built.  Preventing the 
entrance of construction materials, as well as tearing down whatever is in the process of being 
built are both methods the navy has used and continues to use to try and force the quilombolas 
off of their traditional land.  The quilombolas have responded to constructing houses which do 
not require great amounts of time to build.  This ensures that the navy will have less time to 
interrupt the building process.  This is done through the erection of casas de massapê, also 
known as casas de barro.  These houses are akin to adobe.  First, the house’s wooden frame is 
constructed with bamboo and other tree branches, nails, and connecting ties, creating a lattice 
pattern.  Next, water is poured onto clay-like earth and stomped until a kind of mud forms.  This 
clay material is applied to the frame of the house, filling in the cross-sections of the branches, 
and essentially creating an enclosed establishment which then dries, creating a hard, brick-like 
substance.  Roofs are often made of materials purchased outside of the quilombo, although, in 
the event that these materials are confiscated or held up by the navy’s checkpoint, quilombolas 
also use palm leaves.  Once the house structure is complete, the inside of the house is built.  
Walls are finished with “reboque” which is a combination of water and cement that is applied 
and smoothed over, to minimize the amount of dust to which the inhabitants are exposed from 
the dried clay mixture.  The floor is also put in place, made from a cement mixture which is 
allowed to dry. 
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Any quilombola will say that these houses are far from ideal.  These constructions are, 
above all, unstable, in that they do not rest on solid foundation and are not made of extremely 
durable material.  Furthermore, houses not finished with reboque on the inside are often host to 
undesirable animals, including snakes, toads, and a variety of insects.  Still, the ability and 
willingness to create and reside within these dwellings is a testament to the quilombolas’ resolve 
to remain in their own territory.  These houses show both a resourcefulness and a commitment to 
struggle.  In constructing these houses, the quilombolas have been able to stave off the navy’s 
agenda of displacement; an agenda rooted in the navy’s attempts to exercise sovereign power and 
establish a “norm” in the assumed empty space of the quilombo.  It is important to note here that 
these houses are not simply individual efforts on the part of the family or individual that resides 
there.  Instead, all members of the community partake of the building and maintenance of these 
establishments.   
After the January, 2014 destruction of the quilombola’s house, the entire community 
mobilized to help in the house’s reconstruction.  Members whose families had been expelled 
years previous showed up to help apply the reboque on the inside of the house and to place the 
roofing tiles.  Another instance saw nearly the entire community assist in the building of the 
house of a quilombola who was returning to the territory years after her family had been 
expelled.  On the day when community members finished the cement floor for her house, she 
turned to me as I helped her place the furniture on the new floor and profoundly explained, 
“Assim é a luta da gente.”36   
Continuing and propagating quilombola territory is, therefore, not a singular, 
individualist effort.  Rather, the quilombo, as a collective, demonstrates the understanding that 
                                                          
36 Thus is our struggle 
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creating and maintaining a community requires the involvement and participation of every 
quilombola.  Moreover, these collective efforts are realized as daily praxis.  Continuing the 
quilombola way of life means more than simply fantastical, attention-grabbing events.  The life 
of the community is preserved through everyday activities.  Here it is important to note that, per 
the example of those quilombolas that live outside the quilombo territory but are still involved, a 
quilombola ethic and territorial commitment can be, and is, practiced even by those that reside 
outside the actual physical confines of the community.  The ethic of quilombismo is a communal 
one that premises itself on the respect for and propagation of Black life.  The territoriality of the 
quilombo subjectivity involves a commitment to the quilombo territory regardless of where one 
resides on a day-to-day basis, meaning that one can have a commitment and relation to quilombo 
territory without living there everyday.  This is clear from the way in which families expelled 
from the quilombo return to assist in things like repairing and constructing houses.  
Quilombismo, therefore, signifies a territorial commitment which transcends lived space.  While 
creation and propagation are very clearly central to the quilombola ethic, so, too, is the defense 
of quilombo territory.   
Defense Practices 
One of the first things that I heard from the members of Rio dos Macacos when I met 
them was, “A gente não dorme aqui.”37  Because of their concern for what the navy might do 
should they go to sleep and not maintain vigilance, the quilombolas take turns sleeping in the 
community.  Those that are not sleeping patrol the community, machetes in hand.  They 
informed me that, should they let their guard down, they would leave themselves open to the 
                                                          
37 We do not sleep here 
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predations of the navy, which has already shown itself to be capable and willing to perform the 
most dastardly of actions.  This form of armed resistance demonstrates the continuation of the 
quilombola ethic, five hundred years old, of recognizing the uniqueness of their own territorial 
practices and the commitment to defending that uniqueness, even if it means putting oneself in 
harm’s way. 
The community understands the violence that modern society practices upon Black 
bodies and that relinquishing their autonomous existence would mean finding themselves in new 
zones of non-being in Salvador’s urban milieu.  As such, Rio dos Macacos demonstrates an 
approach of radical Black consciousness through its recognition and rejection of the violence 
which typifies Western society.  On the one hand, they reject this violence through their varied 
organizing efforts against the Brazilian navy and its agenda of intimidation and violence.  On the 
other hand, they reject the violence which would come of the government’s diminution of their 
land.  Struggling on both of these fronts demonstrates the keen analysis that is central to radical 
Black struggle, as well as the presence of a radical Black consciousness.  Here, the radical Black 
consciousness is made obvious in the quilombo’s refusal to seek recognition through the reliance 
on modernity’s tools of governance as put forward by INCRA and the Brazilian government.  
Instead of seeking being through taking on a praxis legible to the government, the community 
continues to practice their own set of political, economic, cultural, and social practices, through 
which they know and identify themselves.  They push forward in their resolve to exist on their 
own terms despite the combination of threats and promises from the navy and Brazilian 
government.  By remaining committed to defining themselves as a community and reproducing 
themselves as such, Rio dos Macacos shows themselves capable of analyzing the iterations of 
modernity with which they find themselves faced and willing to struggle for their traditional way 
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of life.  The quilombo preserves the ethic of quilombismo as their politics focuses on the self-
directed governance of their community and rejects inclusion in the modern political apparatus 
due to its erasure of autonomous Black being. 
The Contested Politics of Rio dos Macacos 
The Brazilian navy, through its treatment of Quilombo Rio dos Macacos, continues to 
reaffirm the assumed existence of spaces without a politics; spaces where rights are non-
existence and humans do not live.  This is the a-political space of exception where assassination 
attempts, dwelling destruction, beatings, arson, unremunerated labor, and rape take place without 
any legal acknowledgement that anything of the sort ever happened.  In these spaces, the 
violence that takes place remains at once seemingly invisible and also acceptable, as there is no 
political subject against which that violence is being perpetrated.  Therefore it is no surprise that 
there remains no prosecution for those responsible for the uncountable aggressions against Rio 
dos Macacos.  The quilombola space of Rio dos Macacos remains a criminalized space today—a 
space where no law exists to be observed by state actors.  Using the quilombo’s understanding of 
this a-political reality as a tool, the Brazilian government and navy hold out the possibility of 
establishing the community as a political space in return for deference to the state’s geopolitical 
agenda.   
Despite the government’s interchanging promises and threats, Rio dos Macacos remains 
resolved to defend its territory and traditional cultural, political, and economic practices.  This 
has meant rejecting both the navy’s incursions on their territory as well as remaining steadfast in 
their rejection of the diminution of their territory by INCRA.  Like the quilombos of old, Rio dos 
Macacos must find ways to defend itself from the forces that seek to destroy its alternative set of 
political and productive practices.  The presence of an autonomous community within the 
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crevices of power of the Brazilian navy has led to numerous attempts at the community’s 
destruction.  However, Rio dos Macacos has established a set of practices in defense of their way 
of life which has become central to their identity as a quilombo community.  Community self-
defense patrols, planting practices, auto-construction of houses, civil disobedience, and 
engagement with government representatives all serve to protect and reclaim the quilombo’s 
practices of self-sustenance while also fending off outside aggressions.  The defense of these 
traditions is important because, as the community understands their situation, the navy’s 
continued assaults on their community and the acceptance of the government’s terms both signal 
the imminent destruction of the quilombo’s existence.  It is obvious that the navy wants nothing 
less than the total removal of the quilombo from the area.  This is evident in the grotesque abuses 
it has committed against the quilombolas.  This is perhaps the most visible, easily-understood 
articulation of genocidal violence against the community.  In addition to this, however, the 
quilombo understands that accepting the government’s minimization of their territory also means 
the end of their traditional way of life.  While Rio dos Macacos organizes against the sovereignty 
of the state, Ilha de Maré employs their own set of tactics to defend against other forms of 
modern violence.   
Ilha de Maré, sovereign actors, and civil disobedience 
Struggling against a slightly different iteration of modernity’s rationalized violence than 
that of Rio dos Macacos, Ilha de Maré has brought attention to, and fought against, the effects of 
commodity circulation in the Bay of Aratu.  Like Rio dos Macacos, Ilha de Maré has shown 
itself to be a sharp analyzer of specific practices central to modernity.  While not in conflict with 
the navy to the same extent as Rio dos Macacos, Ilha de Maré currently finds its own way of life 
under attack from the effects of the shipping industry in the Bay.  Shipping has had long term 
176 
 
effects in the area, but has manifested itself most perniciously in the past two years, with the 
fallout from the ship explosion and fuel leak that occurred in December, 2013.  Through their 
recognition of the nature of the shipping industry in Aratu, the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré have 
coordinated a series of actions which target the industry, obstructing “business as usual” in order 
to gain attention from those responsible for the threat to their way of life. 
Despite the fact that the explosion of the Singaporean Golden Miller occurred in 
December of 2013, the state government of Bahia refused to dialogue with the communities that 
comprise Ilha de Maré immediately following the accident.  While the ship that leaked the 
petroleum was a private Singaporean vessel, the Docks Company of the State of Bahia 
(CODEBA) remains in charge of the businesses that frequent the Port of Aratu.  As such, it 
remains the responsibility of CODEBA to respond to situations in which claims and complaints 
are made against the businesses present there.  Having received no recognition of their plight, on 
February 2, 2014, the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré staged a protest and blockade of the road 
leading to the Port of Aratu, effectively blocking trucks from dropping off and picking up the 
ships’ cargoes.  The quilombolas’ demands were simple; schedule a meeting with the president 
of CODEBA, or the road remains closed. 
The action started around 5 AM, with the quilombolas collectively occupying the road, 
carrying banners and signs that registered their complaints with the government and the Port of 
Aratu, as well as their demands for improving their situation.  In addition to blocking the road 
with their own bodies, a number of quilombolas had brought and parked their cars to obstruct the 
passage of other vehicles.  Around noon, a large tree branch was placed crossways in the road 
and lit on fire, further obstructing the route to the Port.  The trucks headed to the Port of Aratu 
were backed up for what seemed like miles, their drivers reclining beneath them to escape the 
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roasting Bahian sun.  The community’s banners not only drew attention to the December 17th 
explosion, but also to a number of other issues which the community was facing from private 
industries.  For example, I was informed that there is a thermoelectric plant being built in the 
region, despite the fact that there is a law stating that no thermoelectric plants could be built 
within twelve kilometers of a community.  The plant is less than three kilometers from the 
communities of Ilha de Maré and where they fish.  The community is concerned with the waste 
from the plant and the noise from the motors, as it detrimentally affects the sea life on which 
they depend.  The plant’s other effects include acid rain, which threatens the health of the people 
living in the area, as well as the health of the surrounding environment, such as the mangroves 
and vegetation on which the community depends.  The community has been protesting the plans 
for and construction of this thermoelectric plant since 2010, when the Superintendent for 
Industrial and Commercial Development (SUDIC) began construction on it.  It was explained to 
me that actions aimed at targeting these issues were necessary because, without staging such 
protests, businesses and the government would implement all kinds of measures which would 
have no benefit to the communities in the area. 
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Figure 4.6 Ilha de Maré protest and blockade of the Port of Aratu. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
Figure 4.7 Debris used to further blockade the Port of Aratu. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
Around noon, a squadron of military police arrived at the protest and implored the 
quilombo leaders to disperse.  An officer argued that they had been in the road since the early 
morning and that while they had the right to protest, it was time to let people go about their 
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business.  The quilombo leaders stated that they would not be going anywhere until their 
demands were met.  When a car from CODEBA arrived, they said, they might consider lifting 
the blockade.  The policeman, assault rifle slung over his shoulder, continued to insist that the 
protest end, to which the quilombolas replied that there was nothing left to discuss, and calmly 
walked away, effectively ending the parlay.  As the day wore on, the quilombolas showed 
themselves prepared to push on with the action.  Around 1:00 PM, giant pots of beans, rice, pork, 
and beef were brought via car to the middle of the road.  Plates, bowls, and silverware were 
distributed among those present, with some people needing to share their platters and utensils.  
Two lines were then formed and food was distributed to all of those supporting the protest.  
Sharing the meal in the midst of the protest showed the quilombolas commitment to remaining in 
the road until their demands were met, as they were able to then carry one with their action. 
Shortly after this, word came that CODEBA would be sending a car to bring the 
quilombo leaders to talk with the president of CODEBA.  One of the leaders quipped that what 
the government was really interested in was freeing the road for the businesses in the Port—not 
in freeing the people that were protesting.  Shortly after 2:00 PM a car from CODEBA arrived to 
bring the leaders to meet with the company’s president.  Before getting in the car, Ilha de Maré’s 
leaders spoke into a microphone that was connected to a set of speakers in a car.  They stated that 
the protest could not have been successful without the participation of everyone present—
everyone was important to the struggle.  With the departure of the quilombo’s leaders, the protest 
dissipated.38  
                                                          
38This, however, was not the only time that the quilombolas strategically blocked the functions of the Port of 
Aratu.  In June, 2014, community members of Ilha de Maré again blockaded the Port, this time with their fishing 
boats.  They collectively swarmed the Port, blocking in the giant freighters that sought to exit the docks with their 
cargo.  This protest, while effective, lasted a much shorter amount of time than did the protest in February of 
2014. 
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In addition to protesting and obstructing the daily business of the Port of Aratu, on June 
6, 2014, Ilha de Maré brought their struggle to the city center of Salvador, where they not only 
made their struggle evident to the general public, but also met with city government officials to 
register their disgust regarding the way the community was being treated regarding the oil spill.  
Starting in the Pelourinho, the quilombolas marched to the City Council’s Chamber near the 
historic city center.39  En route to their destination, the quilombolas obstructed traffic by walking 
through the streets.  With them they carried banners that read, “Pescadores e Quilombolas: nossa 
luta é por terra e água!”; “Contra o Extermínio da Juventude Negra”; “Explosão de Navio: 
Poluição Confirmada!”; “Território Pesqueiro LIVRE”; and “Basta de Crimes Ambientais SEM 
PUNIÇÃO”.40 
After arriving at the City Council’s Chambers, it was announced that only a certain 
number of people would be allowed in to the building to witness the meeting between the 
community and the city council.  Initially, I was not allowed into the meeting, as there were 
many people present.  However, eventually a member of a Dutch film team that was working on 
a special program about Ilha de Maré came to me and told me he could get me into the meeting if 
I wanted.  He went to the policeman guarding the door to the building and told him that I was 
part of his film team and I went in with him.  The meeting was taking place on the second floor 
of the building.  Because I arrived late, I did not get to hear the introductions, nor the planned 
                                                          
39The Pelourinho is the main attraction in the historic center section of the city of Salvador.  The name, in 
Portuguese, means “the whipping post” and was the site of punishments for the slaves during colonial times.  Due 
to agendas of urban renewal and forced expulsions, it has since shifted from being a site of low income housing 
and prostitution to a center for tourism and various other service industries.  Nonetheless, it remains a site 
frequented by both Brazilians and foreigners alike and is a well-known location for anyone even remotely familiar 
with Salvador. 
40 In the same order as the statements written above: “Fisherpeople and Quilombolas: our struggle is for land and 
water!”; “Against the extermination of Black Youth”; “Ship Explosion: Pollution Confirmed!”; “FREE Fishing 
Territory”; “Enough of environmental crimes WITHOUT PUNISHMENT” 
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agenda for the meeting.  What I walked into, however, was a scathing indictment of various 
levels of government in Bahia and beyond, as well as insight into the conditions in which the 
quilombolas of Ilha de Maré were forced to live. 
The points of discussion for Ilha de Maré that I heard touched on access to healthcare, a 
high school for the community, basic sanitation, basic infrastructure, and recompense for the 
chemical spill in the Bay of Aratu.  The lack of infrastructure, one of the leaders stated, 
microphone in hand, was a complete scandal.  The community had never had the right to a plaza 
in which their children could play.  It was embarrassing, she said, knowing that so many of the 
youth of their community want to leave the island to move to Salvador, “porque a gente já sabe 
como é tratado o jovem negro neste estado”.41  Part of the reason that the youth want to move to 
Salvador, she said, was because the young people of the island believed Ilha de Maré lacked 
opportunities, given what they were shown in the media regarding Salvador.  She posed the 
question to the audience, “tem alguma política, um incentivo para os jovens de Ilha de Maré?”42  
The audience responded with a resounding “Não!”43  She listed a number of the things that the 
community did not have for their youth: athletic courts; plazas; soccer fields; in short, they did 
not have very basic things.  They were not asking for an enormous structure like Arena Fonte 
Nova, she stated—they wanted simple things.44  Another demand made by the community at this 
meeting was a road which would link the different parts of the community.  Without this basic 
                                                          
41 Because we know how the Black youth is treated in this state 
 
42 Is there some politics, an incentive for the youth of Ilha de Maré? 
 
43 No! 
 
44Arena Fonte Nova is where the soccer club Bahia plays, and was renovated for the 2014 World Cup, which was 
held in Brazil.  As a result of the rapidity with which Fonte Nova was built, it has become a physical testament to 
many social movements of the import that politicians give projects which benefit businesses, and the neglect with 
which they treat these movements and their communities. 
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necessity, it was argued, it did not make any sense to have any other amenities on the island, as 
the lack of a road meant exposure to hazardous conditions, including muddy, unfinished 
thoroughfares and dangerous animals.  The fact that they lacked these things, she argued, 
demonstrated that the public powers had denied them to their community.  Even the attempts that 
the state government had made to ameliorate certain problems in the community were having 
negative effects in the quilombo.   
The Secretary of Infrastructure had been put in charge of addressing issues of erosion in 
the community and had sought to solve this problem by creating anti-erosion barriers with 
stones.  The problem with this, however, was that the stones they were using were coming 
directly from the mangroves from which the community received much needed sea life.  These 
were the same rocks that crabs and mussels lived in, and which the quilombolas depended on for 
their livelihood.  Thus, it was not satisfactory that the stones used for this project be the same 
ones on which the community so depended.  She also made plain the fact that there was no 
sanitation on the island—all sewage drained out into the sea.  Even the schools, which were run 
by the city, had their sewage drain out into the Bay—“Imagine o absurdo que é isso!”45 she 
exclaimed.  This lack of sanitation was having effects that would be carried on for generations.  
Children, for instance, were being born with vision problems.  She used the example of her own 
nephew, stating, “ele nasceu e com seis mêses a médica disse que ele vai ter que usar óculos”.46  
She went on that there is a family living in Maracanã in Ilha de Maré that has five children and 
“o pai está desesperado porque o médico diz que não entende porque essas crianças vão ficar 
                                                          
45 Imagine this absurdity! 
 
46 He was born and at six months the doctor said that he is going to have to use glasses. 
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cegas.  A mais velha, com oito ou nove anos, já está cega”.47  This was devastating to the 
children’s father, because “o médico mesmo está dizendo que não tem explicação”.48   
This leader went further, saying that it was telling that the actual state officials were not 
present at the meeting.  She said that every time they went to a meeting, the only people present 
there were those that had no power to make actual decisions.  State officials were never present 
at the meetings, she continued, which demonstrated a lack of responsibility and a lack of respect 
for the community.  Toward the end of the meeting, one of the leaders, speaking from the front 
of the room, spoke through her tears, stating, “Eu nunca senti o peso do racismo tão forte, igual 
ao tratamento que deu com essa explosão que aconteceu do navio.  A marinha ajudando 
assessinar a gente.  Os orgãos ambientais ajundando assessinar a gente.”49  She went on, “A 
gente tem certeza que as políticas públicas não são garantidas para a gente…porque não é do 
interés [do governo].”50  She explained that when they discussed their plight with representatives 
from the Institute for the Environment and Hydric Resources (INEMA), they were told that the 
decision regarding what would be done would be made by President Dilma for the people that 
voted for her and that they would simply have to live with the consequences of that decision.  
She described these representatives as “desgraçado” and “nojento”51 and closed her intervention 
by stating that this was only the first step in their struggle to be respected.  “A gente não está 
                                                          
47 The father is in despair because the doctors says he doesn’t understand why these children are going to be blind.  
The oldest, at eight or nine years old, is already blind. 
 
48 The doctor himself says that there is no explanation. 
49 I never felt the weight of racism as strongly as the treatment after the explosion that happened with the ship.  
The navy helping to kill us.  The environmental organs helping to kill us. 
 
50 We’re sure that public policy is not guaranteed for us…because it’s not in the interest [of the government] 
 
51 Wretched and disgusting 
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aqui para pedir favor a ninguém,”52 she said, her voice hardening at the close of her intervention; 
“a gente está decidida passar por cima de quem for para garantir nossos direitos,”53 and with this 
she dropped the microphone and stepped off stage.  From the crowd came the cheer, “No rio, no 
mar: Pescador na luta!  Nos açudes, nas barragens: Pescando Liberdade!  Agronegócios: Resistir!  
As cercas nas águas: Derrubar!”5455 
In addition to demonstrating its understanding of the sovereign state’s role in defending 
and perpetrating capitalism, the quilombolas show their recognition of the persistence of the 
slave ontology that Brazilian society attempts to force upon them.  This is evidenced through the 
acknowledgement that public policy is not guaranteed the community, as the quilombolas 
explained that they knew their well-being was not in the interest of the government.  Even more 
explicit language was used, however, by the quilombolas that accused the representatives of the 
mayor’s office at a public audience, claiming, “este capitão de mato aí que está chicoteando ao 
nosso povo…a escravidão ainda não terminou!”56  She continued on, “E o Estado e a prefeitura é 
o chicote, é o capitão do mato, todo dia chicoteando e assessinando nosso povo!”57  These 
                                                          
52 We’re not here to ask a favor of anyone 
 
53 We are intent on going over whoever to guarantee our rights 
 
54 In the river, in the sea: Fisherman in the struggle! In the weirs, in the dams: Fishing freedom!  Agribusiness: 
Resisting!  Fences in the waters: Tearing down! 
 
55This call and response is something like a battle cry for the Movimento de Pescadores e Pescadoras.  Its 
statements speak to the foundations of quilombola territoriality.  What would be seen as natural, exploitable 
environmental sites—the ocean, rivers, dams, etc.—are here the root of struggle and freedom.  It is through their 
own environment and their dependence on acts like fishing that they express their freedom.  Furthermore, the call 
and response highlights the quilombola ethic of resisting the enclosure practices typical of capitalist primitive 
accumulation.  In advocating the tearing down of aquatic fences, the quilombolas show themselves to be present-
day Levelers and Diggers—fundamentally opposed in their being to the privatization and enclosing of commons. 
 
56 This capitão de mato that is whipping our people…slavery still hasn’t ended! 
 
57 And the state and the mayor’s office is the whip, is the capitão de mato, everyday whipping and killing our 
people! 
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statements are laden with imagery of slavery and the tools which led to the destruction and 
mutilation of slave bodies and communities.  Clearly, the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré see the 
persistence of slave ontology in the present.  Furthermore, the leader’s assertion that the weight 
of racism has demonstrated itself in the treatment of the community as spatially and politically 
non-existent shows how the assumed non-being of Black Brazilians, and the quilombo 
communities in particular, is understood in Ilha de Maré.  The quilombolas, through these 
claims, made clear how the Brazilian state and industries view and treat Black communities as a-
political and a-spatial.  The quilombo’s condemnation of this anti-Black violence reach beyond 
formal settings, however. 
The quilombo’s indictment of the city government did not stop at this public audience.  
When the meeting was over, the protest continued through the streets of the city center of 
Salvador until it came to the mayor’s office.  There, flanked by a banner reading “Território 
Pesqueiro LIVRE JÁ”58 one of the quilombo’s leaders came to the front of the crowd and 
openly denounced the treatment the community habitually received from the city, state, and 
federal governments.  The support from President Dilma and Bahia’s Governor (Rui Costa) for 
the Port of Aratu, she explained, meant the extermination of the people of Ilha de Maré.  “O que 
está sendo negociado é a vida de uma população de um povo preto que vive em Ilha de 
Maré….Nossos governantes já têm uma decisão política que o povo preto e pobre deste Brasil é 
para ser exterminado.”59  Shifting from commentary on the overarching genocide present in 
Brazil to the specific case of Ilha de Maré, she went on, “As várias comunidades de Ilha de 
                                                          
58 Fishing territory FREE ALREADY 
 
59 What is being negotiated is the life of a population of a Black people that lives in Ilha de Maré…Our governors 
already made the political decision that Black and poor people in this Brazil are to be exterminated 
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Maré…estão sendo ameaçadas em nome de desenvolvimento que não é para nós.  Quem faz o 
desenvolvimento, quem traz o desenvolvimento somos nós.  Somos nós que alimentamos, que 
fazemos parte desse povo que está aqui…Infelizmente, tem uma decisão política de que tem que 
exterminar o nosso povo, a nossa cultura, e o nosso modo de vida.  Nós estamos aqui 
revindicando direitos humanos.  Nós queremos viver em nossa comunidade e o poder público, 
infelizmente, nos trata como invisível.  Nós somos pretos e parece que somos invisíveis.”60 
 
Figure 4.8 Street protest by Ilha de Maré. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
                                                          
60 The various communities of Ilha de Maré…are being threatened in the name of development that is not for us.  
Who makes development, who brings development is us.  We are the ones that nourish, that make up part of this 
people that are here…Unfortunately, a political decision was made that our people, our culture, and our mode of 
life has to be exterminated.  We’re here claiming human rights.  We want to live in our community and the public 
power, unfortunately, treats us as invisible.  We’re Black and it seems that we’re invisible. 
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Figure 4.9 Street occupation by Ilha de Maré. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
All the while the leader spoke out, a wall of military police officers stood on the steps of 
the building’s steps, watching the proceedings.  Unsurprisingly, neither Antônio Carlos 
Magalhães, who was the Mayor at the time, nor anyone else from the Mayor’s office came out to 
meet the group of protesting quilombolas.  When it became evident that their statements would 
not elicit a response from anybody in the Mayor’s office, the protesters unfurled an enormous 
canvas banner which read “EM DEFESA DOS TERRITÓRIOS PESQUEIROS”61 in giant red 
block letters.  After stretching the banner out in the plaza so that anyone in the Prefeitura could 
see it, they collectively hung the banner over the plaza’s wall, thereby exposing the banner to the 
entire lower city.62  Despite the state’s insistence on protecting the industry and shipping in the 
                                                          
61 IN DEFENSE OF FISHING TERRITORIES 
 
62The Upper City (Cidade Alta) and Lower City (Cidade Baixa) are two well-known areas of the city center of 
Salvador.  They are linked by the Elevador Lacerda and a winding road called A Montanha (The Mountain).  
Hanging the flag over the wall of the Upper City served to further divulge the community’s message to the city of 
Salvador. 
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Bay and thereby preserving modern notions of environmental domination and exploitation, the 
quilombolas occupied public space to assert the existence and viability of their own 
territoriality63.  Here the quilombo notes that the manifestation of the meio técnico-científico, in 
the form of the development projects in the Bay of Aratu, works to destroy the community and in 
the process completely obscures the needs of the quilombolas.  To reject this treatment and 
literally, physically bring to light the reality of Black Geographies, Ilha de Maré takes public 
space, obstructing the daily functions of the mayor’s office and demonstrating to the public that 
they not only have a different territoriality, but are committed to defending it. 
                                                          
63 While Ilha de Maré has received some media coverage (Silva 2014), public attention to their case is not nearly as 
comprehensive as that of Rio dos Macacos, for instance.  There are relatively few articles in circulation regarding 
the situation in Ilha de Maré when one considers the devastation they continue to face. 
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Figure 4.10 Unfurling of a banner during Ilha de Maré’s occupation of the mayor’s plaza. Photo by Adam Bledsoe 
 
Over a year later, little had changed for Ilha de Maré.  The community had not been 
remunerated for the devastation they experienced due to the explosion and chemical leak in the 
Bay, and the health effects were increasingly worse among the quilombolas.  Cancers, rashes, 
debilitating pain, and the disappearance of their livelihood as fisherpeople were among the 
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claims that community made to the city council members present at a June, 2015 public 
audience.  Many of these city council members present had been in attendance at the public 
audience in the city center the year before.  The quilombolas unanimously voiced that they were 
tired of having so many public audiences in which nothing got solved.  This was “conversa 
pura”64 they claimed, and nothing was going to get done if conversation was the only thing 
happening.  What was occurring in their community was ethnic genocide and environmental 
racism, said one fisherman; it was like they are not even people, exclaimed a fisherwoman.  Still, 
the resolve on the part of the quilombolas was as strong as ever.  “Se somos guerreiro, temos que 
ser mais ainda,”65 one quilombola stated firmly at the meeting.  What was certainly evident from 
these series of meetings was that there was no immediate help coming from the government.   
At the June, 2014 meeting, the woman representing the Mayor’s office at the public 
audience explained that the difficulty in moving forward with relief measures for Ilha de Maré 
was found in the fact that it was not clear who was responsible for the problems in the Bay.  
There are differences in state and municipal responsibilities, she explained, and certain things 
had to be handled by certain actors.  Furthermore, she said, with elections slotted for later that 
year, it was inevitable that all of the gains and progress made regarding Ilha de Maré’s situation 
would be undone if a new set of politicians were elected to office—“A democracia é assim,”66 
she stated.  She implored the community to be patient; things had to be negotiated—they could 
not all be done at once.  A year later, the city council members were preaching the same thing in 
the community center in Botelho in Ilha de Maré.  As there were new city council members—per 
                                                          
64 Pure conversation 
 
65 If we’re warriors, we need to be even more so 
 
66 Democracy is like this 
191 
 
the 2014 elections—they had to be given time to be able to bring their grievances to those in 
higher positions of power.  When radical actions were called for by the quilombolas—such as 
occupying the Mayor’s office until some meaningful pronouncement was made on his part—the 
politicians present urged the quilombolas to calm down.  Such actions would end with people in 
jail, they assured the meeting.  The only piece of advice and words of consolation that came from 
the politicians at the meetings for which I was present was for the communities to wait.  Based 
on the advice of the Mayor’s office and city council members, one would think that simply 
waiting could cleanse the Bay of Aratu of all its problems.   
The meetings with the city council and state government representatives, much like Rio 
dos Macacos’ meetings described above, were not aimed at having the government solve the 
community’s problems.  Ilha de Maré, through its various meetings with different government 
representatives, appealed to actors which they recognized as being invested with certain kinds of 
power, in order that they might protect important aspects of their community’s traditional 
practices.  While emphasizing the rights that they knew were due them as nominal Brazilian 
citizens, they demonstrated their understanding of the persistence of the enforced non-being of 
certain segments of Brazilian society, which is evidenced in a societal lack of respect and 
recognition of quilombo communities.  For Ilha de Maré, the public audiences functioned as 
forums in which the quilombolas demanded that the government recognize the harm they had 
caused the community and subsequently address those negative effects.  As one of the quilombo 
leaders stated at the June, 2014 audience at the city council, “Eu não 191usto de estar aqui neste 
ambiente, que é para mim, um ambiente no sentido de assessinar a vida do nosso povo.”67  For 
                                                          
67 I don’t like to be here in this environment that is, for me, an environment in the sense of killing the life of our 
people. 
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the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré, petitioning the government meant acknowledging the 
devastation that was being wrought in their community. 
In their public audiences, they frequently used the word “denunciar” to describe the 
actions they were taking in the meetings.  This suggests that one of the intended goals of the 
meetings was the shedding of light on the destructive actions (and lack of actions) of the 
government.  In so doing, they sought to confront the government directly, holding them 
accountable for the environmental devastation that was destroying their way of life.  In these 
public audiences, the quilombo seeks to dictate the terms on which they engage with the 
Brazilian state, in its various iterations.  Recognizing that state presence (in the form of the Port 
of Aratu), deleterious development projects, and misguided attempts at improving life in the 
quilombos serve to destroy the community’s way of life, Ilha de Maré comes to the public 
audiences to demand that the nature of state intervention change altogether.  The quilombolas 
thus demand that the state use its resources not for the fortification of private capital, but rather 
for the aid of the community’s way of life.  The presence of Ilha de Maré in spaces like public 
audiences, and their actions therein, should not be seen as a reliance on state power.  Rather, it 
should be seen both as a critique and an expression of quilombola agency, as their leaders stated 
in no uncertain terms that they would do whatever was necessary to protect their way of living.   
Like Rio dos Macacos, Ilha de Maré recognizes the fact that their own territoriality is 
illegible to the Brazilian state.  Receiving attention from the state would require meeting state 
actors in areas deemed legitimate by the purveyors of modern sovereignty.  As such, denouncing 
the state in spaces like public audiences meant demonstrating the hypocrisy inherent in the 
project of the Brazilian nation-state, which, despite its professed commitment to universal 
inclusion, continues to perpetrate the genocidal destruction of subjectivities it deems illegible.  
193 
 
By engaging the state in spaces that codify state power and relying on the language of 
quilombismo to demonstrate the structural racism and violence of the Brazilian government, the 
quilombolas force state actors to face the effects of anti-Black violence.  Certainly, the essence 
of quilombola life cannot be captured in statements made to government officials, as the state is 
incapable of understanding the essence of quilombismo, yet the quilombolas nonetheless took 
the opportunity to register their disgust with the state’s role in this genocide.  Along with this 
attempt at explanation, the quilombo committed itself to obstructing those functions which 
define modern capital and Brazil’s role as an extractive economy, and which the state seems so 
keen on defending.  This commitment is demonstrated in the various protests and blockades that 
quilombo enacted.  By not allowing the reproduction of the functions so vital to the continuation 
of capitalism in Bahia and Brazil’s position in the global economy, Ilha de Maré effectively 
showed—albeit very briefly—state officials and private actors what it meant to have ones way of 
life besieged.  To ensure that their own way of life continues, Ilha de Maré focuses on internal 
politics. 
Ilha de Maré, internal organization, and quilombola solidarity 
The level of internal organization demonstrated by the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré is 
truly impressive.  Ilha de Maré is a relatively large community—there are between 11,000 to 
12,000 inhabitants on the island.  Despite its size and the community’s poor infrastructure, which 
prevents quick and easy access to the different parts of the island, the quilombolas are always in 
touch with one another and involved in the community’s goings on.  Never once was an Ilha de 
Maré-led meeting, protest, or public audience poorly attended during my time in Bahia.  Instead, 
the quilombolas from Ilha de Maré constantly presented themselves as a totally united front.  At 
every meeting I attended, members from each of the different areas of the island were allowed to 
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speak and help plan the agenda for the gathering.  Their commitment to the quilombola struggle 
was not focused solely on their own community, however.  The public actions and strategy 
meetings for the quilombos of Aratu are attended by members of all the different communities, 
and Ilha de Maré often takes the lead on planning and peopling these different events.  It was 
very evident to me early on in my time among these communities that Ilha de Maré had many 
connections, not just in the Bay of Aratu and the surrounding Salvador metropolitan area, but 
also in other parts of Bahia—especially in the Recôncavo.  Through these meetings, the different 
communities were able to remain united, as the encounters served to update the various 
quilombos on recent developments, reflect on what each group needed, and plan a various 
number of actions.  In short, the focus Ilha de Maré demonstrated regarding both its own internal 
cohesion, as well as its commitment to the other communities comprising the quilombola 
struggle, established a strong foundation for the continuation of the ethic of quilombismo in 
Bahia. 
Community meetings at Ilha de Maré were sometimes used as venues to discuss the 
nature of what the quilombo was facing, and to reaffirm the community’s collective 
understanding and approach to their struggle.  In June of 2014, a community reunion was held in 
the community center in Botelho.  The injustices of the quilombo’s treatment by the state was a 
major topic of conversation during this encounter.  Invoking the state government’s preposterous 
slogan, which stated that Bahia was “A Terra de Todos Nós,”68 one of the community’s leaders 
posed the fundamental question, “Quem somos nós?”69  She went on to argue that it did not seem 
that land in Bahia was for communities like theirs at all, demonstrating, again, the ways in which 
                                                          
68 The land of all of us 
 
69 Who is us? 
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quilombo communities remain viewed and treated as non-beings through the ignoring of their 
communal needs.  The quilombos are not seen as party of the collective “we” of wider Bahia, as 
their radical Blackness sets them outside the possibility of achieving inclusion as part of the 
Brazilian nation.  Another quilombola spoke up, explaining why it was that Ilha de Maré seemed 
to be absent from the state’s understood notion of spatial occupation.  The quilombo, she 
explained, did not have a relationship of dominance or accumulation with the environment.  
Instead, they practiced a relationship of dependence and respect.  As such, she said, they 
described their environment as “ambiente,” and not “meio ambiente.”  The distinction she draws 
here is one that speaks to the unique relation the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré have to the world 
they live in.  By explaining the difference between seeing the environment as “ambiente,” as 
opposed to “meio ambiente,” this quilombola was evidencing the fact that her community did not 
see themselves as separate from the “natural world.”  Rather, the world in which they found 
themselves was comprised of both the “human” and the “natural”—they were a collective 
whole.70 
Meetings like this were important points of encounter for the community to ruminate on 
their community as a collective and vocalize their understandings of self.  These meetings set the 
groundwork for the collective gatherings that Ilha de Maré helped to coordinate with other 
quilombo communities from the Bay of Aratu, Salvador, and the Recôncavo.  During my time in 
Bahia, I was able to partake of a number of assemblies attended by Ilha de Maré and a variety of 
other social movements.  Such meetings were attended by groups like Rio dos Macacos, the 
Movimento Sem Teto da Bahia, Tororó, the quilombolas of Acupe (in the Recôncavo), and a 
                                                          
70This distinction is not necessarily self-evident, as the English translation for both “ambiente” and “meio 
ambiente” is the word “environment.”  However, “meio ambiente” connotes a natural environment that is unique 
to, or separate from humans, whereas “ambiente” connotes a whole, or rather, everything present taken as one. 
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number of other quilombola fishing communities from the Recôncavo.  At these encounters it 
was always emphasized that the connections between the various communities present needed to 
remain intact, as these quilombos and social movements saw their oppression and struggles as 
linked to each other.  This was especially underscored regarding the Recôncavo communities, 
which are geographically farther apart from the Bay of Aratu than Salvador is.  The constituents 
of these reunions highlighted the similarities of their respective situations, ultimately concluding 
that they were all treated as if they did not exist.  As a collective remedy to a collective problem, 
these meetings usually involved plans for staging actions, of which all those present planned to 
partake.  The blockade of the road leading to the Port of Aratu and the obstruction of the 
shipping routes with the fishing canoes were both products of meetings like those described 
above.  Through internal organization and the maintenance of a collective notion of struggle, 
both solidified through organized encounters, Ilha de Maré is able to stage effective actions as 
part of their struggle.  Through this close attention to self-organization, the quilombolas are able 
to pursue their own sense of justice, as institutional means of redress—like working with 
government officials—has proved far less than unsatisfactory. 
By committing to a collective notion and praxis of struggle, Ilha de Maré ensures that 
they and their fellow quilombolas, alongside whom they struggle, remain cognizant of the ways 
in which they are oppressed and active in their willingness and ability to combat this 
marginalization and create new futures for themselves.  While the actions that come from this 
organization lead to moments in which the plight and territorialities of the quilombolas are made 
temporarily visible to their oppressors, the more important issue is that the quilombo 
commitment to autonomous politics reproduces the quilombo subjectivity, in all of its variety.  
The meetings organized by Ilha de Maré—whether comprised solely of those from the island, or 
197 
 
by members of various other communities—reinforce what it means to be quilombola by 
offering a space where threats to the reproduction of the quilombo are discussed and agendas for 
the continuance of community life are planned.  Tororó, also, is an important practitioner of 
quilombola solidarity. 
Tororó and internal organization 
Quilombo Tororó, too, has found itself threatened by events taking place in the Bay of 
Aratu.  Tororó, however, finds itself in the unhappily unique position of being beset upon by 
both the Brazilian navy and the private industries arriving in the area.  In many ways, they find 
themselves fighting on two separate fronts to preserve their way of life, which, like that of Rio 
dos Macacos and Ilha de Maré is one intimately linked to the natural environment around them.  
The navy has essentially enclosed the community, building a wall around the quilombo’s living 
spaces and effectively barring the quilombolas from being able to forage, plant their fields, or 
build their houses “outward.”  This has resulted in a great decline in the self-sustaining practices 
which previously typified the community and has also necessitated that the quilombolas “cresce 
para cima.”71  The result of this last point is that Tororó resembles a typical urban favela 
community in its appearance—little green space, multi-story apartment buildings, and paved 
roads are found throughout the community.  The presence and expansion of private industries in 
the Bay of Aratu has also worked to erode Tororó’s traditional fishing practices.  While they 
have (as yet) still not felt the effects of the explosion and chemical spill that is devastating Ilha 
de Maré, the environmental degradation and topographical changes that have marked the 
presence of private interests in the area have wreaked havoc in their own right.  The quilombolas 
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explained to me that the pollution from the soy by-products of M. Dias Branco have led to a 
marked decrease in the presence of mussels and shrimp in the mangroves, while the sea floor 
was irreversibly changed to accommodate the large freighters used by Ford to ship their cars, 
which are produced in Camaçari.  The destruction of the sea floor, I am told, has meant a 
decrease in fishing yields, as the fish habitats have changed drastically.  The quilombolas still 
fish and collect mussels, shrimp, and crabs in the mangrove, as these practices remain central to 
their way of life, but the yields from such activities are much less than what they used to be.  
Given the two-pronged assault on their way of life, Tororó has had to find different ways of 
fighting to preserve their traditional practices. 
In 2014, a number of women from Tororó began renting out a small kitchen in the 
community, naming it “Tempero do Quilombo.”  They have turned the kitchen into a restaurant 
from which they serve food to community members and anyone else in the area that wants a 
meal.  About forty-five women are associated with the restaurant which is run as a cooperative.  
As it was explained to me by one of the women involved in the restaurant, “não tem dono—o 
dono é o grupo.”72  The quilombolas involved in the restaurant have had classes on making a 
variety of confections, as well as salty snacks, which can be made at home or in the restaurant 
and sold within the community as well as outside it.  Ultimately, the cooperative hopes to be able 
to purchase their own kitchen from which they would work, instead of renting the space.  In 
addition to the restaurant, the quilombolas have begun to generate income in other ways, as is 
necessary to compensate for the loss of much of the natural habitat surrounding their community. 
The quilombo currently engages in what could be called a kind of tourism.  Several 
community leaders work together to coordinate visits with outside groups that come to see the 
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quilombo and learn about the community’s history.  The quilombolas offer “classes” on a 
number of activities that are part of their history and culture.  Capoeira classes, boat tours of the 
Bay of Aratu, visits to the mangrove, acarajé classes, and workshops on making small crafts are 
all offered to visiting groups by a number of members from the quilombo.  Along with the 
classes come brief history lessons, which explain the significance of the different activities.  For 
example, the history of capoeira comprises a part of the capoeira lesson.  How African slaves 
developed the martial art as a form of self-defense, which eventually became a kind of art, only 
to be reconverted into a form of self-defense by the famous Mestre Bimba—a native to 
Salvador—is explained prior to the class beginning.  The trip to the mangrove involves passing 
some of the wells the community formerly used, which have since been filled in or polluted so 
that drinking from the wells is no longer possible.  This ignominious history continues to be 
explained upon reaching the mangrove, as the quilombolas describe how the sea and sea life used 
to be in the area.  Still, while the trip guides acknowledge that their ability to reap the sea’s 
harvest has been diminished, they do not hesitate to demonstrate their continuing commitment to 
fishing.   
Walking about the mangrove, the quilombolas demonstrate to the visitors where and how 
to find the mussels that are so central to their way of life.  It is truly impressive to see the facility 
with which these quilombolas move about the mangrove, spotting mussels that are invisible to 
the untrained eye, and prying them from the mangrove roots before placing them in the large 
buckets they carry.  Once on the mangrove, visitors are offered canoe rides in the Bay to view 
the businesses which have been such a detriment to the community.  Viewing M. Dias Branco 
from the canoes, for example, the boat guides explain what the pollution has done to the area, as 
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well as the ways in which the company’s security team tries to prevent local fisherpeople from 
fishing in the area surrounding the factory.   
In addition to the various activities offered by Tororó, the quilombolas insist on visitors 
hearing the history of their community; a lesson which has two parts to it.  First, one of the 
community elders speaks to visiting groups about the quilombo’s founders—runaway and freed 
slaves—and the foundations of the community, which are rooted in a close relationship to the 
Bay and the hills surrounding the quilombo.  The present-day struggles of the community are 
also discussed, describing the role that the navy has played in the enclosures surrounding the 
quilombo, as well as the quilombolas’ attempts to continue their way of life despite the effects of 
the environmental degradation brought by the businesses in the Bay.  Secondly, a DVD and 
booklet packet is offered to visitors, which further describes the history of Tororó.  This is a 
production that was funded by the Steve Biko Institute and released in 2015 and is now used by 
the community as a way to further divulge the story of their struggle.  This nascent tourist 
industry in the quilombo is an important source of income for the inhabitants, as their traditional 
means of making money—fishing—has been greatly threatened by the recent developments in 
the Bay.  Just like the restaurant, tourism is treated in a communal way, and the proceeds from 
the different classes are divided among those that partake of the events.  This is not to suggest, 
however, that Tororó has abandoned its traditional way of life—nothing could be farther from 
the truth. 
Like ninety percent of Brazilian quilombos, Tororó is culturally certified but is still 
awaiting INCRA to conduct the diagnostic which will determine how much territory they are 
granted by the government.  As of July, 2015, six years after receiving cultural certification, the 
quilombolas of Tororó do not know when INCRA will arrive to make the territorial study.  Thus, 
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Tororó finds itself in a similar position to many other quilombos in Brazil—culturally 
recognized, but denied territorial acknowledgement.  Because of this, the community is officially 
prohibited from conducting the foraging that is so central to their self-sustenance.  The quilombo 
relies on collecting jackfruit, mangoes, African palm, cajá, and cashew fruit.  The ability to 
continue their foraging practices and to plant their fields are the two most salient reasons Tororó 
wants its territory titled.  It is clear in its claims, however, that it does not necessarily want back 
all of the land that was once used by the community.  Some quilombo leaders believe that while 
they previously planted and foraged all of the land that the navy now occupies, they no longer 
have enough people to tend to such a large area.  They only want enough land to be able to 
practice their traditional methods of planting and gathering necessary foodstuffs.  While they 
wait for INCRA to conduct their territorial diagnostic, however, the quilombolas continue to 
preserve what traditional practices they can, in order to defend their way of life.  Among these, 
as I mention above, are fishing and gathering mussels, crabs, and shrimp.  The preservation of 
traditional religious and cultural practices also persist in Tororó.  There are two terreiros in the 
community, as well as a capoeira school, where a community member acts as the mestre.  Tororó 
also continues unique holiday celebrations.  In January, the community celebrates Dia dos Reis 
with a samba de roda73 and march led by a model cow that the children of the community 
construct.   
Another important community practice is the prevention of drug trafficking in the 
quilombo.  The suburban region of the Salvador metropolitan area is notorious for the amount of 
drug trafficking present there.  The neighborhoods close to the quilombos in the Bay of Aratu are 
frequently mentioned in the media and among locals as areas that have high levels of crime.  As 
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such, protecting their communities against these forms of violence is a major goal of all of the 
quilombos profiled here.  The leaders of Tororó were very proud in informing me that they had 
not allowed drug trafficking as a practice to take hold in their community.  They admitted that 
some members did use drugs, but that none had begun to sell them.  Keeping the distribution and 
sale of drugs away from the quilombo’s territory is clearly seen as part of preserving the internal 
integrity of the community.  Like the other quilombos discussed here, however, inter-quilombo 
solidarity is also central to Tororó. 
Tororó and quilombola solidarity 
In the same way that Ilha de Maré uses its territory as a location for strategic planning 
and reflection on quilombismo, so, too, does Tororó.  In May of 2014 I was able to attend a class 
led by an attorney who worked closely with traditional communities in Bahia, held in Tororó.  
Present at this meeting were members of Tororó, Rio dos Macacos, and Ilha de Maré.  The class 
was part of a series of meetings which sought to bring different quilombos together in order to 
strengthen their leadership base.  The meetings were each facilitated by different individuals, all 
of whom set a unique agenda for each encounter.  The five classes which were planned for 2014 
focused on society, race, gender, power, and territory.  During the day in question, the focus was 
on “society,” and the guiding question for the class was “por que existem ricos e pobres?”74  
Those present were grouped in twos and everyone discussed the day’s overarching question. 
I was paired with a quilombola woman who explicated inequality in Brazil as rooted in a 
tradition of domination.  In a profoundly clear, cogent manner, she discussed the extermination 
of the indigenous groups of Brazil as well as the enslavement of Africans, noting that these 
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continue to be practiced today.  She also mentioned the role that an organization like the Catholic 
Church has in perpetuating inequality, stating that churches explain world phenomena as being 
inevitable due to “God’s plan.”  She continued on that the poor in Brazil were taught to accept 
and expect their poverty and that laws geared toward things like agrarian reform really had the 
effect of further entrenching inequality.  Her explanations of these phenomena struck at once as 
both extremely well thought out and convincing.  These were topics that she had clearly reflected 
on individually and collectively with others. 
After these small group conversations, we came back to the larger group and discussed 
what we had talked about.  Other people discussed wealth distribution, noting that the wealthy 
never redistributed what they had; that poverty was an age-old question, as evidenced in slavery, 
de-valued labor, and forced employment both globally and in Brazil; that legacies of poverty are 
difficult to overcome, as rich people are generally born rich and poor are born poor.  Still another 
woman opined that it was always made to seem that the patrão had worked hard, but that you had 
not—and that society was always explained in a way that made governing and running 
businesses seem as if they were too complicated for regular people.75  In this sense, she 
explained, poverty is a political decision.   
Discussing the quilombos’ relation to poverty, the class facilitator explained that he saw 
the quilombos of Aratu as existing semi-independently of the capitalist system.  He posed a 
question to the group: How did they see themselves in relation to money?  Nearly everyone in 
                                                          
75“Patrão” is the Portuguese word for patron.  The history of patronage in Brazil is an important one, as it harkens 
back to slavery and partially explains attitudes taken by poor citizens and wealthy employers and politicians 
toward one another.  Employers are usually seen as a kind of father figure—a benevolent actor whose patronage 
makes their workers beholden to them.  In this formulation, workers are supposed to be thankful and deferent to 
their patron.  This relationship is evidenced in the statements by the quilombola mentioned above, who argues 
that the patrão is always cast as a hard worker who takes care of the difficult tasks which apparently prove 
unwieldy to the poor worker. 
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the room began describing the difference between the quilombos’ relation to money and the 
favelas’ relation to money.  In the favelas, they said, one would die without money, but in 
traditional communities it was a different story.  One quilombola woman, for instance, explained 
that she could go about fifteen days without using or needing money, and she would do just fine.  
As one of the quilombolas succinctly explained, “Se não tiver, não morre.”76  Another 
quilombola clarified that it was not possible to live indefinitely without money, just that they 
were not as dependent on it as were people that lived in favelas.  She went on, however, that their 
communities were becoming increasingly dependent on money for things that they did not need 
to purchase in the past.  Items like fish and natural gas still did not need to be purchased, because 
these communities fished and could use firewood in place of gas.  However, the quilombos 
needed to increasingly purchase other foodstuffs and drinking water—a symptom of the 
combination of enclosures and environmental degradation—as well as medicine, clothes, 
transportation, and leisure activities.  The reliance on purchased goods was eroding certain 
aspects of their traditional way of life, they said. 
For instance, whereas these communities were formerly self-sufficient regarding food, 
they now relied on the purchase of food like bread.  They noted that the introduction of these 
kinds of processed foods were leading to their communities becoming obese and sick.  Another 
factor contributing to the increasing role of money in the quilombos’ life is consumerism, 
propagated by media images among the community youth.  Like the meetings and protests 
coordinated by Ilha de Maré, the course that Tororó hosted in their community offered an 
important space for the quilombolas of Aratu to meet and discuss the causes and meanings of 
their struggle.  This meeting, and the subsequent classes attended by the community, give the 
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quilombos the opportunity to further analyze their collective situation and reflect on what is 
important for them moving forward.  These meetings are but one example of Tororó committing 
its time and energy to helping the cause of other quilombos. 
The leaders of Tororó played a significant role in bringing attention and assistance to Rio 
dos Macacos in the late 2000s.  Some of those familiar with the situation claim that, had it not 
been for the role Tororó played in helping Rio dos Macacos bring its case to the public’s 
attention, Rio dos Macacos might not exist today.  Tororó helped Rio dos Macacos start the 
process of officially becoming a quilombo, and petitioned for the food aid which is temporarily 
necessary for Rio dos Macacos, given the destruction of their crops.  Rio dos Macacos needed 
this help, I was told, because they were largely ignorant of their constitutional rights as a 
quilombo community77.  Tororó clearly remains committed to the causes of their fellow 
quilombolas, putting their time and energy into protecting the territorial integrity of other 
communities.  This takes different forms, including hosting meetings where quilombos, as a 
collective, can discuss and analyze their situation, as well as working to bring the struggles of 
other quilombos to the attention of the public institutions that can aid their cause.  The quilombos 
of Aratu, while unique in their own ways, all demonstrate similarities in the oppression they face 
as well as in their methods of struggle.  Furthermore, the quilombos articulate their struggles as 
part of the same cause. 
When discussing the various articulations of the quilombola struggle in Bahia, it was 
commonplace to hear members of one community reference other quilombos as their own.  For 
                                                          
77 Interestingly, while Tororó helped Rio dos Macacos garner the national attention that has made it so 
newsworthy to the public of Bahia and Brazil, I have found almost no journalistic accounts of the case of Tororó 
and what they are going through as a community. 
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example, quilombolas from Ilha de Maré would use the term “a gente”78 when describing the 
predicament and actions taking place in Rio dos Macacos.  Quilombolas from the Recôncavo 
were mainstays at the public audiences for Rio dos Macacos and Ilha de Maré, where they 
championed the causes of their brethren from the Bay of Aratu and discursively linked the 
situations of the quilombos of Aratu with those of their own region.  Actions were always 
planned among quilombo communities—no quilombo ever scheduled or enacted a protest, public 
audience, or strategy meeting without the presence of quilombolas from other communities.  
Even in the case of Rio dos Macacos’ impromptu protest outside the gate of the naval villa, 
members from Tororó and Ilha de Maré presented themselves as soon as they were notified.  The 
approach taken by the quilombos of Aratu clearly evidences a common struggle among the 
communities.  This struggle is not bound by geographical proximity, as the quilombos in 
question also maintain a close relationship to the communities in the Recôncavo, some hours 
away.  What remains central to the quilombos in the Bay of Aratu is the recognition of the reality 
of the zone of non-being and the never-ending commitment to acknowledging and defending 
Black humanity.  Quilombismo continues to inform the lived politics of the quilombos in the Bay 
of Aratu, despite the persistence of global anti-Black violence and its variants found in Bahia and 
Brazil, more generally. 
When the quilombolas of Ilha de Maré remain steadfast in their endeavors to protect the 
mangrove from further pollution, they are both defending the environment from which they have 
come as well as struggling to maintain the conditions in which their children can continue their 
quilombola lifestyle.  When members of Rio dos Macacos refuse to accept government land 
proposals that confiscate the majority of their territory, they are not only attempting to conserve 
                                                          
78 Literally “the people.”  This is colloquially used to me “us.” 
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the territorial expanse of their community, but seeking to ensure that the future generations will 
have sufficient space in which to territorially reproduce themselves.  Tororó continues to practice 
their fishing and foraging despite the negative effects of the navy’s enclosures and environmental 
degradation. 
In this struggle, the actions of the quilombos are the most active and conspicuous 
elements of the drive to preserve the territorial conditions of Radical Black Geographies and 
present-day marronage.  This is significant for the fact that these communities, largely led by 
women, are actively staking a claim to the right and duty to protect their children and their 
children’s future, and, as such, claiming a position of radical motherhood. 
What makes this subjectivity unique is that, in addition to demanding the ability to 
protect the Black lives that they brought into the world, these subjectivities are not based on the 
normative notions of family, domesticity, labor, or rational existence that underpin the Western 
and notion of politics and being.  Instead, the role of the quilombos is to protect the open 
possibilities that emerge from the persistence of quilombismo, a commitment that has persisted 
for centuries.  The ethic of quilombismo continues to privilege Black life amidst a society 
structured on the necessity of Black social and physical death and has done so since the 
communities’ inception centuries ago.  In the Bay of Aratu, quilombismo is propagated by those 
who reject the condition of non-being forced onto Afro-descendant populations, and who seek to 
protect their loved ones by taking up the responsibility of defending their territory.  This struggle 
involves the defense of physical space, the reproduction of socio-spatial relations, and the 
securing of the lives of their children.  That is, continuing the ethic of quilombismo involves 
taking hold of all that is denied the Black in the modern epoch.  By assuming the ability to create 
territories that are, at their core, alternatives to the anti-Blackness of modernity, the Quilombos 
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from the Bay of Aratu present a case of modern-day marronage and, as such, an alternative to the 
extractivist, anti-Black sovereign approach of present-day Brazil.  By engaging with these 
communities’ territorialities and methods of struggle, one can see the viability of existences that 
both value Black life and create the conditions for a politics not dependent on non-being and its 
attendant violence. 
Quilombola obstruction of the oppressive elements of society takes multiple forms.  
Using the space and time of public audiences to demonstrate the quilombo’s capoeira and dance 
traditions, for instance, offers an opportunity to assert the importance of the community’s culture 
and history amidst a setting aimed at eliminating those same phenomena.  Blocking the Port of 
Aratu and the naval villa are moments in which the spatial capability of these supposed non-
beings are briefly acknowledged by their oppressors.  The quilombolas fleetingly stop being a-
spatial precisely because they temporarily hinder some of the actions which bring modern 
subjects into being—namely sovereign legal procedures, the perpetuation of capitalist 
accumulation and the reification of the modern family.  In this way, these quilombos engage in 
tactics similar to those of contemporary Latin American social movements—occupying public 
space to register their discontent and assert their political and territorial claims (Reyes 2012; 
Zibechi 2012).  This, however, is not sufficient to preserve the unique quilombola existence, nor 
is it capable of breaking the relations of modern governance or capitalist production.  As the case 
of the Black Movement and its subsequent influences show, visibility alone leads to cooptation.  
It is because of that realization that the relations internal to the quilombos, which manifest 
themselves through, among other things, unique labor and gender practices, are so important to 
the continuation of quilombismo. 
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Conclusion 
The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu demonstrate the ways in which modern political 
economic formations continue the violence of the Middle Passage and colonialism in the present 
day and the manners in which Black actors continue to create alternatives to that violence.  As 
occurred during European colonization, those of African and indigenous descent in Brazil 
continue to be understood and treated as inhuman and unevolved “Others,” while their spatial 
expressions remain viewed as indicative of “empty” space.  These populations and their 
geographies are therefore subjected to a variety of practices of erasure by the Brazilian state and 
those private corporations that continue the accumulation of land and capital that is necessary for 
the perseverance of capitalism and sovereignty.  These take form in specific practices.  The 
community of Rio dos Macacos has been habitually displaced by the Brazilian navy for the past 
five decades.  While the navy’s original presence in the area predates the arrival of industry and 
shipping in the area, the naval base, dam, and villa are all cast as being part of a security 
apparatus necessary for the protection of the Aratu Industrial Center and the Port of Aratu, both 
late 20th century products of Brazil’s attempt at “modernizing” their economy.  The Brazilian 
navy’s insistence that they not only remain, but expand, in the area is a clear example of the 
Brazilian state’s commitment to protecting and propagating the presence of capital in the Bay of 
Aratu, despite its effects on the communities living in the area.  This commitment is part of a 
larger national involvement in specific political economic practices. 
Both the Industrial Center and the Port remain important aspects of Brazil’s larger role in 
the global economy, as both serve as spaces of fabrication and circulation of commodities that
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make up a part of Brazil’s commitment to extractive practices.  By manufacturing and serving as 
a point of distribution of materials such as biofuels, petroleum products, metals, and natural gas,
both the CIA and Port of Aratu help to entrench Brazil in its commitment to the extraction of 
natural resources as its primary means of income.  Partaking of such practices reveals present-
day iterations of the meio técnico-científico described by Milton Santos, which relies on science 
and technique to remodel and integrate territory, as is clearly being done in the practices of 
manufacturing and shipping (Santos 1993, 35-36).  While Rio dos Macacos has felt the effects of 
the state’s desire to protect these extractive industries and spread the meio técnico-científico, Ilha 
de Maré suffers the consequences of the pollution that accompanies a reliance on such practices, 
while Tororó remains oppressed on both registers. 
The Port of Aratu is a site of shipping that connects Brazil, and Bahia more specifically, 
to the global economy.  Companies from all over the world ship through the Port of Aratu, 
loading and unloading a variety of manufactured products, metals, chemicals, and fuels, linking 
Brazil’s national resources and territory to a number of locations both within and outside of Latin 
America (CODEBA 2016).  The pollution and environmental degradation that the shipping and 
manufacturing has brought to the region is unquestionable.  While the oil spill of 2013 remains 
the most stark example of the negative effects of shipping for Ilha de Maré, the presence of 
shipping and industry in the area has been detrimental to the quilombo’s way of life for decades, 
as it has adversely affected not only the marine life in the area, but the ability of the quilombolas 
to farm and forage, as well.  In Tororó, community members have been repeatedly displaced to 
make room for the Brazilian navy, just as they have in Rio dos Macacos.  They have also felt the 
negative effects of shipping and industry, seeing their mangroves and shellfish disappear, and 
having the sea floor near their community dredged for the benefit of the Port of Aratu.  Despite 
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the devastation these factors have brought to the three quilombo communities, the Brazilian state 
continues to engage in behaviors that adversely effect the quilombolas; treating the communities 
as if they were empty spaces. 
While the state has outright ignored the plight of Ilha de Maré and Tororó regarding the 
effects of pollution and environmental degradation in the Bay of Aratu, state organs like 
INCRA—that ultimately have the power to observe and delimit quilombo territory—have sought 
to destroy the politics of Rio dos Macacos through nominal territorial recognition.  Instead of 
respecting Rio dos Macacos’ historical presence on the land and the community’s clear 
commitment to realizing a unique territoriality, INCRA has insisted on setting its own definition 
of quilombo territory.  This is not aberrant behavior on the part of INCRA—indeed, Brazilian 
legislation dictates that the state must have the ultimate say in defining the parameters of a 
quilombo community—yet it nonetheless shows the national subordination of a quilombola 
subjectivity to “rational” modern actors.  While the Brazilian state portrays itself as “respecting” 
quilombo communities, it maintains that Rio dos Macacos should not and need not have access 
to traditional fishing and farming sites; it refuses to acknowledge that Ilha de Maré is facing any 
adverse conditions, much less a catastrophic assault on its very existence; it holds Tororó in 
limbo by promoting shipping and military expansion in the region and not moving to title the 
community’s land. 
By preventing Rio dos Macacos from having access to fishing sources and land amenable 
to farming, Brazilian state entities ensure that the quilombo will remain dependent on things like 
state food aid or be forced to partake of capitalist modes of production to secure their means of 
subsistence.  Furthermore, the insistence on having Rio dos Macacos accept state involvement 
through the guise of development projects pending territorial recognition, signals the state’s 
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intent to “modernize” the quilombo, through direct state involvement.  In addition to this, the 
quilombos’ endeavor to prevent the domination of nature and spread of the meio técnico-
científico also marks their spatial capacity as null.  The case of Ilha de Maré shows how the 
decision to remain independent of the meio técnico-científico also casts one as a non-being.  By 
protesting this capitalist mode of production, Ilha de Maré is forced to work to prevent the ever-
accumulating capitalist machine while receiving essentially no legal recognition of their struggle.  
Still, these communities remain steadfast in their commitment to protecting their autonomy and 
articulating current forms of marronage qua quilombismo. 
By identifying as quilombos and committing themselves not only to each other, but to the 
wider struggle of quilombo communities, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu draw on the 
histories, and continue the legacies of, maroon settlements in Brazil and more widely.  Contrary 
to the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which emerged under the assumption that quilombos were 
inexistent things of the past, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu show that “the term quilombo 
itself does not refer only to historical facts and past events; each day it acquires new meanings” 
(Leite 2012, 250-251).  At the core of these quilombos’ struggles is the desire to create a world 
not based on a social and political order of domination (Theodoro et al. 2015, 219) but rather on 
relations of cooperation, justice, equality, and respect (Nascimento 1980, 160).  In their everyday 
practices, the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu reject the forms of anti-Blackness that 
materialize in present-day Brazil.  The anti-Black violence of Bahia manifests itself in myriad 
ways.  In this dissertation I have focused on the ways that the quilombolas have sought to create 
territories independent of sovereign violence, gendered marginalization, the hyper exploitation of 
labor, participation in the global capitalist economy, and a reliance on the state to ultimately 
define their territory.  The quilombolas’ territorialities are more than simple rejections of 
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prevailing social, economic, and political norms.  Far from negative forms of freedom—or 
freedom from something—these communities evidence a commitment to building and creating 
the world in which they want to live. 
The quilombos wage their struggles in a variety of locations and through a variety of 
activities.  In state and federal public audiences they reject state insistence on defining their 
territory and denounce the genocidal behavior of state actors; in the streets of Salvador they 
obstruct the mundane activities of urban life to draw attention to their situations; in the spaces of 
the quilombos they continue to plant and cultivate the land, despite state destruction of their 
crops; in the spaces of capital circulation they prevent the the continuation of commodity 
exchange; in their community centers they painstakingly analyze their conditions of oppression 
and reflect on the possibilities of how to achieve a future for their people.  In short, in their 
struggle for the continuation of their expressions of quilombismo, the Quilombos from the Bay 
of Aratu create tools, theories, and new realities on an everyday basis (Theodoro et al. 2015, 218-
219).  Quilombo praxis, then, demonstrates the emergence of a recomposition of humanity 
(Miranda et al. 2015, 31) as well as a focus on avoiding the fixed, determinate endings on which 
modernity depends (Roberts 2015, 174).  Quilombismo, as an iteration of present-day 
marronage, and evidenced in the actions and reflections of the Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu, 
focuses not on realizing a static “end goal” or condition, but rather “an approach to and vision of 
politics that puts the accent on the process, rather than on the end result” (Vargas 2008, 142).  
The quilombos are quilombos precisely because they remain committed to constantly analyzing 
the effects of global anti-Blackness and creating ways of life that recognize and respect the lives 
of those deemed non-beings.  In the specific case presented above, the quilombos wage their 
struggles against prevailing modes of global capital, which presently manifest in various forms 
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of extractive practices.  The Quilombos from the Bay of Aratu demonstrate a present-day form of 
quilombismo by not only critiquing, but refusing the modes of accumulation and displacement 
that accompany these extractive industries.  This mode of existence refuses to seek being through 
engagement with the state or partaking of “rational” modes of production (Leite 2008, 973; 975-
976).  Present-day quilombismo continues the struggle started centuries ago by the original 
maroons, establishing viable ways of life through a commitment to constantly asserting the 
dignity and humanity of everyone.  This modern-day marronage therefore presents us with an 
alternative to the reliance on the domination of the natural world, capitulation to globalized 
capital, and subjugation of global populations deemed “Other.”  An open approach such as this is 
vital to creating possibilities not dependent on domination and gratuitous violence.  Indeed, as 
part of the wider approach of Black Geographies, quilombismo and marronage truly suggest that 
“Black geographies will play a central role in the reconstruction of the global community” 
(McKittrick and Woods 2007, 6).
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